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Glossary of Non-English Language Terms  
askari Swahili for ‘soldier’, ‘guard’ or ‘police officer’ 
  
  
dholuka Nubian traditional dance, accompanied by music 
   
 
gurbaba Traditional Nubian dress for women, involving an elaborate 
and bulky embroidered skirt worn under a dress tied in a 
particular fashion 
gurusa A Nubian bread 
   
 
kwekwe Swahili for ‘blemishes’  
kitu kidogo Swahili for ‘something small’, meaning a bribe 
   
 
larbein Kinubi word for a celebration held 40 days after a burial 
    
madoadoa Swahili for ‘spots’ or ‘stains’ 
 
majimboism Jimbo is the Swahili word for ‘state’ or ‘region’ and 
majimboism is a political position in favour of increased 
decentralisation so that ethnic groups can dominate their own 
areas 
 
 
shags Sheng (see below) for ‘rural home’  
shamba Swahili for ‘garden’ or ‘farm’  
Sheng An extremely localised form of Swahili spoken in Nairobi 
  
  
wananchi Swahili for ‘ordinary citizens’ or ‘the people’ 
  
  
zara’ib (singular – zariba) Arabic for ‘garrison’ 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations  
Carter Commission 1933 Kenya Land Commission 
 
CEMIRIDE Centre for Minority Rights and Development  
DC District  Commissioner 
 
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union  
KANU Kenya African National Union  
KENSUP Kenya Slum Upgrading Program 
 
KNCE Kenya Nubian Council of Elders  
KNCHR Kenya National Commission of Human Rights 
 
MCA Member of the County Assembly  
MP Member of Parliament  
NaRC National Rainbow Coalition 
 
NGO Non-Governmental  Organisation  
ODM Orange Democratic Movement 
 
OSJI Open Society Justice Initiative  
UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency 
Acknowledgements  
First and foremost my utmost gratitude goes to the many people who participated in my 
research in Kenya. I am humbled by the generosity of time, information and spirit that I 
encountered with the Nubian community in Kibera, Eldama Ravine, Nakuru, Kericho, Kibos 
and Kisii. In particular I owe a great debt to Rajab Bilale Osman and Hassan S. Abdallah for 
their friendship and guidance. My most profound and sincere hope for this book is that it  
meets your expectations. Special thanks to Yusuf Ibrahim Diab, Issa Abdul Faraj, Ibrahim 
Athman and the Kenyan Nubian Council of Elders; to Jamaldin Yahya; to the Kibra Land 
Committee; to Ismail Ramadhan and Community Rights Forum of Kibera; and to Zidu Guwa, 
Youth Reform Self Help Group, Beledia Nubi, the Haiba foundation and the Nubian Youth 
Consortium for receiving me into your community and guiding my way. Very special thanks 
to Adam Hussein Adam at the Open Society Initiative in Eastern Africa, without whom I  
could never have got this project off the ground; and to Korir Sing’Oei of CEMIRIDE   
(among other initiatives and roles), without whom this book would contain many more errors. 
I  owe  sincere  and  earnest  thankfulness  to  Paul  Muldoon  and  Michael  Janover,  who  were 
wonderful intellectual interlocutors throughout this process, and  without whom  writing this 
book would not have been nearly as satisfying or rewarding. 
I am obliged to many of my colleagues who supported me in various ways throughout 
the course of this research, including Simon Adams, Brad Blitz, Scott Brenton, Denise 
Cuthbert, Greg Constantine, Graeme Counsel, Johan de Smedt, Peter Geschiere, Fiona  
Haines, Geoffrey Hawker, Paul James, Douglas Johnson, Adrian Little, Gabrielle Lynch, 
Maureen Lynch, Bronwen Manby, Kate Macdonald, Terry Macdonald, Shelley Marshall and 
Matt Tomlinson. I am particularly indebted to David Anderson at the Oxford African Studies 
Centre for hosting me as a Visiting Student for the 2011 Trinity term. In Kenya, my thanks 
goes to Ambreena Manji and the British Institute in Eastern Africa for guiding me through the 
challenges of obtaining research permission in Kenya; and to Antoinette Kankindi and 
Wambui Kariuki for the helpful and fruitful affiliation with the Strathmore Governance 
Centre. 
This project would not have been possible without the financial support of the Centre 
for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, and the Layne Beachley Aim for the 
Stars Foundation, for which I am extremely grateful. Similarly, I am appreciative of the 
invaluable administrative support of Sue Stevenson, Gayle Whyte, Anna Davis, David Bell, 
Colin Rose, the staff at the Matheson, Baillieu, Bodleian and Deakin libraries, and the staff at 
the Kenya National Archives. Many thanks also to Muchiri for the Kiswahili lessons. 
For their extraordinary friendship, personal and intellectual support, and their tolerance 
of my constant distraction, thanks to James Clinch, Greg Deacon, Sophie de Feyter, Christina 
Kenny, Tanya Lyons, Kudzai Matereke, Kate McGannon, Cameron Nolan, Michelle Osborn, 
Caitlin Wilks, and my family. Extra special thanks to Debra Smith and Kiran Pienaar for 
positively every kind of support imaginable. 
Thanks to Penny Farthing Espresso and the Brunswick East Project for all the coffee 
and desk space. 
Special thanks to Rob Sorsby and the very helpful editorial and production teams at 
Ashgate. 
And finally, my most profound thanks to Andrew Stapleton, who sits next to me as I 
write this and who has been cracking me up, propping me up, editing and indexing through 
the longest and hardest parts of this project. 
This rather long list is testament to the extent to which this work is not mine alone, 
though I take full responsibility for any of its flaws. 
  
An earlier version of Chapter 2 was published as ‘Statelessness, identity cards and 
citizenship as status in the case of the Nubians of Kenya’, Citizenship Studies, 18 (1) (2014): 
15-28. Earlier versions of parts of Chapter 3 have been published as ‘Indigeneity and Kenya’s 
Nubians: seeking equality in difference or sameness?’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 51 
(2) (2013): 331-354 and ‘Counting as citizens: The case of the Nubians in the 2009 Kenyan 
census’, Ethnopolitics 10(2) (2011): 205 – 218. I am grateful to the editors and publishers of 
Citizenship Studies, the Journal of Modern African Studies and Ethnopolitics for allowing the 
amended reproduction of parts of those works here. 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Mahmood1  is a 30-year-old Kenyan Nubian living in Kibera, one of Nairobi’s largest   
informal settlements. Mahmood’s great grandfather was a soldier in the King’s African Rifles 
in the early days of Kenya colony, and received numerous awards from the British authorities 
for his service. As a dependent of the soldier, Mahmood’s father had been able to live 
peacefully in the homestead his father built in 1914 in Kibra, as it was called then, at that time 
a peaceful area of forest and small gardens or shambas. The postcolonial generations of 
Mahmood’s and other Nubian families are struggling to fit in and secure all the relevant 
aspects of citizenship on a par with other Kenyans. Mahmood acquired his Kenyan identity 
(ID) card three years ago, nine years after he should have. During that time, he missed out on 
an opportunity to study at tertiary level and on an educational trip to Germany as the guest of  
a German non-governmental organisation (NGO) who admired his self-help group’s urban 
garden. He is not yet married because he hasn’t been able to get secure employment and save 
enough money. Because he is a Nubian he had to present extraordinary documents to the 
authorities before they would believe he was born in Kenya to Kenyan parents. He could not 
get the documentation he was after – his mother did not have a birth certificate and his family 
had no land title documents for the now small patch of land on which their house is located in 
Kibera. His ID card application was repeatedly rejected then lost. Out of frustration he gave  
up chasing it for a few years. He was tired of wasting his time, and of the offensive and 
humiliating encounters with state officials who asked if he was a refugee. In any event, secure 
land tenure seemed a greater guarantee of physical and political security in Kenya than ID 
cards. That and recognition in the list of Kenya’s 42 – the Nubians hoped 43 – tribes. 
The future looks slightly brighter for Mahmood’s six-year-old niece, Amina. Her 
mother, Mahmood’s sister, got an ID card at the same time as Mahmood and has worked hard 
  
1 Mahmood and others mentioned here are fictional characters, but their circumstances are real, constituted by a 
blend of those encountered among different families during the research for this book. 
to acquire all the relevant documents so Amina does not face the same problem when she 
turns 18. The authorities, at least for now, seem to be more amenable to issuing ID cards to 
Nubians. In Kibera, and some other Nubian settlements up country, they allow Nubian elders 
to sit on a vetting committee to verify the identity and ancestry of ID card applicants in place 
of having to supply the impossible documents. Lately, though, young people are being 
referred to central committees again and denied the opportunity to be vetted by people who 
know them. The Nubians were counted as one of 111 tribes of Kenya in the last national 
census in 2009, though popular understanding of Kenya’s ethnic makeup maintain that there 
are only 42, which doesn’t include the Nubians. No development (such as water, roads, 
sanitation, health clinics or schools) has come their way as a result of any planning the census 
is supposed to feed into. 
Most importantly, without secure land title, Mahmood and his family live in a state of 
anxiety about their belonging in Kenya, indeed at times about their physical security there. 
Even though they rustled up enough money to buy a small plot of land in peri-urban Nairobi, 
periodic episodes of inter-ethnic violence outside (even inside) Nairobi make them scared to 
move there. They fear they would be in some other tribe’s territory and therefore vulnerable 
so the plot remains undeveloped. In any event, their home is Kibera. Their friends and 
extended kin are there, weddings are held there and their ancestors are buried there. 
Whenever an issue arises in the community, a meeting is convened in Kibera. Nevertheless, 
unlike most other tribes of Kenya, they have neither formal nor informal protections of the 
area as ‘their own’. 
Importantly, Mahmood’s self-help group is also in Kibera and Mahmood is proud that 
they have one of the largest urban gardens in any of Nairobi’s slums. A number of other 
initiatives, including a water tank and toilets, which provide essential services for the 
surrounding mostly Nubian families (albeit at a price) also instils in Mahmood and his self- 
help group a sense of pride. This group is the only Nubian self-help group in Kibera that has 
proper registration documents. Other groups typically lack the organisational capacity to 
arrange registration and some fear they will be discriminated against because they’re Nubian. 
This sometimes makes it hard for the other groups to participate in wider civil society 
activities like applying for project funding grants. As well as the formal barrier of non- 
registration, many Nubians also feel unwelcome in wider civil society activities. Ali, the 
leader of a different self-help group in Kibera, finds it alienating when people ask who the 
Nubians are at civil society forums. Mahmood, though, doesn’t mind – he takes pride in 
explaining Nubian cultural traditions and heritage to those who haven’t heard of them. 
Rumour has it that some other self-help groups can be hired for ‘protection’ purposes. This is 
an additional source of income for the young men in these groups and sometimes the only 
form of security for Nubian families, especially those who lease out old houses to non-paying 
tenants. It is risky though. If they get caught by the police without ID cards, they run the risk 
of extortion. This practice is also the cause of a number of violent conflicts in Kibera, but 
without police protection in Nairobi’s slums, and in keeping with a broad pattern of diffusion 
of violence in Kenya, these groups are common (Katumanga 2005; Osborn 2008). 
Mahmood’s uncle, Ibrahim, was a councillor in the Nairobi City Council. Along with 
another Nubian man, Abdul, these are the first two Nubians to occupy political positions since 
the early post-independence era when there was a Nubian Member of Parliament (MP). 
Mahmood and his family admire Abdul because he is fair in his allocation of resources to 
different families in his ward. He gives educational bursaries based on need, for example, 
rather than ethnicity. However, Mahmood’s brother personally benefitted from Ibrahim’s  
more nepotistic approach, having gained a sought after salaried position in the National Youth 
Service (interestingly, he had no ID card at the time, but Ibrahim was able to help him with 
that). Ibrahim also made some progress a few years ago in using political avenues to move 
towards secure land title for at least a portion of the land in Kibera, largely because of his 
political association with senior politicians. The actual title, however, is yet to eventuate. 
The 2013 election was an important one for Mahmood – the first in which he could 
vote because he finally had an ID card. Because the Nubians are so few compared to other 
tribes in Kibera, it is impossible for them to elect ‘one of their own’ even as an MP, but 
Abdul was elected as a member of the Nairobi County Assembly. In terms of other forms of 
political engagement, Mahmood’s former neighbour, Abu, started a new lobby group which 
made a submission to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission set up after the post- 
election violence of 2007–2008; quite an accomplishment for a community relatively 
inexperienced in such formal political engagement.2 Abu and his group hope this will be a 
 
more promising path to secure redress for the historical injustice of the expropriation of the 
vast majority of land in the original boundaries of Kibera. However, as for all the other 
communities in Kenya who made similar submissions, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission, despite finally releasing its report in 2013, has had little tangible impact on the 
issues raised in the submission. As an alternative, Abu and some of the younger members of 
his group who have good media skills are slowly getting the Kenyan public to take notice of 
the Nubians by posting videos of Nubian culture on YouTube and writing newspaper 
editorials. Mahmood, though, at only age 30, has become too jaded to bother much with this 
or other more political groups and prefers to focus his energies on the more localised 
activities of his self-help group. 
In contemporary political communities all over the world we find groups of people, 
like the Nubians, who are formally citizens but who more closely resemble non-citizens in 
their limited access to rights, limited opportunities to participate in political life, and in the 
limited security and weakness of their political membership. How are we to understand and 
address the injustices of the myriad people who fall into this category? This book addresses 
this pressing political question through an in-depth case study of the Nubians of Kenya and 
by building on a recent body of theoretical scholarship which attempts to understand what 
citizenship means when we are confronted with the realities of marginalisation. 
This book is motivated by four key concerns. The first of these is also the most 
obvious. Our commitments to equality and democracy are significantly threatened in very 
basic ways by the longstanding presence of people in our communities, like Mahmood, who 
  
2 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s mandate is to address historical injustices perpetrated 
between independence in 1963 and the end of the 2008 violence. 
are not afforded the same quality of citizenship as others. This threat is significantly 
complicated by the empirical character of inequalities, be they in the liberal democracies of  
the global North or a younger nation like Kenya. This study demonstrates that inequality is 
characterised by flux and inconsistency. The categories of people who experience lesser 
citizenship, the depth of the inequalities, the axes on which they are manifest (status, 
membership, rights, political participation), their duration, their heritability, their geography, 
their consistency across time and within categories of persons, all vary and change regularly,  
in significant and more minor ways. This story is about the Nubians, but this kind of story – 
about deficits in citizenship as status, imbricated in far more complex, contradictory, 
unpredictable, fluctuating norms and practices of citizenship, politics, belonging and rights –  
is one that can be found in many parts of the world. The difficulty in accounting for inequality 
among citizens in democracies at all, let alone its untameable character, is a longstanding 
problem in political theory and research. 
My second concern is also a longstanding concern of democratic theorists: what is the 
relationship between ethnicity and citizenship, and what should or, more modestly, what  
could it be? All major traditions of democratic theory hold great fears for what ethnicity will 
bring to the polity. For civic-republicans ethnicity is characterised by parochialism and 
favouritism that will undermine civic allegiance and national cohesion. For liberals, ethnicity 
is a form of difference than can only undermine equality, understood as universalism in 
sameness. Communitarians are more willing to entertain the notion of some role for ethnicity, 
seeing community as the most effective way to shore up liberal values. Ultimately, though, 
communitarians typically also see ethnicity as undermining democracy because it is 
insufficiently liberal, unable to foster a sufficient degree of universal equality. The deeply 
divided and sometimes violent character of polities like Kenya often bears out these fears. 
Ethnic diversity, not problematic in and of itself, deteriorates into tribalism and the moral 
obligations between ethnic members far outweigh those between citizens, enabling ‘big men’ 
to pillage the state’s resources to benefit ‘their own’. At the same time, however, democracies 
characterised by ethnic diversity also see ideas of social justice, social cohesion and 
interpersonal responsibility taught and learnt in the ethnic community, and sometimes 
translated across ethnic groups (Lonsdale 1994, 2004; Klopp 2002; Werbner 2004). 
Unfortunately, the multidimensional nature of ethnicity is not always very well dealt with in 
either the Africanist or the democratic theory literature. The Africanist literature has only a 
handful of voices attempting to grapple with the good and the bad of ethnic politics (Berman 
1998; Ekeh 1975; Klopp 2002; Lonsdale 1994, 2004; Lynch 2011c; Werbner 2004). I build   
on the invaluable foundation these thinkers provide but this remains a nascent area of research 
and theory. To the extent that contemporary democratic theory addresses ethnicity, this is best 
done by the literatures on the politics of recognition (Taylor 1994) and multiculturalism 
(Kymlicka 1995).3  Debates in these literatures still remain unresolved, as scholars continue to 
 
disagree about which interpersonal practices and institutional arrangements are most 
appropriate for dealing with ethnic (and other) difference. Furthermore, this literature 
currently lacks the specificity required to address ethnic diversity of the longstanding and 
non-migrant, kind we find in Kenya (Kymlicka 2004). Finally, with very few exceptions 
(Ndegwa 1997; Smith 2013), mainstream citizenship theory (as a particular branch of 
democratic theory) has rarely been deployed as a resource to understand ethnic politics with 
any rigour. This book cannot, of course, meet the dizzying challenge of reconciling ethnicity 
and democracy. Nevertheless, it makes a modest attempt to contribute to the discussion. 
The third of my motivating concerns for this book is less familiar than these two 
colossal political projects. In contradistinction to much of the literature on citizenship that is 
concerned or optimistic about globalisation (and especially migration), I am concerned, but 
still cautiously optimistic, about increased localisation. We are increasingly constructing our 
political communities, including of course their boundaries, not only in reference to 
cosmopolitan ideals of inclusiveness, but with much more parochial and territorial discourses 
of indigeneity and autochthony (literally to be ‘born of the soil’). Perhaps (some say likely) 
  
3 Indigenous politics is also a feature of the literature on the politics of recognition, however, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is an indigeneity of a different kind to that found in Kenya. 
because of all this globalising and mobility, attachments to origins and soil are becoming 
more and more salient (Appadurai 2006; Malkki 1992). As Peter Geschiere (2009) so 
insightfully observes, though this tendency is so easily identifiable in Africa, for example in 
the Ivory Coast where citizens literally use the term autochthon and are forced to return to 
their home villages to register themselves, it is also present in Europe where the new Right in 
countries like France, Italy and the Netherlands brandish similar slogans in order to maintain 
some (imaginary) sense of national homogeneity in the face of increasing immigration from 
far-flung countries. This is a worrying trend to the extent that it tends to lead to exclusivism 
and territorialism, too often culminating in violence.4  Nevertheless, socially cohesive and 
 
tight-knit local communities can provide the context in which an engaged citizenry can 
develop through robust debate surrounding the terms of ‘right’ and justice, participation in 
self-governance, and practices that make rights and responsibilities meaningful. Here I 
attempt to grapple with this very delicate tension. 
The fourth and final motivating concern is a theoretical-methodological one. Though 
the case study that forms the heart of this book is about an African community, the themes  
and the normative and theoretical questions are of much broader relevance. It is unusual to 
come across works of scholarship that critically engage ‘mainstream’ political theoretical 
debates using empirical reflections from Africa (for an exceptional example see Kymlicka 
2004). Given a history of academic scholarship on and in Africa that contributed to the 
construction of Africa as the ‘dark continent’, and Africans as occupying the bottom rung in a 
hierarchy of humanity, we are right to be self-conscious about the ways in which western 
theories are used to understand Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). With this in mind, 
scholarship about political phenomena in Africa tends to shy away from explicitly orienting 
itself to broader debates. A gulf has thus developed between mainstream theory and African 
studies. 
    
4 It is also particularly worrying in cases where it generates forms of internal domination. See Appadurai 1988. 
Yet, it seems to me that the gulf here is an unnecessary and problematic one. On the 
one hand, to treat Africa as ‘too different’ to contribute to mainstream theory is problematic 
to the extent that it posits the West as the standard against which other states and polities are 
measured, and Africa as exceptional.5 In this book, I take seriously the challenge to think of 
 
Africa not as exceptional but as part of the world (Bayart 2000). This approach enables me to 
treat Africa as every bit as able to offer insights regarding the nature of political subjectivity, 
membership and ‘right’ or justice (the questions at the heart of citizenship) as are the western 
liberal democracies which have dominated citizenship theory to date. On the other hand, 
Africa’s difference must also be taken seriously for to treat Africa as ‘not different enough’ is 
also dangerous: it runs the risk, alluded to above, of subsuming Africa’s specificity under 
‘conquering Western discourses’ (Mudimbe 1988). This leaves us in a difficult position, one 
that I posit we can only get ourselves out of by taking risks and venturing to attempt a 
scholarship that treats Africa as ‘just different enough’. 
As such, throughout this book I bring together theories not only from the West but also 
from African and Africanist scholarship on citizenship and political life, with empirical 
research on Africa, in a dialogical relation that generates important insights for both 
citizenship studies and African studies. In this way, this work is not situated outside of the 
tensions between ‘African realities’ and ‘western theories,’ but is rather one part of the plural 
and iterative process through which this tension is being worked out. As a scholarly work, the 
argument put forward in this book does attempt to impose some order on experiences and 
ideas about rights, political membership, political subjectivity and ethnicity. However, it does 
so in a way that invites further dialogue on these matters and with sympathy for the risks of 
the endeavour. 
     
5 While Asia, the Middle East and Latin America are also found wanting against this standard, Africa is, typically, 
treated as the most exceptional (Mudimbe 1988). This approach also perpetuates the fallacy of the West as itself 
homogenous and internally undifferentiated. 
Citizenship  
Prevailing attempts to deal with citizenship inequalities can helpfully be categorised into three 
areas: those which deal with migrants or outsiders, those which deal with marginalised  
insiders or citizens, and those which attempt to understand citizenship across the in/out   
divide. The challenge posed to democracy by the presence of migrants or outsiders within the 
nation has dominated citizenship studies over the last decade. The great ‘paradox of  
democratic closure’ is that the universality of human rights and the closure of a community as 
a demos are both central commitments of democracy, yet they cannot co-exist (Benhabib  
2004, 17). The presence of migrants in our democratic communities bring this paradox into 
stark relief, and so we are faced with the difficult question of what we should do with  
migrants to best honour both these commitments. Under what circumstances, and to what 
degree, should we grant migrants membership and rights in a democracy? Responses differ, 
some emphasising the need for greater openness to new members within the national 
framework albeit with more open borders (Bosniak 2006; Carens 1987, 2008), others look 
beyond the nation for mechanisms like post-national citizenship that may guarantee rights in 
other ways (Sassen 2002; Soysal 1994). Responses to these questions illuminate important  
and sometimes unanticipated aspects of contemporary citizenship practices, such as the 
exercise of political subjectivity by non-citizen migrants who claim the rights they do not   
have (McNevin 2011; Nyers 2008; Rancière 2004). 
Nevertheless, questions about citizenship status, mobility and migration do not capture 
all of the ways in which democracy is threatened by the presence of people in our political 
communities who are not equal but whose inequality is not connected to their clear outsider  
or migrant status. There is a different set of questions, equally as important for democracy, 
about what needs to change about our social and political structures in order to reduce the 
marginalisation of certain members of the community. Responding to this set of questions led 
TH Marshall (1950) to argue for the extension of social citizenship, for the enhancement of 
the welfare state to confer social and economic rights on citizens so that they can make better 
use of their (pre-existing) civil and political rights. More recently, marginalisation has been 
explored primarily through the lenses of recognition, redistribution and identity politics, 
curiously moving away, by and large, from a direct engagement with citizenship theory 
(Honneth and Fraser 2003; Taylor 1994; Young 1990, 2000).6  Instead, a different language – 
predominantly of justice – has framed engagement with the challenge marginalisation poses 
to democracy. This field has generated many crucial insights into practices of citizenship, 
particularly institutional arrangements that can facilitate such practices equally for all. 
However, perhaps because scholarship in this field tends to take legal nationality status for 
granted (the citizenship status of those in whose interests this field has emerged), this area 
does not explicitly use these insights to modify our theories of citizenship. 
In some promising and novel attempts to surpass the assumptions of either inclusion or 
exclusion, of presence or absence of status, some more recent efforts have sought to surpass 
the in/out divide. Elizabeth Cohen (2009), for example, proposes the analytical device of 
semi-citizenship, arguing that there are four orders of citizenship that can be experienced by 
those with or without status, depending on their enjoyment of different kinds of rights. This 
opens up the possibility of accounting for marginal insiders by helpfully abandoning the idea 
that legal status is the sole determinant of citizenship. However, it also goes too far in making 
the untenable suggestion that some categories of people, such as enemy combatant prisoners  
at Guantanamo Bay, who we would normally consider quite abject outsiders, can be thought 
of as citizens, albeit semi-citizens. 
More promising is Engin Isin’s (2002) desire that we consider the role of logics of 
alterity rather than logics of exclusion in our study of inequalities and citizenship deficits. 
Logics of alterity refer to the generation of Otherness. Unlike logics of exclusion, logics of 
alterity can be understood as fluctuating (people can be Other at some points but not at 
others), deployed in degrees, and deployed against apparent ‘insiders’ (those with citizenship 
status) as well as outsiders. Isin observes that all historical communities have been in part 
    
6 For an exception see Somers 2008. 
constructed by the constitutive outside not just of the foreign and distant but also of the 
internal and close, of the local. Isin (2002, 30) explains that: 
While the logics of exclusion would have us believe in zero-sum, discrete, and 
binary groups, the logics of alterity assume overlapping, fluid, contingent, 
dynamic, and reversible boundaries and positions, where agents engage in 
solidaristic strategies such as recognition and affiliation, agonistic strategies such 
as domination and authorization, or alienating strategies such  as  disbarment 
across various positions within social space … That is why it is important to 
distinguish between the logics of alterity that constitute strangers and outsiders 
as immanent identities and the logics of exclusion and enclosure that constitute 
aliens or barbarians as transitive or exterior identities. 
This approach opens up significant possibilities for linking the fields of migration studies and 
marginalisation or social inclusion, and for tackling the flux and inconsistency of inequalities. 
By acknowledging and accounting for the rather messy and iterative social relations through 
which certain people are rendered meaningful and equal members of a political community, 
while others occupy all manner of blurry positions in relation to that community, Isin  
provides a critical insight into the constitution of citizenship that enables us to far better 
account for the presence of strangers like the Nubians, who are neither clearly inside nor 
outside the polity. 
If we are to understand the case of the Nubians then we need a theory of citizenship 
that can account for inconsistencies and flux of this kind, and the sometimes minimal but 
rarely absent role of status in determining enjoyment of citizenship. The narrative of 
Mahmood and his family above indicates the extent to which their situation defies easy 
categorisation. There are inequalities but they don’t apply in consistent ways even across 
members of the same family or community. They change over time and they are not all the 
result of structural injustices, though many are. The predicament of defying easy 
categorisation is indicative not only of the deficits in the Nubians’ experience of citizenship 
but also of the deficits in the idea of citizenship. 
To think about citizenship as solely, or even predominantly, a marker of status, rights, 
membership or participation, is to preclude the possibility of fully accounting for flux and 
inconsistency. Many studies of citizenship (in)equality, wittingly or unwittingly, find 
themselves resting on one aspect of citizenship over the others and attempt to identify the 
presence or absence of citizenship on that basis. Linda Bosniak’s (2006) aliens are 
characterised primarily by the absence of status, albeit a status that ‘follows them in’ to the 
community and affects other aspects of citizenship. Cohen’s (2009) semi-citizens are defined 
primarily by the presence or absence of rights. Anne McNevin’s (2011) political subjects rest 
primarily on their performance of political acts. By scrambling for one axis on which to  
define the presence or absence of citizenship (even if it is in degrees, as McNevin’s and 
Cohen’s are), these thinkers and others are restricted in their ability to follow their otherwise 
highly insightful analyses through to their logical conclusions. In all these cases, the language 
of citizenship is stretched, perhaps beyond its best utility.7 
 
Taking my cue from Benhabib (2004), I therefore propose an analysis that relies upon 
the explicit and ‘full’ disaggregation of the component parts of citizenship without a view to 
necessarily put them back together as a whole. In The Rights of Others, Benhabib (2004) 
argues that the disaggregation of citizenship across territorial boundaries, which we observe 
most obviously in the European Union, is promising to the extent that it represents the 
proliferation of democratic allegiances and access to rights, and so long as institutions and 
boundaries are configured in (possibly new) ways that protect democracy. I agree with 
Benhabib that citizenship can be disaggregated across different territorial sites, sub- and 
supra-national, but I go further than that. Where Benhabib sees the sites of disaggregation as 
primarily territorial, I see them as potentially far more multiple than that, for example across 
social and political space, as well as physical. Furthermore, where Benhabib focuses 
 
7 A stretching well acknowledged by both McNevin (2011, 148) and Bosniak (2006, 120). 
primarily (though not exclusively) on rights, I go further again to suggest that not only rights 
but also the other components of citizenship can be disaggregated not only from geographical, 
social and political territory but also from each other. With this approach it is possible to 
appreciate the unbundling and (sometimes partial) reassembling of the components of 
citizenship in different ways, not just in different historical eras (Sassen 2006) but, also, in 
different places on various scales, both global and local. 
I call the approach to citizenship used in this book ‘full disaggregation’, in order to 
signal both my debt to Benhabib and the difference between my take and hers. Importantly, 
this approach to understanding citizenship is an advancement, rather than a critique, not only 
of Benhabib’s argument but also other influential approaches to citizenship (Bosniak 2006; 
Cohen 2009; McNevin 2011; Sassen 2006). This approach is not inconsistent with the  
insights provided by these scholars but I do hope it is clearer. At least in this case, I could not 
have made sense of the Nubians’ political condition(s) without it. 
While Benhabib is concerned about the risks that this kind of disaggregation of 
citizenship poses to the preservation and enhancement of democracy, she is also excited about 
its democratic potential. She argues that ‘cosmopolitanism, the concern for the world as if it 
were one’s polis, is furthered by such multiple, overlapping allegiances which are sustained 
across communities of language, ethnicity, religion, and nationality’ (Benhabib 2004, 174–5). 
Benhabib’s optimism is based on the observation that that the disaggregation of rights – 
specifically the increased codification of human rights at supra-national levels – can make 
more resources available for the marginalised and excluded. I neither dispute nor deny that   
we should see the promise of cosmopolitan democracy in the kind of disaggregation of 
citizenship that Benhabib describes. However, with Glover (2012), but for different reasons, I 
do think it is fruitful to recognise that disaggregation is more agonistic, fragile and uncertain 
than Benhabib’s European example suggests.8  The disaggregation of the components of 
  
 
8 It is not necessary to entirely refute Benhabib’s disaggregation thesis, as Glover does, in order to recognise that 
disaggregation of citizenship is a more agonistic, fragile and uncertain process than Benhabib describes. 
citizenship from one another and from predictable liberal democratic designations of time, 
space and persons (assembled primarily around citizenship status in a sovereign territory) can 
also have anti-democratic effects. Examples of these are explored in this book. 
The different components of citizenship can roughly be categorised as membership 
(including formal status and a broader sense of political belonging), rights, responsibilities 
and participation, linked together by political subjectivity. Within each of the components 
there are degrees of quality and depth that fluctuate over time, space and persons. The 
substance or content of the component parts (Which rights? What forms of membership? 
What forms of political participation?), as well as the relations of independence and 
interdependence that exist between them and the factors that secure them, will vary in 
different social and political contexts. An analysis of the components and the relations 
between them, therefore, requires an in-depth analysis of that social and political context. 
Of these different components, membership is the most fundamental (Arendt 1973,  
293; Benhabib 2004, 57). The dominant ordering principle for determining membership in 
political communities in contemporary times is nationality status – the primary formal marker 
that distinguishes which individuals belong to which polities. In liberal democracies it is 
through possession of nationality status that individuals achieve the pinnacle of formal 
membership and associated access to rights guaranteed by the state, as well as acquiring 
associated responsibilities such as taxation and sometimes military service. Yet, an  
ontological sense of membership in a political community, or political belonging, is felt and 
experienced in a range of contexts that far exceed interactions with state agents and the legal 
status that formalises that relationship. McNevin (2011, 15) explains: 
Political belonging can be thought of as a dynamic ordering principle that 
structures different kind of political  communities  across  time  and  space. 
Particular modes of political belonging become deeply embedded in our spatial, 
temporal,  and  embodied  ontologies.  They  contribute,  in  other  words,  to  our 
conception of who we are. In addition, they contribute to how we perceive the 
context in which we act politically and the authority we have for doing so. 
As a feature of our ontologies, our sense of political belonging therefore includes but far 
exceeds our formal relationship with the state. A sense of belonging is felt in spaces and  
places that may or may not be penetrated by the state: in bureaucratic encounters, interactions 
at decidedly political public events (election rallies, village meetings), in civil society 
organisations, in self-help groups, or in more quotidian settings – in the workplace, at school, 
in the street, at the clinic, on the bus, at a wedding. The multiple sites of citizenship (Yuval- 
Davis 1999) are often sub- or supra-national but they are not only constructed on a 
geographically determined hierarchy from local to national to supra-national, international or 
global. Rather, the sites of political affiliation are crosscutting, and not necessarily   
constrained or even shaped by geography, though certainly they can be. Political belonging is 
relevant in all these sites and, in each, a person’s sense of political belonging is evident in his 
or her decisions about whether, and how, to interact with others in these settings. Is it with   
full confidence of their legitimate right to do so? Or is it defensive and frustrated at a lack of 
recognition? Is it timid, tentative or anxious? Or is it a hopeless or angry withdrawal? As   
such, membership in the sense of referring to broad and deep political belonging, and not only 
formal status, is a precondition for, if not access to, certainly meaningful enjoyment of the 
other components of citizenship: rights and opportunities for political participation. 
Between these components there are degrees of independence and interdependence 
such that sometimes it is necessary to have one component in order to have or enjoy another, 
but at other times the possession of one component has little impact on others. As an example 
of the former circumstance, one may require citizenship status to claim rights. As an example 
of the latter, one may have formal status but still lack the ability to effectively claim rights or, 
conversely, one may not have formal status but nevertheless still be able to exercise political 
subjectivity and act politically. By assessing the interdependence between the components it  
is possible to account also for the often prevalent disconnection between possession of a 
particular component (say, rights) and enjoyment and exercise of that component. To give the 
simplest example, without legitimate and robustly recognised membership, it is often difficult 
to exercise the rights that a citizen may technically be entitled to or possess. Relations of 
interdependence and independence between component parts can also be analysed in terms of 
which components secure others and how. Some citizens find their rights, or even their 
citizenship status, respected one day and revoked the next. Coming to an understanding of 
what conditions bring about the greatest long term consistency and predictability of 
membership, rights and opportunities for political participation is an important democratic 
project. 
These ‘components’ are, of course, only articulated in this categorical way for  
analytical clarity. In practice it is always hard to identify both which category a particular 
phenomenon would fall into (Is the right to vote about rights or about political participation? 
Are ID cards about status or membership?), and what the relations are between the 
components (Does an ID card depend on membership, or the other way round? Is status really 
independent of community-level political participation?). As such, disaggregation into certain 
categories is not really the objective but rather an analytical exercise that can assist in our 
thinking about these issues. The point is not to arrive at a neat list of phenomena that fit into 
each category and then draw lines of independence or interdependence between them. Rather, 
the objective is to open up the possibility of thinking about the different material and 
intersubjective experiences of people’s lives as often relating to ‘citizenship’ but not always  
in predictable or clearly intelligible ways. 
 
Recognition and Distribution  
Regimes of recognition and redistribution govern the various ways in which people access 
and enjoy citizenship’s components and, as such, are deeply implicated in the generation of 
citizenship deficits and inequalities. Recognition and redistribution can be understood as 
intricately linked political processes, which together refer to both the material and immaterial 
intersubjective conditions of political life that determine the different opportunities and 
capacities people have for making use of their citizenship (Kiss 1999, 196–9; Fraser 1995a, 
1995b, 1997; Young 1990). The politics of recognition is concerned not with only the fact of 
inequalities but with the political, social, economic, cultural and institutional processes that 
constitute and sustain inequalities, and thus when and how recognition and redistribution 
enhance or endanger equal citizenship (Kiss 1999, 200). From this perspective, the question is 
not, for example, whether or not ethnicity is a fundamental social good but rather what role 
ethnicity plays in affording access to, or leading to the deprivation of, other social and  
political goods (Kiss 1999, 195–6). 
Recognition and distribution play out in encounters both between individuals and 
between individuals and institutions.9  As such, processes of recognition and distribution 
pertain to the daily practice of citizenship; the ‘routines, rituals, customs, norms and habits of 
the everyday through which subjects become citizens’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008, 17), as well as 
encounters with the state. Daily encounters in public and ‘private’ places constitute 
opportunities to be made to feel respected, listened to and taken seriously, or disrespected, 
humiliated, belittled or simply ignored. These encounters provide the background to people’s 
reasoning about when and where it is appropriate, safe or worthwhile for them to act and 
speak. These encounters thereby determine the access people have to certain kinds of public 
spaces and public debates and, once there, their influence on those spaces, debates and their 
consequences. Similarly, encounters with institutions and institutional agents contribute to 
one’s sense of legitimate belonging or alienation. State institutions that are responsible for 
political representation, public decision making, welfare provisions (schools, hospitals and so 
on), avenues of government accountability, law and law enforcement, individual  
identification regimes (ID cards), collective identification regimes (censuses), electoral 
commissions, government bodies such as Chief’s Offices or Land Registries which are 
9 It will become clear that by placing the emphasis on individuals here I do not mean to suggest that groups are not 
part of this dynamic. On the contrary, throughout this book I argue that, at least in the Kenyan case and probably in 
others, individuals experience their relations to other individuals and institutions through their group identity and 
membership. 
responsible for distribution of material goods, quasi-state based institutions like (in Kenya) 
the Kenyan National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR), the Truth Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission, and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission all 
collectively act out and usually reinforce recognition and distribution regimes that are often 
mirrored at the interpersonal level. 
There are debates about the empirical and normative value of making distinctions 
between recognition and redistribution. For example, Fraser (1995a, 1995b, 1997) sees a clear 
distinction between the two, at least for analytical purposes, whereas Young (1990, 39–63) 
sees maldistribution as a consequence of misrecognition or non-recognition.10  In relation to 
 
Kenya there are debates about whether recognition or distribution would better bring about 
equality among citizens (Branch 2011, 16; Lynch 2011b, 394). Although it is possible to   
think of recognition and redistribution as distinct processes it is more productive, and a more 
accurate reflection of real life political processes, to conceive of them as mutually reinforcing 
and jointly structuring the material and intersubjective conditions of political life, generating 
and sustaining structural inequalities or contributing to enhanced equalities (Kiss 1999,196– 
9). The chapters that follow provide multiple examples of the ways in which acts of 
recognition (or misrecognition) and distribution (or maldistribution) iteratively enhance or 
diminish relations between different groups of citizens. The material conferral of an ID card – 
an act of recognition – enables access to various distributive channels, including employment, 
education and relief services. The refusal of the state to distribute land in formal, secure ways 
is experienced not only as a lack of distribution but also as the withholding of recognition of 
the Nubians as a legitimate ethnic group of Kenya.11  As such, any analysis of recognition and 
  
10 For an eloquent discussion of the differences between Young and Fraser’s approaches to distinguishing between 
recognition and redistribution, see Kiss 1999. 
11 Though it can be fruitfully used to assess individual cases, analysis of recognition and distribution regimes lends 
itself particularly well to dealing with groups. Claims for amendments to regimes of recognition and redistribution 
are typically directed at remedy of structural inequalities. As Young observes, structural inequalities, as opposed to 
inequalities that result from bad luck or lack of personal effort, typically have their effects on people by virtue of 
distribution regimes that shape citizenship must take account of material conditions, including 
systematised or institutionalised disparities in wealth, income, control over one’s use of time, 
access to real opportunities for political participation as well as intersubjective conditions that 
routinely associate negative judgments with particular identities (Fraser 2003, 36; see also 
Werbner 2002b, 679). Neither recognition nor distribution precedes the other. 
Discursive frameworks that normalise certain ways of doing things shape the prevailing 
patterns and routines of recognition and distribution. In Kenya, the predominant discursive 
frameworks (ethnicity, indigeneity, autochthony, discussed further below) become attached to 
more normative discourses of justice and injustice (historical and distributive), alterity, 
entitlement, danger and fear, rights and sometimes also democracy, diversity, inclusion or 
citizenship (Lynch 2011c). Through these attachments, legitimacy and influence are conferred 
on certain modes and patterns of recognition and distribution, in this case resulting in the 
apparently ‘natural’ privileging of indigenous and autochthonous ethnic groups. Other 
discursive resources than the predominant ones can become available and these can perform 
important interventions in prevailing recognition and redistribution regimes, shifting or even 
rupturing them. In the case of Kenya, liberal discourses that promote the pre-eminence of 
constitutional order and impartial institutions have operated since the 1990s to challenge the 
hegemonic privileging of ethnicity as an ordering principle. To a lesser extent Kenyan 
nationalism and class-based alliances have, at times, also tempered ethnic logics of belonging 
and citizenship. However, it is much easier to operate within established routines, norms and 
patterns of rule making and behaviour, and recognition and distribution regimes than it is to 
transform them (Li 2000, 2001). Incentives for carving out a place for oneself or one’s group 
within the prevailing regime are greater than incentives for seeking change. Through the 
establishment and continued renewal of such regimes, certain citizens become more equal   
than others. 
 
 
their having certain characteristics that render them part of a group, and all members of that group are subject to 
constraints on the basis of their having that characteristic (Young 2001, 15). 
As Charles Taylor (1985, 92) puts it, ‘part of what is involved in having a better theory 
is being able more effectively to cope with the world. We are able to intervene successfully to 
effect our purposes in a way that we were not before.’ A theoretical approach that understands 
citizenship as made up of component parts that can be fully disaggregated, and which are 
assembled and reassembled by different recognition and distribution regimes, allows us to 
respond to two different kinds of questions. One set of questions is about the substance of the 
component parts of citizenship: Which rights, which responsibilities, what form of political 
participation, what forms of membership are we talking about here? The second set of 
questions is about how inequalities in possession and enjoyment of these components are 
generated and how they might be mitigated: What kind or form of recognition should we 
afford to what kinds of groups or individuals? Should censuses count ethnic groups? Should  
ID cards include or exclude ‘tribe’? What kind of redistribution should we entertain of land, 
for example? Or of development resources? What about political or civil service offices? 
Both the precise questions and their substantive answers will vary from one political 
community to another and to discover them, and thus to create the possibility of democratic 
change, depends upon an in-depth understanding of each particular case. 
 
Ethnicity  
In the Kenyan context, responding to both these sets of questions (about the substance of the 
component parts of citizenship, and the recognition and distribution regimes which govern 
possession and enjoyment of those components) inescapably requires an account of the role 
of ethnicity in politics. Like the concept of citizenship, the concept of ethnicity is one that is 
widely contested. With primordialist conceptions of ethnicity that adopted essentialist 
approaches emphasising the ascriptive nature of ethnic identity now discredited (cf. 
Hutchinson and Smith 1996: Young 2002), ethnicity has joined the ranks of identities 
understood as constructed and actively recreated by subjects. Members of an ethnic group 
may draw on a shared sense of history, mythical or actual origins, and perceive themselves to 
also share a common fate, thus having intergenerational, past and future oriented ontologies 
(Glazer and Moynihan 1976; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Young 2002). Ethnic groups will 
often also share a culture that may be constituted by elements such as language, religion, 
rituals, rites of passage, beliefs and kinship systems, which serve to unite people who are 
otherwise differentiated by status, age or class (Barth 1969; Glazer and Moynihan 1976; 
Eriksen 1997; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Lynch 2011c, 12; Ranger 1983, 1995; Smith  
1986; Young 2002). In Kenya, ethnic groups are the locus of some of the most salient,  
perhaps the most salient debates about morality and ethics, justice and ‘right’, and who should 
behave in which ways. The ethnic group is thus often the primary locus of development of 
reward, sanction and personal reputation (Lonsdale 1994, 2004). 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent eternal and self-evident nature of their boundaries 
and content, and indeed this is a significant part of their appeal and salience, ethnic groups do 
not exist independently of their active creation and recreation by ethnic members who are 
conscious of their membership (Berman 1998; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Lynch 2006b; 
Weber 1996; Young 2002). Ethnic groups are therefore primarily (though not exclusively) 
defined by characteristics which Young (1990, 43) sets up as definitive of social groups, that 
is, they are developed around identity, affinity and differentiation from others, rather than 
from core and essential characteristics, despite claims to essential characteristics often being 
part of the identity of the group.12  As such, ethnic groups typically have deep internal 
 
tensions. 
 
As constructed entities ethnic groups are highly malleable, amenable at once to a 
profound sense of ‘naturalness’ and a great adaptability. Geographic concentration can be 
  
12 Lynch (2011c, 19) argues that because they are based on kinship – biological or imagined – ethnic groups are 
different from social groups. With Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka (2004, 11), however, I argue that the kinship 
element of ethnic identity is ‘metaphoric’ and therefore consistent with Young’s notion of ‘affiliation’. This is not 
to suggest that ethnic groups are not a particularly unique kind of social group because of the particular strength of 
their sense of not only affiliation and also identity and differentiation from others, but simply to suggest that the 
implications of Young’s point about the openness of social groups to democratic encounters with others still 
applies. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
conceived in more or less narrow ways, linguistic similarity can be asserted or refuted on the 
basis of dialects, narratives of origin can be contested and similarities or differences in   
custom can be asserted at different times. Ethnicity operates as a powerful source of identity 
that has been adapted throughout history to respond to prevailing political climates, whether   
to defend the group against threats or to take advantage of opportunities. The identities,  
names, boundaries and alliances of ethnic groups can be, and regularly are, moulded to fit into 
and exploit prevailing regimes of recognition and distribution (cf. Li 2000, 2001). This makes 
ethnic groups both a source of fierce identification and fierce differentiation at close and far 
range (Lynch 2011c, 13). Ethnicity thus has both elements of apparently ascriptive, 
naturalised and primordial identity, and a conscious, instrumental social and political 
construction.13 
In the context of Kenya ethnicity is a powerful conditioning factor in the recognition 
and distribution regimes and, therefore, it is a powerful conditioning factor of political 
subjectivity, rights, membership and opportunities for political participation as well as for the 
inter-relationship between these components. For the Nubians, ethnicity is the organising 
principle that has the most impact on their access to and enjoyment of citizenship. Competing 
principles of liberalism and constitutional order, nationalism or class, though theoretically 
offering more promise of equality for this minority group, have delivered little for them, and 
liberal strategies for seeking inclusion have featured only marginally in their struggle for 
 
13 A brief note is required here about terminology. In academic scholarship and politically correct terms, the word 
‘tribe’ has been overtaken by ‘ethnic group’, largely because ‘tribe’ maintains pejorative connotations stemming 
from its historical use by colonial powers to describe anything and everything that might appear like a group 
(Young 2002). The word has inherited connotations of primitivism. Nevertheless, in Kenya both elites and  
ordinary people are quick to make a distinction between tribe and tribalism, the latter being a source of tension and 
discrimination, the former being a legitimate source of pride in, and attachment to, one’s identity and community 
(Wamwere 2008, 95–7). To defer simply to the term ‘ethnic group’ over ‘tribe’ would be to abandon the local 
political vocabulary that is so central to the practice of politics explored in this book. Given these considerations, I 
use the word in a considered way devoid of negative value to describe what I have just defined as an ‘ethnic  
group’, and I use the terms interchangeably. 
equal citizenship. This book explores the political context that renders ethnicity such a salient 
feature in this community’s experience of political life and in doing so draws out problems 
and potentials of ethnicity in politics. 
The concerns that democratic theorists have about ethnicity are serious. The 
conventional approach of many democratic theorists is to advocate the abolition of ethnicity  
or at least any place for it in politics (Benhabib 2004, 138–9). Recognition and distribution 
regimes based on ethnicity, hold these theorists, can only ever be anti-democratic because the 
qualification for equality is ascriptive rather than voluntary (civic-republicans), it promotes 
division of the political community (civic-republicans and liberals), and it undermines an 
approach to universal equality based on sameness (liberals). According to these arguments 
ethnicity must be eradicated from the polity. However, the approach more commonly adopted 
in the Nubian community in their response to a recognition and distribution regime based on 
ethnicity is the opposite. Rather than fight for the eradication or transcendence of ethnicity,  
the Nubians tend to affirm the prevailing regime (based as it is on indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity) and simply seek inclusion in it. While the idea of eradicating 
ethnicity is of limited utility given the infeasibility of a context in which ethnicity loses its 
salience for Kenyans, the idea of affirming the prevailing regime is normatively and 
democratically concerning as it runs a high risk of marginalising other Others. This puts us in 
a very difficult position both in theorising and acting in Kenyan politics. 
To take the ‘full disaggregation’ approach to citizenship is to open up a whole host of 
possibilities for understanding, in a far more nuanced way, the realities, risks and possibilities 
of a place for ethnicity in politics. Two decades ago, John Lonsdale’s (1994, 2004) concept of 
‘moral ethnicity’ established a vocabulary with which we can talk about the more 
democratically positive aspects of ethnicity. The concept of disaggregated citizenship   
provides further theoretical precision, expanding and sharpening the ways in which we can 
account for and then take advantage of the multiple positive aspects of ethnicity as it relates to 
citizenship. As Lonsdale and others (Eyoh 2004; Werbner 2004) have now well established, 
ethnic groups are important, even primary, sites of development of ideas of right and justice, 
of relations of respect and reciprocity, of ontological security relating to political 
membership, and of rights claims and fulfilment of responsibilities. In other words, they are 
important sites for the meaningful enjoyment of many of the components of citizenship. 
Nevertheless, concerns about the parochialism of the democratic practices of ethnic 
communities still stand. The extension of these democratic political solidarities across ethnic 
groups is far less prevalent and instead countries like Kenya are troubled by ‘political 
tribalism’ (Lonsdale 1994, 2004) or ‘uncivil nationalism’ (Berman 1998). Indeed, the 
parochialism with which relations of respect and solidarity are established and expressed begs 
the question of whether such relations are, in fact, moral, civic or democratic at all. There is  
no straightforward answer to this question; however, what is clear is that any account of  
ethnic politics that cannot explain the occasions on which such relations are extended across 
ethnic boundaries is impoverished in both its analytical power and its potential to identify and 
encourage a transformation of polities that are troubled by undemocratic inter-ethnic   
relations. 
As such, there is a need to explore principles and practices of what Werbner (2004) 
calls moral inter-ethnicity, in a way that can account for not only relations of respect and 
solidarity that do occur (Klopp 2002; Orvis 2001), but also of competition and antagonism. 
Given the intractability of ethnicity as a salient political identity, and the need to maintain 
sensitivity to the democratic potentials of different modes of social and political organisation 
than those that have dominated citizenship and democratic theory to date, understanding is 
needed of not only what ethnic politics is but what it could be. Perhaps there is a possibility 
that competition could be displaced by solidarity and that antagonism could be diminished 
into mere agonism; a less violent, less winner-takes-all approach to managing disagreement 
(Isin 2002, 2008). If there is, and I suggest that is the case, then identifying the social, 
political, economic and institutional conditions under which such relations are possible is 
surely a worthwhile task. In cases like that of the Nubians, where citizenship deficits are 
longstanding and deep, and where they are interpreted and experienced almost entirely 
through the lens of ethnicity, the need to explore ways in which ethnic relations can become 
more democratic is both urgent and important. 
 
Indigeneity, Autochthony and the Nubians as Ethnic Strangers in Kenya  
As a minority ethnic group who’s political place in Kenya is defined by their stranger status, 
the case of the Nubians sheds considerable critical light on our understanding of ethnicity, its 
relationship to citizenship, and the risks and potentials therein. Since their migration with the 
British colonialists from Sudan as soldiers and throughout Kenya’s postcolonial history, the 
various and often paradoxical ways in which the Nubians have successfully or unsuccessfully 
negotiated their status – as askaris14, detribalised natives (a subject race) and ultimately ethnic 
strangers, underscore the centrality of indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity as the  
prevailing discursive framework in which recognition and distribution regimes operate in 
Kenya. 
This book will provide evidence to argue that the construction of the Nubians as an 
ethnic group over the last century in Kenya is best understood as a response to a political 
culture that has, since the colonial period, maintained a privileged role for indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity and failed to deliver, at least for the Nubians, on the promises of a 
liberal constitutional order. Though general inter-ethnic divisions and competition, and even 
repeated events of violence have come to characterise Kenya’s politics and have occupied 
significant scholarly attention (Berman 1998; Lonsdale 1994; Lynch 2006a, 2006b, 2011; 
Ndegwa 1997; Posner 2005; Steeves 2006; Wamwere 2008; Wekesa 2010), it is the division 
between perceived indigenous and autochthonous ethnic groups and ethnic strangers that is 
the greatest determinant of citizenship deficits facing the Nubians. 
As military middlemen during the colonial period, the Nubians fit into the category 
Mamdani (2001a) calls ‘subject races’ of the colonial period; today’s ethnic strangers (see 
also Manby 2009b, 37–95). Subject races were neither settler nor fully ‘native’, either non- 
indigenous or constructed as non-indigenous and in positions of relative privilege and power 
14 Askari is Swahili for ‘soldier’ or sometimes ‘guard’ or ‘police officer’. 
compared to other Africans. As soldiers brought by the British to consolidate control over 
Kenyan territory, and as ‘detribalised natives’, the Nubians occupied a peculiar position in 
colonial Kenya. Their loyalty and attachment to the British and their ambiguous role in the 
struggle for independence are key factors in their on-going exclusion from full citizenship in 
the country. Furthermore, the Nubians are ‘native-strangers’, in the same racial category as 
their hosts, precluded from the possibility of going ‘home’ available to European strangers 
and, in practice, precluded from the buffer of economic strength enjoyed by Asian strangers 
(Berry 2001; Skinner 1979, 285). They have been left to their own devices to find ways of 
securing political incorporation into the societies in which they had lived, by now, for 
generations (Appadurai 2006, 58). 
In Kenya, there is a widespread and very salient belief amongst government officials 
and in the general political imagination that the nation is made up 42 indigenous tribes, of 
which the Nubians are not one. Though there are no clear mechanisms or criteria for 
determining what constitutes indigeneity in this sense, the notion of ‘the 42 tribes’15 
 
nevertheless renders indigeneity the benchmark for full inclusion in Kenyan society and a 
characteristic of citizenship in the dominant (yet diverse) population. The Nubian case 
suggests that indigeneity in this respect is therefore the norm rather than a special status of a 
small and highly differentiated minority (Balaton-Chrimes 2013). 
As the case of the Nubians illuminates, it is increasingly not only indigeneity but 
autochthony, and the notion that every true Kenyan tribe has a homeland, that governs 
belonging and citizenship in Kenya (Médard 1996, 2008). Compared to indigeneity, 
autochthony is not usually thought of as a widespread discourse for determining or asserting 
belonging outside francophone Africa but it is nevertheless salient in Kenya in a similar 
though even more concerning way than indigeneity. The term literally means to be ‘born of 
the soil’, and connotes a particularly strong and, importantly, unique connection to an area of 
land (Geschiere 2009; Loraux 2000). Autochthonous claims are often made as absolute 
 
15 Hereafter referred to without scare quotes. 
claims in keeping with the inherently ‘natural’ character of autochthony and its emphasis on 
purity of blood and soil, even if they are widely known to have little basis in historical fact. In 
Africa, the term is used increasingly to assert exclusive use, control and access to particular 
pieces of land (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Jackson 2006; Leonhardt 2006; Lynch 2011b; Marshall- 
Fratani 2006; Médard 2008; Pelican 2009). Autochthony claims are less about the content of   
a community’s tradition, culture, history and self-identification – features typically associated 
with indigeneity – and more about their relative rights over a piece of territory, in particular 
the right to exclude (Geschiere 2009). This makes it an ambiguous notion, absolute in theory 
yet inherently relational in its application. Not only is it a conceptually unstable term but, in 
practice, autochthony claims with their emphasis on exclusion also have a propensity to 
generate political instability. 
Over the past decade, the Nubians have increasingly come to identify themselves not 
only as citizens of Kenya but as an indigenous and autochthonous tribe whose homeland is 
Kibera. This highly unusual and unanticipated claim – of a one-hundred-year-old community 
to an indigenous homeland in an urban slum – signals the extent to which these norms have 
pervaded Kenyan political culture and have generated a dangerous cycle of Othering. It is a 
great concern that Nubians largely feel the path to equal and secure citizenship (meaning all  
of its components) is through a claim such as this. After all, the Nubians number only 
approximately 20,000 to 30,000 nationally, only half of whom live in a Kiberan population of 
around 350,000, and in conditions of extreme scarcity of space and services (Kenya Ministry 
of Housing 2007; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010; Open Society Justice Initiative 
(OSJI) 2011c; de Smedt 2011,107).16  The spectre of ethnic territorialisation and violence that 
  
16 The 2009 National census counted 15,463 Nubians (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010); however, given 
that it was possible to answer ‘Kenyan’ for one’s tribe, and given the census methodology was problematic 
(Kerrow 2010), this cannot be taken as the final figure. A 2009 research survey by OSJI gathered data on 18,862 
Nubian individuals; however, methodological challenges prevented them visiting every Nubian household (OSJI 
2011c). The OSJI research established that approximately 50 per cent of Kenya’s Nubians live in Kibera (OSJI 
2011b). If we take this proportion, and slightly inflate the figures from the National Census, we can estimate 
has long lingered over the Rift Valley and the Coast of Kenya is migrating to Nairobi. There 
has been no better time to understand how inequalities of citizenship that generate emotional 
and political appeal for claims like this can be mitigated. 
 
Methodology 
 
The arguments put forth here about the Nubians’ citizenship deficits are based on interviews, 
participant observation of community activities (political activities like public meetings as 
well as social activities like weddings), archival research in Kenya and the UK, analysis of 
print and online media as well as governmental and nongovernmental reports, and  
engagement with secondary literature. Interviews were conducted with over 100 people 
between March 2009 and January 2012 but predominantly in 2009. The participant 
observation and interviews were primarily with Nubians (though there were also some with 
other residents in Kibera who interact with Nubians) and interviews with NGOs and other 
experts on particular issues explored in this study (for example the constitution and ID card 
procedures). Reflecting the patriarchal nature of the community, a disproportionate number of 
formal interviews were with men, though effort was made to interview as many women as 
possible and to pay particular attention to their views during day-to-day, less formal 
interactions with the community.17 
 
The objective of this methodological approach was to explore citizenship ‘from below’, 
seeking to contribute a more socially embedded understanding of the meaning of citizenship 
(as well as, it turns out, indigeneity and land) in people’s lives and experiences of politics (cf. 
Ndegwa 1997, 600). Very few studies, and almost none outside the discipline of  
anthropology, attempt to understand how people experience and interpret citizenship (Joppke 
2007, 44). Where this kind of research has taken place, it has shed considerable light on what 
  
approximately 20,000–30,000 Nubians in Kenya, so 10,000–15,000 in Kibera. There is a great deal of discrepancy 
over the size of the population in Kibera. For a full and up to date review of the potential figures, ranging from 
200,000 to 700,000, see de Smedt 2011, 107. 
17 Approximately 70 per cent of participants in this study were men. 
citizens (or non-citizens) think of citizenship (see Holston 2008; Kabeer 2005). For example, 
in Naila Kabeer’s (2005) edited collection she observes that ordinary people often experience 
citizenship more as a particular kind of relation with other citizens, than as a top–down, state 
conferred status. This study bears out this finding and others related more particularly to 
contemporary Kenya. Furthermore, a research methodology ‘from below’ is particularly 
appropriate for a study of marginalisation. Marginalised people by definition lack influence 
over the ways in which we understand the world so it only makes sense to seek out their  
views and understand their experiences if we are to theorise what marginalised citizenship is 
and how it could be remedied. This approach also enables a clearer analysis not only of 
experiences and interpretations of marginalisation but also responses to it. As such, this study 
seeks to understand ways in which meta-norms, practices and discursive frameworks are 
appropriated, rejected or transformed by ordinary individuals and communities. 
The implications of this approach are that the aspects of political culture emphasised in 
this book are those that affect the Nubians most profoundly. The contention here is that the 
Nubians’ citizenship deficits, and their difficulties in overcoming them, are attributable to a 
significant degree to their ethnic stranger status. The reasons why the Nubians suffer from 
discrimination in access to ID cards, a lack of symbolic recognition and material distribution 
as an ethnic group with a rightful place in Kenya, and the strategies the Nubians use to  
counter this disadvantage are heavily conditioned by an implicit understanding that  
indigenous and autochthonous ethnic groups are more secure citizens who can better enjoy 
rights and access opportunities for political participation. That is, indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for robust citizenship in 
Kenya. There are other communities who share the stranger status of the Nubians and suffer 
similar citizenship deficits, including the Galje'el on the Coast of Kenya and Kenyan Somalis. 
Like these groups, the Nubians’ experience of and response to their position in Kenyan  
society emphasises these features of Kenyan political life. 
However, every community in Kenya can argue in one way or another that it has been 
marginalised at some point (Lynch 2011c, 224) and for many such communities the grounds 
for their marginalisation will be different (though often still related to ethnicity). There is the 
iconic stranger community – Kenyan Asians – who suffer citizenship deficits but of a 
different variety to those suffered by the Nubians and Galje’el.18  Staying on the ethnic axis, 
there are ethnic groups who are smaller in number than the ‘big tribes’ (Kikuyu, Lou, Luhya, 
Kamba, Kalenjin), such as the Kuria, Taita, Taveta, Teso, Tharaka and others. There are also 
tribes whose homelands are in the rural hinterland of the country, like the Turkana or 
Samburu, who suffer different deficits again, related to their considerable distance from 
Nairobi. Then there are other groups marginalised for different reasons, not related strictly to 
ethnicity as such but to particular characteristics of their ethnic culture and lifestyle, such as 
pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities like the Maasai or Ogiek (respectively). And, of 
course, there are entirely non-ethnic bases on which people may suffer citizenship deficits, for 
example related to their religion, gender, sexuality, differences in their physical abilities and  
so on. I do not intend for the reader to come away with the impression that the Nubians are   
the only or even the most marginalised of Kenyan communities, or that indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity is the only privileged identity marker in Kenya’s recognition and 
distribution  regime. 
Similarly, many of the citizenship deficits faced by the Nubians and described here are 
also attributable, to some extent, to other aspects of the Nubians’ position in Kenyan society. 
For the Nubians, their ethnic stranger status stands out as the primary barrier to citizenship 
 
18 In contemporary Kenya, the alterity of people belonging to racial categories (Europeans and Indians) from 
indigenous status has little material effect on their lives. Their superior economic status has meant that their 
inability to access the benefits, described in what follows, of being one of the 42 tribes has not led to material 
deprivation. The comparative situation of these strangers, who are generally absent from public debates about tribe 
and belonging, and the Nubians, who engage heavily in such debates (at least at the local level), demonstrates the 
extent to which economic circumstances influence engagement with parochial discourses, such as indigeneity. 
However, it could be argued that the place of these racial outsiders in Kenya is still, nevertheless, not as secure as 
the 42 tribes. Idi Amin’s expulsion of Ugandan Asians, though extreme, serves as an example of the possible 
consequences of being racial strangers in a context where not only ethnic but also racial indigeneity governs 
principles of belonging. 
but there are other factors that also play an important role in generating citizenship deficits for 
them and for others. As such, many of these deficits are also shared by other Kenyans, even 
those who come from the big five tribes. Other influential factors include class, gender, age, 
urban or rural location and physical ability. Of these, class and gender are perhaps the most 
significant. 
As such, throughout the book effort is made to draw out the ways in which class 
inhibits the Nubians’ access to recognition, resources and power. It is sometimes argued that 
Kenya has only two tribes: the rich and the poor. Patterns of accumulation since before 
independence have privileged the elite so that the wealthy get richer while the poor, 
regardless of their ethnicity, struggle to make ends meet. As such, though exclusion from 
access to (ethnicised) neo-patrimonial networks constitutes a serious barrier to development, 
access to such networks is not, alone, adequate for development and robust citizenship. Very 
significant class divisions also operate to marginalise poor Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin or Kamba. 
Similarly, women in Kenya suffer citizenship deficits as a result of their gender, while 
men enjoy the necessary (but again, not sufficient) precondition of masculinity that grants 
access to important elements of citizenship, including the corridors of power and land 
ownership. In Kenya, land has been concentrated not only in the hands of the rich but also in 
the hands of men (Shipton 1988), and laws, policies, institutional practices and cultural norms 
have made it difficult for women to assert their rights to land and other forms of property 
(productive or otherwise), even in instances where there may be a legal right (Kimani and 
Maina 2010). The 2010 constitution contains a number of provisions to enhance women’s 
citizenship, including enhanced rights in marriage, inheritance, land as well as quotas for 
representation in both tiers of government law making assemblies (counties and federal) 
(Kramon and Posner 2011). However, like previous efforts to enhance women’s roles in 
social, political and economic life in Kenya, these have been met with resistance (Dena   
2012). Thus, Kenyan women, regardless of their ethnicity, also suffer arbitrary citizenship 
deficits that reflect poorly on the quality of Kenya’s democracy. 
Again, the attention paid to the Nubians in this book should therefore not be 
misconstrued as positing the Nubians as the most marginalised of all Kenyan citizens or as 
exemplifying a general state of citizenship deprivation. The citizenship deficits suffered by   
the Nubians are in some circumstances reflective of more widespread patterns of deprivation 
but in others are particular to ethnic strangers. Nevertheless, the presence of non-ethnic forces 
of marginalisation (class, gender) does not negate the reality that indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity is, in the Nubians’ experience, a necessary but not sufficient   
condition for citizenship, and a condition which this community lacks. Rather, these examples 
illustrate that for some particular Nubians, such as women or the very poor, the barriers to full 
citizenship are multiple. The utility of the disaggregated approach is that it allows for a more 
precise identification of the factors at play in different peoples’ enjoyment of citizenship at 
different times and in different places. The framework of fully disaggregated citizenship can 
meaningfully be applied to analysis of various kinds of citizenship deficit, such as those  
rooted in class, gender, race, physical abilities, alienage and so on. Such applications may  
(and are probably likely to) suggest different components of citizenship that do not feature 
very centrally in this study or perhaps at all. Other applications of this theoretical approach 
will certainly illuminate different recognition and distribution regimes, not only in different 
contexts, but also in Kenya. The very purpose of a disaggregated approach to citizenship is to 
make the concept applicable to various and varying experiences of citizenship that are always 
fluctuating and inconsistent. This study should therefore be read as an invitation to further 
scholarship in this area, to extend and refine the ideas about citizenship laid out here. 
In what follows, two broad thematic chapters bookend the more empirical analysis of 
the Nubian case. Chapter 1 provides a detailed account of the Nubians’ history in Kenya, and 
the historical and institutional context in which indigenous and autochthony ethnicity has 
emerged as such a hegemonic feature of Kenyan political culture. Having laid this 
groundwork, chapters 2, 3 and 4 detail the citizenship deficits faced by the Nubians, each 
chapter highlighting a different aspect of the recognition and distribution regimes in which  
the deficits are generated. Chapter 2 uses an analysis of the Kenyan identification regime and 
the Nubians’ historical exclusion from it to argue that citizenship is not individualistic in 
Kenya but rather it is experienced as a largely collective status – not only socially and 
politically but also bureaucratically. Chapter 3 takes this argument further, using an analysis  
of ethnic enumeration in the 2009 Kenyan census to argue that indigeneity in Kenya is not a 
special status of marginalised minorities but is rather the norm, and that ethnic groups not 
understood as indigenous suffer particular citizenship deficits because of their stranger status. 
Chapter 4 extends this argument further still, arguing that it is not only indigeneity but also 
autochthony that conditions people’s quality of citizenship. The Nubians’ lack of a recognised 
homeland, the challenges that presents for them and their seemingly absurd claim that Kibera 
should be recognised as their shags (ethnic homeland), far overshadow the other citizenship 
deficits faced by the community. 
These discursive frameworks – ethnicity, indigeneity and autochthony – have 
hierarchical importance. I begin with a discussion of ID cards because that is the predominant 
concern expressed by outsiders in relation to the Nubians’ citizenship. I progress through 
collective recognition and indigeneity and to land title because that tends to be the order in 
which remedies are considered by outsiders. However, it is land that stands out as the most 
important of these. Communities in Kenya with a recognised homeland do not face problems 
related to collective recognition as one of the 42 indigenous tribes or problems with  
individual recognition when applying for ID cards. In this sense, land is therefore the basis of 
all the other elements of citizenship. The more common way of approaching the problem of 
exclusion, by starting with ID cards, is stood on its head. 
Chapter 5 addresses the concerns these discussions raise about the exclusionary 
tendencies of ethnicity, indigeneity and autochthony through a broader theoretical discussion 
of the relation between ethnicity and citizenship. The chapter summarises the threat this 
relation poses to democracy and then goes on to tentatively explore some of the possibilities 
the relation presents for the enhancement of democracy. I then argue that there may be 
possibilities for the extension of these democratically valuable practices across ethnic groups 
and build on the work of Lonsdale (1994, 2004), Werbner (2004) and Isin (2002) to explore 
notions of solidaristic and agonistic inter-ethnic exchange. I explore the constraints and 
possibilities of these principles of inter-ethnic engagement for mitigating the more 
problematic aspects of ethnic diversity in a democracy. 
When coming to terms with the realities of marginal citizens, it is imperative that we 
interrogate the multiple and interdependent components of citizenship with a view to 
understanding how they enhance or undermine political subjectivity, rights and opportunities 
for meaningful political participation and membership. This theoretical approach enables the 
identification of the various aspects of social and political life that generate inequalities; 
aspects that we cannot see if we take a narrow view of what citizenship is. Only then can we 
work to advance democracy in ways that go beyond conventional institutional approaches and 
that tap into and capitalise upon democratic relationships that are meaningful and sustainable 
in the communities in which we live, diverse as they are at both the hyper-global and hyper- 
local levels. 
Chapter 1: The Nubians and Kenya’s Ethnic History 
   
 
Ethnicity has long and widely been considered a central feature of political life in Kenya and 
so it is of the Nubians’ experience of citizenship. Yet, the reasons for this require explanation 
rather merely being assumed (Lonsdale 1994, 132). In a context of often extreme material 
deprivation and poverty, increasing urbanisation and associated ethnic mixing there are other 
options around which Kenyan citizens could construct their political identities, most notably 
nation and class. Why, then, does ethnicity predominate as an organising principle of political 
life? What is it about the Kenyan state and society that renders ethnicity such a salient  
political identity at the expense of the development of other, perhaps more civic, identities? 
Throughout the colonial and postcolonial periods of Kenya’s history, politics has 
played out predominantly at the very centre and at the local level. As a result, citizens’ (and 
non-citizens’) experiences of governance, distribution of development, recognition of 
legitimate belonging and legitimation of authority have been highly personalised (in 
individual leaders) and territorialised. Though the state apparatus, particularly during the 
Kenyatta (1963–1978) and Moi periods (1978–2002), was highly centralised and the power 
vested in the office of the President was formidable, the state’s control over population and 
resources took place at the district rather than regional level, marking a stark continuation of 
colonial practices. This pattern of governance, development and political life has resulted in 
heightening of political consciousness of the ethnic group and the constant manoeuvring and 
positioning of individuals and groups to legitimate their belonging and to access power and 
resources through ethnic networks. 
In such a context, stranger ethnic groups like the Nubians have found themselves at a 
severe disadvantage. Having descended from a number of Sudanese ethnic groups 
encountered during their military migration, the Nubians are in a complex position of having 
their contemporary identity defined by a historically common nationality (Sudanese) rather 
than tribe (Johnson 2009). Despite this challenge, and in contrast with Ugandan Nubians 
(who are sometimes labelled a Muslim ummah, or a community but not a tribe or ethnic 
community), Kenyan Nubians have forged a highly cohesive and rich ethnic identity on the 
basis of a shared ancestry, a narrative of being ‘brought by the British’ to Kenya, a rich 
shared culture of language (Kinubi), culinary traditions and rituals and a perceived 
‘homeland’ in Kibera (Kokole 1985, 1995; Wanji 1971, 6; cf. Leopold 2006).19 
 
Yet, though their ethnic identity has been well established, it remains a stranger ethnic 
identity. Up until the last few years the Nubian community has been to a large degree socially 
invisible, or when they are visible they are often still perceived as foreigners, not Kenyan but 
Sudanese (Makoloo 2005, 19). Johnson puts it dramatically but accurately when he says that, 
‘[t]he final irony is that the Nubis’ earlier arguments [about their exceptional status] have at 
last been accepted by the post-independence Kenyan government, but as a way of 
disenfranchising them’ (Johnson 2009, 127). Nubians report feeling like ‘refugees’, and being 
told by other Kenyans to ‘go back to Sudan’, a land most of today’s Nubians have never 
known. Few Kenyans think of the Nubians as part and parcel of Kenya’s ethnic makeup. 
As ethnic strangers, the Nubians illuminate particular characteristics of Kenya’s 
citizenship regime that are often neglected in a broader focus on ethnic divisions. The 
following chapters establish the ways in which not only ethnicity but indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity is a precondition for equal recognition and distribution for Kenya’s 
citizens. For other citizens in Kenya who suffer citizenship deficits – particularly the poor, 
members of religious minorities (a category in which the Nubians also fall as Muslims), non- 
mainstream communities like hunter-gatherers or pastoralists, women and others – other 
features of Kenya’s political life are likely more relevant to explaining and remedying those 
19 For a very detailed description of Nubian ethno-genesis, see de Smedt 2011, especially chapters 1 and 3. These 
strongly shared facets of their identity notwithstanding, like all ethnic groups there is an element of complexity and 
contestation to their group formation. For example, Kenyan Nubians maintain a strong affiliation with Ugandan 
Nubians and families identify themselves with sub-Nubian clan identities rooted in pre-migration Sudanese 
ethnicities, though very rarely and with no great significance anymore. Unlike the Kalenjin (Lynch 2011c, 5) the 
Nubians, perhaps because of the small size of the community, do not (currently) have a high degree of internal 
differentiation. Furthermore, perhaps because of their relatively extreme marginalisation, the permeability of their 
boundaries is (currently) quite limited. 
deficits. The focus of this book, however, is on the factors of Kenyan political life that most 
heavily condition the Nubians’ experience of citizenship. For this minority community it is 
their ethnic stranger status that most heavily impacts upon their access to and enjoyment of  
the various components of citizenship. This chapter therefore introduces the Nubians and 
explains their incorporation and limited integration into the Kenyan community, illuminating 
the features of Kenyan political institutions and culture that have inhibited the development of 
this minority ethnic stranger group’s citizenship. 
 
Strangers Introducing Strangers  
A great deal of misunderstanding has surrounded the term ‘Nubian’ in East Africa. It is often 
simply associated with those communities who identify themselves as originating in the Nuba 
Mountains or the ancient Nubian Kingdoms (the area that is now known as Nubia, in  
Northern Sudan and Southern Egypt) dating around 2000 BC to 1500 AD. In fact the terms 
‘Nubi’ and ‘Sudanese’ have been used at different times for different purposes, most notably 
to refer to slaves from Nubia (one of the major sources of slaves, prior to European 
Imperialism (Johnson 2009, 113; see also Leopold 2006, 195–6)).20  In particular, it is in the 
 
slave armies of nineteenth-century North Africa that today’s Kenyan Nubians have their 
origins. These armies were composed of various tribes not only from Nubia but from 
throughout the Sudan (Johnson 1988, 1989).21  In the course of their migration, the soldiers 
lived in zara’ib, or garrisons, which were not only military but also social and economic  
communities of great complexity, including not only soldiers but wives, concubines, domestic 
servants and gun-boys (de Smedt 2011, 38; Johnson 2000). As the higher ranks of soldiers 
were populated with slaves captured in Muslim and Arabic speaking areas of Egypt and 
20 I use the terms Nubi or Nubian and Sudanese interchangeably in this chapter up until the discussion of the post- 
independence era, in which I refer to the community exclusively as ‘Nubian’. As this book is written in English, I 
use the term ‘Nubian’ but note that ‘Nubi’ is the Nubian language word that Nubians use to describe themselves. 
21 The category of ‘slave’ was a complex one at the time entailing various forms of coercion and compulsion, and 
possibilities for freedom and agency we would not normally associate with slaves. As such, the contemporary 
Nubians of Kenya strongly resist the identification of their ancestors as slaves. 
Northern Sudan (including Nubia), the command of these officers over the more southern 
Sudanese in the context of their living together accelerated their Arabisation (in terms of 
language) and Islamisation (Nasseem and Marjan 1992, 199; Wanji 1971, 46–50).22  The 
Nubians of today continue to speak Kinubi in Kenya and Uganda, however, it is Islam that 
remains the most fundamental aspect of Nubian identity across East Africa (Kokole 1985, 
1995; Nasseem and Marjan 1992; Parsons 1999a, 226; Soghayroun 1981; Wanji 1971). 
Today’s Kenyan Nubians have their origins in one particular group of soldiers and their 
dependents: those who were stationed in Equatoria, a province of the Sudan cut off from the 
Egyptian administration in 1883 during the Mahdist revolt. After a two-year period of 
isolation, these soldiers were incorporated into the Imperial British East African Company by 
Frederick Lugard and later became the backbone of the protectorate armed forces then of the 
colonial armies of Uganda and Kenya, playing a crucial role in the imperial project in East 
Africa (Lugard 1893). 
The contemporary status of the Nubians must be understood against this background. 
That the Sudanese soldiers were introduced into East Africa, and their role determined by 
Europeans (themselves strangers), upset indigenous power structures and precluded to a large 
degree the possibility of hospitable incorporation into local African communities (Shack 
1979, 15; Skinner 1979, 282). The British considered the Sudanese a martial race, not only 
deploying their military force against local populations but also elevating the Sudanese 
soldiers and their families above other Africans (Leopold 2006, 183; Lloyd-Jones 1926, 229; 
Killingray 1999; Parsons 1999a, 1999b).23  Particularly in the early King’s African Rifles, 
groups such as Nubians but also other Muslim foreigners – Swahilis and Somalis – 
constituted the bulk of the armed forces because ‘[t]hey had no emotional ties to the East 
 
22 There is some debate about the exact nature of Kinubi language but most believe it to be a pidgin or a creole 
Arabic (Atieno-Odhiambo 1977:8; Heine 1982; Kokole 1985; Owens 1985; Nasseem & Marjan 1992:199). 
23 Through their military careers, even from the slave era, the Nubians consolidated their reputation for military 
prowess, strength, bravery and loyalty. There are numerous testaments to this throughout the military history of the 
Sudanese soldiers (Casati 1891, 62; Lugard 1893, 219; Moyse-Bartlett 1956, 86). 
African population’ (Parsons 1999a, 61).24  The military actively promoted the isolation and 
therefore ‘breeding’ of this race. The influence of these ideas of a martial race on shaping the 
early and persistent identity of the Nubian community cannot be underestimated. Although, 
‘[i]n reality, the military orientation of these southern Sudanese communities was a vestige of 
military slavery and not some innate cultural characteristic’ (Parsons 1999a, 62), their 
treatment by the British as a superior and homogenous race served to promote a self- 
consciousness, the forming of external group boundaries and the internalisation of beliefs in 
their superiority to other Africans (de Smedt 2011, 40; Wanji 1971, 23). The problematic 
early incorporation of the Sudanese askaris and their families into East Africa has had long 
lasting consequences for the community that, for more than a century after this initial 
migration, has sustained, though often in far less voluntary ways, this uneasy isolation from 
the communities that surround them. 
 
Detribalised  Natives  
More than any other factor, the issue of settlement of this community once their military 
service was over has consistently underscored the anomalous status of the Nubians. By 1912 
it was decided that the soldiers and their dependents would be allowed to settle at Kibra (now 
Kibera), a forested area of 4,197.9 acres on the edge of Nairobi.25 While Kibera was a  
military reserve and its occupants under military rule, the Nubians enjoyed a relatively 
privileged status that they valued and fought for as long as the British were there to listen. 
They enjoyed a lower rate of taxation and a life that is remembered today as a ‘golden age’ of 
peace and prosperity. During this period and up until the 1930s, the soldiers and their 
descendants maintained their ambivalent attitude towards other Africans and a sort of 
voluntary isolation in terms of religion, language and urbanisation – but most tangibly 
24 Swahilis from the coast were ‘foreigners’ to the populations of the interior although they are not foreign to 
contemporary Kenya. 
25 The area was originally inhabited by the Maasai who ceded it to the British in the 1904 Maasai Agreements 
(Carter 1933: Appendix VIII The Masai Agreements). This aspect of the land issue is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 4. 
through their legal and institutional separation in the military. However, it was not long 
before conflicts in understanding over the ownership of the land emerged which persist to 
today. While the Nubians thought they were given the land to own, in perpetuity and in lieu 
of a military pension, the colonial authorities considered them ‘tenants at will of the Crown’ 
and imagined they would leave (though it is unclear to where) upon the death of the last 
askari in each family. 
This conflict arose at a time when land tenure, administrative systems and the economy 
were evolving in ways that would determine belonging in Kenya on the basis of indigeneity 
and autochthony for a century to come. The colonial encounter brought about the 
concentration of power and resources in a central state, dispersed through a powerful 
provincial administration, leading scholars to describe the Kenyan state as a decentralised 
despotism (Berman 1998; Lonsdale 1994; Mamdani 1996). Africans were territorially and 
administratively segregated by ethnicity, each supposedly homogenous reserve and its 
inhabitants governed by a ‘customary’ Native Administration. Investing broad powers in a 
single person was not a custom common to many communities in the pre-colonial era 
(Mamdani 1996, 53) but became the norm under this new arrangement. Ethnic communities  
in Native Administrations were governed though the characteristic indirect rule of the British 
Empire, that is, through ‘chiefs’, either appropriated, manipulated or plain invented, and who 
were under orders from the Protectorate and later Colonial Government. Ordinances in 1902 
and 1912 dictated that chiefs’ responsibilities were primarily to maintain public order, keep 
roads clear and hear petty cases, and they had power to instigate rules relating to liquor, 
poisonous plants, arms and to force labour for public works (Tignor 1976, 42–3). Native 
councils and native tribunals were later established in an attempt to better reflect the councils 
that indigenous communities were accustomed to as a source of authority, however,  
individual chiefs continued to be disproportionately influential in these. This was particularly 
important because native tribunals came to have ‘almost exclusive jurisdiction’ over land  
cases (Tignor 1976, 45). This form of governance, land distribution and social organisation 
had the effect of freezing claims of different tribes to particular pieces of land which they 
could call home and calling an externally induced halt to the dynamic interactions that various 
tribes had with each other and with their land before European colonisation (Berry 1992b, 
340).26 
In this context, the Nubians were categorised as ‘detribalised natives,’ an anomalous  
category that absorbed a range of Africans who ‘cannot be sent home as they either do not 
know to what reserve they belong or have lost all desire, and even the means, to live in the 
reserve to which their fathers belonged’ (District Commissioner Nairobi 1931c). In short, 
‘detribalised natives’ were mostly Africans displaced with various degrees of force by the 
British in order to serve them and who had developed urban lifestyles disconnected from  
those of their former ethnic communities. In their dealings with this category of native, the 
British focused infinitely more on the former trait (their disconnection from their ethnic 
community) than the latter (their service for the colonial order). There prevailed a desire to 
provide such Africans with the means to serve the British in the ‘modern’ ways they required 
(in this case militarily) while maintaining ‘traditional’ forms of social order. While content to 
benefit from their exposure to it, the colonial authorities did not believe Africans were  
morally ‘equipped to deal with the vicissitudes of town life’ (Burton 2001, 216) and did not 
yet deserve urban citizenship (Burton 2003). It is evident that the British hoped such people, 
including the Sudanese, would simply fade away. As Parsons (1997, 88) suggests, ‘[w]hile 
conventional histories of the [King’s African Rifles] and personal accounts of officers are full 
of praise for the loyalty and service of the Sudanese, the civil administration of Kenya would 
have preferred them to simply disappear when discharged from the army.’ Given the failure  
of the British to find a place for them, how they might resettle themselves independently and 
govern themselves in a manner satisfactory to the Colonial government as strangers in an 
environment of host communities they helped to subordinate, one can only imagine. 
 
 
26 Though, as Lynch (2011c, 16–7) notes with great clarity in her study of the Kalenjin, Native Administration was 
not always, or perhaps ever, quite this clear-cut and the boundaries were blurrier than the colonial authorities were 
willing to admit. 
Despite their best efforts to find a way of fitting the Nubians into their colonial 
administrative structures, the colonial authorities were ultimately unable to do so and 
eventually had to allow the Nubians to stay in Kibera, where they continued to be a thorn in  
the side of the colonial authorities whose last ditch effort to get them to move was to wilfully 
neglect to develop the area. Over the period from 1928, when the area was first turned over 
from military to civilian rule, up until the early 1950s, the population of Kibera grew as non- 
Nubians moved in (usually as tenants of or workers for the Nubians) while the size of the land 
shrunk. The authorities eroded the acreage available to the Sudanese by realigning the railway 
to pass right through Sudanese homesteads and building European sporting clubs and a golf 
course on the fringes of the settlement. The appropriated land was used for both government 
and private interests and by 1947 there were only 1,700 acres remaining (Parsons 1997, 110; 
de Smedt 2011, 74).27  The Nubians tried but failed to shore up their formerly special 
relationship with the government as a means of securing a place and privilege in Kenya. They 
began to move away from military roles to others and some Nubian families began to find 
their quality of life declining. Though many took government jobs, the Nubians were a small 
minority within those occupations. They had neither the strategic effect that their cousins had 
in West Nile (Uganda) or Sudan in terms of either solidifying the administrative and coercive 
apparatuses of the late colonial period nor the material and political benefits associated with 
such a role (cf. Johnson 2000). As independence approached, the Nubians found themselves 
in a precarious position of increasingly fragile superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the African 
population. 
  
27 Between 1946 and 1948 Nubian homesteads were destroyed with limited compensation for the realignment of 
the Kenya-Uganda railway. This was followed between then and the departure of the colonial government with 
appropriations of land for the Caledonian Football Stadium, the Harlequin Rugby and Football Ground, the Italian 
(Juventus) Football Ground, Woodley Estate (for European residences), the Impala European Club Area, Lang’ata 
Prison Quarry, Nairobi European Yacht Club, the Royal Nairobi Golf Club, and the Ministry of Works Housing 
Estate, Karanja (or Salama) estate, and other small plots for private European residences (Particularly interviews 1, 
2b, 7a, 31, 35, 38a, 38c, 44, 51; de Smedt 2011, 74–8). 
Independence  
If these contradictions had not already put the Nubians in a tenuous position, then 
independence itself did. Decolonisation presented a particular set of challenges for the 
Sudanese, pulling their loyalties in two directions as they navigated the difficult task of 
establishing themselves as Kenyans in political and not just military terms, and after more 
than six decades of identifying themselves as distinct from (and superior to) African Kenyans 
(Atieno-Odhiambo 1977, 7). In the pre-independence period, the colonial administration saw 
the Nubians as potential allies in a sea of African unrest, and in some ways continued to offer 
them special treatment (for example, by only selectively enforcing rules they knew the 
community did not like). However, on balance the 1950s was really the twilight of the era of 
special treatment for the Sudanese. Rather than take the advice of a handful of colonial 
officials who advocated keeping the Nubians onside, the government simply allowed the 
Sudanese to move even further into the background of their concern, distracted as they were 
by the Mau Mau uprising and increasing calls for independence. 
A complex and seemingly paradoxical position emerged amongst the community in 
response to the tensions of this historical turning point as it did in many ethnic communities   
in Kenya at the time, where some sustained a loyalty to the British while others sided with the 
African nationalists. The older generation clung to the now tenuous relationship they had with 
the British as a matter of pride in their military history but also to preserve their privilege and 
even their very right to a place in Kenya, which they likely perceived the African nationalists 
might be reluctant to grant. This generation made efforts to distance themselves from the Mau 
Mau independence movement and the emerging nationalists in order to prove their loyalty to 
the British. The older Sudanese felt strongly that they should not be treated like other   
Africans because of their special relationship to the colonial government, pleading to Lugard 
in London (in a likely bluff) that they ‘would rather pay non-native poll tax than be included 
category indigenous natives [sic]’ (Secretary of Sudanese Union 1940). 
The older generation interpreted the threat of losing their special status as an injustice 
and responded by seeking repatriation to the Sudan. Their application for repatriation was 
rejected in part because of costs but also because they were deemed insufficiently Sudanese, 
having lost all connection with the rural Sudanese way of life (Johnson 2009, 121; Parsons 
1997, 116). The repatriation attempt and the deliberate distancing from African nationalists 
must therefore be understood not simply as an expression of attitudes of superiority and 
attempts to retain privilege but also as attempts to compel the government to recognise the 
intractability of their belonging to Kibera and Kenya. Their attachment to the British (and 
associated privilege) must have appeared to these old soldiers as the only option they had for 
guaranteeing somewhere they could stay and continue to live with their families. It was at this 
point in history that the Nubians experienced a subtle but crucial shift in the quality of their 
stranger status. Where under the colonial authorities they could continue to think of 
themselves as sojourners, maintaining (however vaguely) the possibility of leaving Kenya, 
with the departure of the British it became imperative that they seek not only residence but 
membership, and not only socially but politically (Skinner 1979, 41; cf. Levine 1979, 31). In 
other words, they needed to seek meaningful and equal citizenship (cf. Peil 1971; Shack   
1979, 5–6; Skinner 1979, 284). 
A strong sense of belonging in Kenya (albeit in a peculiar category) and aspirations 
therefore for full membership in the Kenyan polity were taken up much less ambiguously by 
the younger generation. While the older generation sought either repatriation or the 
continuation of their privilege as a strategy to maintain their close connection to the British 
administration, the younger generation were beginning to identify with the African cause and 
rebuffed the idea of returning to the Sudan. This generation was beginning to see that mere 
tolerance or social acceptance would not be enough. Instead the postcolonial era required 
political integration of residents as citizens (cf. Shack 1979, 9–15). Furthermore, they started 
referring to themselves not as Sudanese but as Nubians, detecting the need to adopt an 
identity that would be more conducive to harmonious relations with other Kenyans after 
independence. We can see in this generational struggle, and the contradictory interpretations 
of history, a much deeper struggle for a place in Kenya. Ambiguous as the older generation’s 
claims about Sudan may have been, the overwhelming point of the repatriation attempt was 
that the Sudanese really did, by this time, have nowhere else to go to. Kibera was the only 
home they knew and they had deep and affective ties to Kenya whether they liked it or not. 
For example, some Sudanese wrote as early as the 1930s that: 
[i]t is also common knowledge that owing to such long and continuous service 
we have entirely lost touch with our country of origin and have owing to such 
service embraced Kenya Colony as our country of  adoption;  We  wish 
respectfully to emphasize that if we are forced to return to our country of origin 
we and our wives and children could be absolute strangers in the Sudan (ex- 
King’s African Rifles soldiers 1938). 
At the moment of independence in 1963, despite the fact that Kenya had effectively become 
their home, the Nubians remained in an ambiguous position in the country. The British left in 
too much of a rush to resolve the status of the Sudanese community. Neither the tenure of the 
land in Kibera or the other Nubian settlements, or their status as Kenyans was ever clarified 
and the political sensitivity of ownership of land in Kibera has perpetuated the neglect and 
marginalisation that began after the transfer to civil rule in 1928, if not earlier. As Osborn 
(2006, 23–4) puts it, ‘[s]omewhere between being Kenyan and non-Kenyan, nationalist and 
British supporter, privileged and impoverished, legal and illegal, owner and squatter, the 
status of the Nubian community has remained tenuous’. 
 
Post-Independence 
 
The decades after independence marked a rapid decline in the status and lifestyle of the 
Nubians in Kibera and other parts of Kenya. The political landscape in Kenya changed in 
ways the Nubians were neither well positioned nor well equipped to handle. The Nubians 
were lost without their former military patrons and unsure of how to proceed with claiming 
their rights and establishing themselves as rightful members of the Kenyan political 
community. Not only were they too small in number to have much electoral influence but 
their colonial loyalties and military history worked against them, reinforcing their stranger 
status. 
As ethnicity, particularly of the indigenous and autochthonous variety, came to 
dominate Kenya’s recognition and distribution regimes and shape citizenship, the Nubians 
only became more marginalised socially, economically, politically and on the land they 
perceived as their own. In what follows, I establish the ways in which politics in Kenya has 
been, from the citizen’s perspective, a highly localised and personalised affair. Building on 
structures of political organisation and ethnic territorialisation entrenched in the brief but 
powerful colonial period, postcolonial political leaders sustained modes of governance, 
administration, development and control that incentivised local and therefore largely ethnic 
patrimonial networks. Combined with unfavourable socio-economic conditions, particularly 
from the 1980s, this has resulted in a political culture in which the most obvious path to 
emerge from marginalisation and remedy citizenship deficits is through a localised, ethnic 
politics of claims to rights, political belonging and patronage. As such, the patterns of 
political activity that dominate Kenya’s recognition and distribution regimes are reinforced 
not only via pressures from above, from the state, but also from pressures from below, as 
citizens sensibly position themselves to make the most of the prevailing political culture 
(Cheeseman 2009; Holmquist 1984). 
At the same time as the Nubian community was struggling with its own identification 
and relationship to Sudan and Kenya, the Kenyan political elite were embarking on a struggle 
over Kenya’s political future that remains unresolved today. The two major political parties at 
independence, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), representing mostly the  
smaller tribes of the Rift Valley and Coast, and white settlers, and the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), dominated by larger tribes, particularly the Kikuyu and Luo who together 
comprised nearly 40 per cent of the total population at the time, held competing visions of the 
best way to govern this ethnically diverse polity (Gertzel 1970; Throup 1993, 373). Fearing  
the consequences if the major tribes were to attain control over the central state, which they 
did, KADU maintained that a decentralised electoral and administrative apparatus would best 
serve the needs of Kenya’s diverse (and particularly the smaller) communities, and bring  
about the most equitable development outcomes. This became known as the majimboist 
position, jimbo being the Swahili word for state or province (Anderson 2010). While KANU 
agreed to this at the pre-independence constitutional forums in London, with a majority in 
parliament and with KANU’s leader Jomo Kenyatta holding the Presidency, KANU rapidly 
dismantled the majimboist constitution, compelled the majority of KADU members to cross 
the floor and join KANU within a year and in doing so established a highly centralised one- 
party state that lasted nearly three decades. 
KANU’s vision was, ostensibly, a more nationalist one. Under the leadership of Jomo 
Kenyatta, KANU became one of Africa’s most successful and stable nationalist parties. 
However, nationalism in Kenyatta’s terms did not mean the development of a state apparatus 
and political culture in which all Kenya’s tribes were equal or equally Kenyan. Rather, 
Kenyatta and KANU deracialised but did not genuinely democratise the state or unite the 
Kenyan nation (Mutua 2008, 76). Kenyatta’s nationalism primarily sought to limit fracturing, 
and the centralised and controlling nature of the state was a response to this need to prevent 
any form of rebellion that would threaten stability. This brand of nationalism was not one that 
built any genuine national cohesion or equity. Not only did it fail to adequately address 
underlying sources of division but it actively contributed to them. 
Both the nationalist influence under Kenyatta and majimboist influence under Moi have 
contributed to the privileging of recognition of indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity as the 
primary condition for citizenship in Kenya over other modes of recognition and distribution. 
Neither the nationalist nor majimboist agendas have been enacted in ways that that could 
enhance democracy and equality though both theoretically contain the potential to do so. 
Instead, their invocation has been consistently characterised by competition, vested interests 
and fear. 
In addition to the supposed nationalist alternative, a more liberal agenda has also 
periodically challenged the pre-eminence of ethnic logics in political life. Particularly since  
the return to multipartyism in the early 1990s, pro-democracy activists have mobilised around 
ideas of human rights and constitutionalism. These groups have lobbied on the streets,  
through civil society and through more formal political processes for a new constitution that 
would bring about not just a change in the letter of the law but in political culture, such that 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law would be respected from the top to the bottom of 
society. These efforts culminated, finally, in the 2010 constitution. However, despite recent 
gains in legislative and institutional design, the enactment of liberal values among state actors 
and ordinary citizens remains limited, while the superior salience of ethnicity persists   
(Berman 1998; Branch 2011, 16; Cheeseman 2009; Lonsdale 2008; Lynch 2011c). 
Kenya’s postcolonial history, and the history of the Nubians within it, is thus 
characterised by multiple struggles over the role of ethnicity in politics and citizenship. In 
what follows I outline the major periods in Kenya’s post-independence history and explain 
how each contributed to the pre-eminence of ethnic logics in political life and subsequent 
citizenship deficits for ethnic stranger groups like the Nubians. 
 
Kenyatta  (1963–1978) 
 
Jomo Kenyatta’s period in the Kenyan Presidency was one characterised by stability and 
economic progress achieved through an authoritarian, centralised state. It was also a period 
during which the seeds of future discontent were sown. Though hailed as one of the great 
African nationalists of the era, Kenyatta was an ideologically moderate political character 
whose period of imprisonment under the British during the Mau Mau rebellion and the 
Emergency gave him appeal among Africans but whose conciliatory rhetoric, centrist politics 
and economic ideology ultimately made him a more acceptable figure to the British than more 
radical alternative leaders such as Oginga Odinga or even Tom Mboya (Branch and 
Cheeseman 2006, 20; Hornsby 2013, 67–8). As such, Kenyatta enjoyed an unchallenged 
position at the helm of the young nation and widespread political support within KANU and 
among the population at large as well as (eventually) from departing colonial authorities. 
Nevertheless, though his personal position was secure from early on, Kenyatta inherited a 
polity that not only had never been a cohesive nation but was deliberately divided along 
ethnic lines through the structure of the provincial administration, the prohibition of national 
political parties that lasted until 1960 and differences in economic development between 
ethnic groups (Gertzel 1970, 9). Faced with the challenge of how to govern such a nation, 
Kenyatta chose to use his power to entrench particular patterns of social, political and 
economic hierarchy that were born under colonialism: ethnicised patrimonial networks, 
hierarchies of power and development between ethnic groups, the preclusion of nationally 
appealing, programmatic political agendas and parties, and the strengthening of centralised 
control over highly localised political culture (Gertzel 1970; Mutua 2008, 58–65). Through 
the combined use of neo-patrimonialism and coercion Kenyatta was able to both entrench 
himself as mzee, the father of the nation (baba taifa), and prevent the young polity from 
fragmenting.28  
However, there were costs for the democratic credentials of the Kenyan state. Kenyatta 
established both a state apparatus of governance and control, and a culture of development   
and distribution that would entrench localised and therefore ethnic relationships as the   
primary political relationships for citizens. Over decades scholars have agreed that the 
powerful Executive Presidency, combined with a relatively weak legislature, strong   
incentives for opponents to incorporate into the establishment as well as strong mechanisms   
of control (especially in the provincial administration) have been defining features of the 
Kenyan state (Branch and Cheeseman 2006; Mueller 2008; Tamarkin 1978). It was also  
during Kenyatta’s period that some of the grievances that continue to fuel ethnic conflict  
today occurred, particularly around land distribution and inequitable development between 
ethnic groups and regions. All of these legacies were rooted in the impulse toward the 
formation of an elite class and the preservation of privileges and advantages that Kenyatta and 
other elites had forged in the late days of colonialism (Branch and Cheeseman 2006, 19).29 
    
28 Such as that threatened by the Shifta wars. 
 
29 One of the ways in which the independence elite established its position as such was by demonstrating loyalty to 
the British during the Mau Mau era and therefore accessing positions of authority in the state that helped them 
transition through independence as an elite class. This divide, between loyalists and African nationalists, has never 
been healed or even widely discussed in Kenya. 
One of the most profound legacies of the Kenyatta era has been a significantly 
strengthened Executive and weaker legislature. With the same speed and vigour with which 
he dismantled the majimboist decentralisation arrangements, Kenyatta strengthened his own 
office by both altering the constitution a number of times and by surrounding himself with 
people loyal to him. Kenyatta’s cabinet was stacked with such politicians, as were the major 
Ministries, and all their activities were centralised in Nairobi. This had the effect of further 
strengthening the loyalty of Cabinet Ministers and Ministry staff as people in these positions 
were able to use their access to the state to further build networks of patron–client 
relationships (Barkan and Chege 1989, 439; Tamarkin 1978, 303–4). Though the legislature 
in its early days witnessed lively debate (Gertzel 1970), it was much weaker than other 
systems of governance (particularly the provincial administration), and was shackled by the 
incorporation of MPs into vertical patronage networks which limited the likelihood of 
meaningful challenges to policy (Branch and Cheeseman 2006, 23–4; Hornsby 2013, 263).30 
 
The civil service was also weakened in this way, with the upper echelons stacked with 
Kikuyu employees loyal to the regime (Mutua 2008, 268; Tamarkin 1978, 307) leading 
Hornsby (2013, 124) to note that ‘by 1964 there was already disquiet among other 
communities that Africanisation was ‘Kikuyuisation’ in disguise.’31  An approach to human 
resources management in the civil service that privileged ethnic identity and secured loyalty 
through patrimonial distribution of jobs and other perks fostered a culture in which civil 
servants were supporters of the status quo first, technocratic or bureaucratic specialists 
second. The decay of institutions responsible for policy leadership and implementation was 
  
30 The term 1969–1974 had a stronger legislature than other terms, including a number of MPs who spoke out in 
Parliament about the death of JM Kariuki in 1975. This dissent did not last long as Kenyatta cracked down on 
those politicians using both sticks and carrots, described further below. 
31 Though Hornsby (2013, 175) notes that the evidence is not as compelling as the common rhetoric around this 
 
issue. In 1969, Kikuyus made up 20 per cent of the population and 35 per cent of the top civil service positions, as 
well as being over represented in the elites of the civil service – the concentration was greater at the higher levels 
of government than throughout the administration. 
exacerbated in the later 1970s as Kenyatta and senior political staff became complacent and 
these patterns of governance became most deeply entrenched (Hornsby 2013, 279). 
At the same time as Kenyatta weakened parliamentary structures he strengthened 
administrative ones in his favour. The provincial administration, inherited from the colonial 
era, gave Kenyatta a hierarchy of provincial commissioners, district commissioners, chiefs 
and assistant chiefs that he used to enhance his personal control across the country. It was the 
chiefs and district commissioners who had the most contact with the citizenry and therefore 
had the most capacity to influence the population. The Head of the Administration, 
responsible for its control and supervision, was the Permanent Secretary of the Office of the 
President (Tamarkin 1978, 306). District commissioners and chiefs wielded significant 
powers as they were responsible for some of the most important control and distributive 
functions of the state: law and order, chairing land boards, agricultural and harambee 
committees,32  and manipulating local KANU branches to monitor and repress opposition 
 
within the party (Tamarkin 1978, 307). They were ‘lords in their own realms’ (Barkan and 
Chege 1989, 438) who, like parliamentary politicians, were able to use their position to grow 
clientelist networks. Under Kenyatta, these officers became more powerful than the   
legislature or conventional legal system (Branch and Cheeseman 2006). The hollowing out of 
the middle regional level of the administrative and governance apparatus that started with the 
dismantling of majimboism and accelerated with the strengthening of the provincial 
administration served to strengthen the centre, the centre’s influence on the local level and the 
experience of the very local (district) as the most significant political arena (Gertzel 1970,   
13). 
The might of Kenyatta’s coercive apparatus, in addition to the centralisation of power, 
further impaired the development of alternative political programs and parties. Kenyatta 
successfully controlled all opposition either through coercion or integration into the KANU 
  
32 Harambee is Swahili for ‘let’s pull together’ and harambee committees were the primary mechanisms of 
development, as explained further below. 
establishment (Hornsby 2013, 169–175; Tamarkin 1978). After subsuming KADU in 1964, 
another radical left-wing party, Oginga Odinga’s Kenya People’s Union, was formed from 
KANU dissidents in 1966 and then also collapsed, in 1969, when it was banned by Kenyatta 
after only three brief years in which its activities were significantly curtailed by the provincial 
administration (Throup 1993, 373–5). Kenya thus became a de facto one party state and 
remained that way (later de jure) until 1992. At least under Kenyatta, a degree of competition 
and dissent was allowed within the party. There were free and fair elections at the local level 
but these were competitions between personalities and patrimonial promises, rather than 
parties with ideological or programmatic agendas. The quality of a politician’s patronage 
became the key to his (rarely her) political success. The personalisation of politics in this way 
was to have long-term consequences for later patterns of personal networks taking precedence 
over programmatic political parties as sources of legitimacy and political influence (Throup 
1993). Not only were alternative parties precluded but even the party apparatus as a site of 
policy development and ideological cohesion within KANU was sent into decay as Kenyatta 
preferred to exercise authority through the more amenable provincial administration (Branch 
and Cheeseman 2006, 22). 
For situations in which the party mechanism was not sufficient for co-opting  opposition, 
Kenyatta also had a formidable security force. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Kenyatta 
stacked the military with loyal Kikuyu and non-aligned British and Kamba   personnel 
(Hornsby 2013, 180–82, 230) and senior police roles with his fellow Kikuyu (Hornsby 2013, 
231; Tamarkin 1978, 300). The police remained largely docile while the (predominantly 
Kikuyu) General Services Unit (GSU), established in the late 1960s, became Kenyatta’s force 
of choice for quelling more significant episodes of upheaval (Hornsby 2013, 231; Tamarkin 
1978, 300). There were multiple political assassinations during Kenyatta’s  time (of Pio Gama 
Pinto in 1965, Tom Mboya in 1969, and JM Kariuki in 1975), and frequent detention of other 
political dissenters sent a loud, clear message (Holmquist 1984, 76). 
Though there was some civil society, including some trade unions and a reasonably free 
press, any threat these institutions posed to the regime was mitigated by the strength of the 
provincial administration and security forces so they were unable to successfully influence 
policy (Hornsby 2013, 191–2; Tamarkin 1978; Throup 1993). 
Above all, Kenyatta’s most effective method for securing support from the population 
and steering the young nation through its first decades of independence was neo- 
patrimonialism, drawing on the resources of a stable state facing relatively little pressure on 
resources from a relatively small population. Kenyatta presided over strong rates of economic 
growth in the 1960s (6 per cent annual growth of GDP between 1964–1969) and stabilised   
but stagnating growth in the 1970s as government became more complacent (Hornsby 2013, 
128, 290). A combination of commercial and small-scale agriculture, especially the cash   
crops of tea and coffee, were the mainstay of the economy while some industrialisation 
supplemented this income. This economic stability was achieved through balancing  
centralised economic planning with support for private enterprise, modelled on colonial 
economic policy (Hornsby 2013, 220). The Kenyan population was 8.6 million at 
independence in 1963 and 15 million in 1979, shortly after his death (Hornsby 2013, 199,  
386). This represented a rate of growth of 3.3 per cent per year, which was to cause a major 
demographic issue in the 1970s and 1980s as Kenya would have one of the highest ratios of 
unproductive to productive individuals in the world, but this was not on Kenyatta’s watch 
(Hornsby 2013, 199). Another risk that developed under Kenyatta but became consequential 
under Moi was debt. From the moment of independence when the Kenyan government was 
forced to take a substantial loan from the British government to buy back white-owned farms, 
debt began to grow as more and more loans were taken from bilateral and multilateral donors. 
For many ordinary Kenyans, though, the Kenyatta era was one where they experienced real 
positive changes in their lives with increased incomes and access to education (Horsnby 2013, 
306). With the exception of the landless, the problems with debt and poor structuring of the 
economy would not be visible to ordinary Kenyans until after Kenyatta’s death. Without the 
same pressure Moi would later face to push for higher levels of economic production,  
Kenyatta and others with access to the state were free to use the considerable patrimonial 
resources available to the state to shore up not only their own personal position and wealth 
but also that of those loyal to them. 
Of those resources, land was and remains the most powerful and controversial.  
Kenyatta and his close ally Jackson Angaine (Minister of Lands and Settlements from 1963 to 
1979) used land policy to structure land ownership along ethnic lines and to reward elite 
figures loyal to them with easy access to large farms (Hornsby 2013, 108). The settlement 
schemes of the Kenyatta era, funded by loans to buy white farms, enabled the resettlement of 
90,000 families who had been displaced by colonisation of the White Highlands, but many 
others remained landless while one quarter of the bought-back former white farms were 
distributed as large farms, affordable only by the wealthy (Horsnby 2013, 303). Though the 
success of the settlement schemes in terms of stimulating agricultural production and  
resettling the landless were limited, their continuation throughout Kenyatta’s period in power 
had the advantage of sustaining hope among the landless that their time might come, and 
thereby quelling possible dissent. Meanwhile, a land consolidation and registration process 
was taking place in the former reserves in ways that actively maintained the ethnic patterns of 
settlement of the colonial period. There was significant resistance from ordinary residents to 
sanctioning land for ‘non-indigenous’ groups, and local land boards worked to privilege 
‘indigenous’ groups in granting of titles. In the Rift Valley and Coast areas historical patterns 
of settlement were confused by multiple historical layers of ‘indigeneity’ and the movement 
and settlement of squatters displaced during colonialism. The distribution of land in these  
areas to mixed ethnic groups through both settlement schemes and registration of land in 
former reserves (in particular the movement of Kikuyu to areas outside their ‘traditional’ 
homeland) caused tension at the time that has exploded since in multiple episodes of inter- 
ethnic violence (Anderson and Lochery 2008, 337; Hornsby 2013, 251). 33 
The management of the Kenyan economy and the distribution of resources was thus 
within a regime of deep contradictions, entailing capitalist impulses, centralised planning and 
 
33 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of land distribution. 
strong neo-patrimonial practices (cf. Mutua 2008, 63). The commodification of agricultural 
production, land, property and labour that underpinned all of these dimensions of the Kenyan 
economy represented a significant consolidation of colonial restructuring of Kenyan society 
that fundamentally changed many traditional social orders, for example between generations 
and genders, but especially between the rich and the poor (Berman 1998). This management  
of the economy, development and land policies had two significant effects: it strengthened the 
primacy of ethnicity in economic and political life and this in turn served to mitigate the 
possibility of alliances across emerging lower classes, even in a context of dramatically 
increasing inequalities, not only between but within ethnic groups. 
Inequalities between ethnic groups became and remain a major source of resentment in 
Kenya (cf. Gertzel 1970, 17; Hornsby 2013, 254–8). The White Highlands in and around 
Central Province demonstrated a far higher degree of incorporation into the colonial era 
capitalist economy than other areas. Though their displacement from white farms constituted  
a grave injustice, this meant that tribes from that region, especially Kikuyu, were better 
positioned to benefit from the capitalist economy after independence (Gertzel 1970, 16). In 
this way, Kenyatta’s own tribe, or rather elites from his own tribe, achieved faster and greater 
development than others. By the late 1970s there was a 15-year difference in life expectancy 
at birth between Central Province (majority Kikuyu) and Nyanza (Hornsby 2013, 306). 
However, from the perspective of economic development, there were also more 
significant inequalities emerging within ethnic groups and across the population more 
generally. By the mid-1970s, control of the state and its resources had established a small but 
powerful elite who ruled the country and ‘dominated politics, the civil service, business, 
large-scale farming, parastatals and most formal and informal power structures’ (Hornsby 
2013, 254). At the other end of the spectrum were the majority of Kenyans. Though the 
proportion of people living in poverty was decreasing, life for those in poverty was becoming 
much harder and this included significant portions of the population in all ethnic groups, 
including the Kikuyu: the landless, small farmers, the unemployed and pastoralists (Hornsby 
2013, 306). These people had (and have) more in common with each other than with elites of 
their own ethnic groups. Yet, patterns of governance, control and development encouraged 
them to look not to each other for support or to form alliances and demand more of the state, 
but instead to look to their ethnic leaders. Ethnic patrimonialism was calculated to be more 
likely to bring about a change in one’s life than class solidarity. Only a tiny handful of voices 
(Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia, JM Kariuki, though himself a beneficiary of elite favour) in 
power in the state were speaking out to demand pro-poor policies and were ultimately 
silenced.34  Unions, which in any event only served those formally employed, were divided by 
 
political views and ethnicity and deliberately weakened by the state (Hornsby 2013, 191–2). 
The response of the state and political leaders to inequality only exacerbated these problems. 
In response to ethno-regional inequalities and the need for development in other areas, 
Kenyatta fostered the harambee system. It has been variously argued that the harambee 
system was an effort to balance out inequalities in development (Cheeseman 2009, 103), and 
that it served only to further entrench ethno-regional inequalities (Holmquist 1984, 86). Both 
analyses hold some truth. Harambee, meaning ‘let’s pull together’, was a self-help approach 
to development that required local communities to initiate ideas and proposals and then seek 
support for them from patrons at the district and national levels in elected and civil servant 
positions. Communities contribute to fund the majority of the initial outlays associated with 
construction and the state funds recurring costs. Harambee was therefore a ‘half-way brand’ 
of self-help, requiring a self-starting community but also dependent on considerable financial 
and technical assistance from the state (Holmquist 1984). Politicians and people in positions 
of authority at all levels – from chiefs to MPs – were expected to use their leverage with the 
central state to attract technical and financial support for a project and also to make personal 
contributions to the fundraising. 
This approach had the effect of making development highly localised and personalised, 
where identifiable patrons took credit, along with their local counterparts, for schools, clinics, 
34 JM Kariuki was murdered in 1975. According to Branch and Cheeseman (2006, 27), his calls for pro-poor 
policies were not as radical as Odinga’s and Kaggia’s (for example calls for land caps) but were rather demands 
that the elite better fulfil their role as patrons of the poor. 
agricultural infrastructure and other development projects. Decades of this practice 
entrenched networks of patronage that extended throughout the civil service and KANU. 
Harambee has been described as a double-edged sword for democracy: on the one hand this 
gave the wananchi,35  particularly in rural areas, a degree of influence over state budgets and 
 
policy (attracting spending on their interests) and ensured a degree of accountability insofar  
as political leaders and civil servants were forced to prove their worth by delivering support 
(Hornsby 2013, 261). On the other hand, it enabled a neutralisation of any class conflict or 
peasant resistance by fostering a vertical self-help mentality that cut across class (instead 
drawing on location and therefore ethnicity) and providing a semblance of state assistance for 
development that could ward off more extensive claims on the state (Holmquist 1984). In 
doing so, the practice of harambee further limited the possibility of trans-ethnic nation 
building, instead favouring highly parochial initiatives and the consequently ethnicised 
patronage networks that supported them. Further, by acting as the primary forum for a 
relationship between the state and its citizenry, harambee also had the effect of instilling in 
both politicians and citizens the belief that delivering tangible goods to one’s constituency 
(read, in most cases: ethnic community) is the measure of a good public figure and leader. 
This has since been more prevalent than any notion of a good politician as one who takes 
seriously the obligations of parliamentary service, legislative initiative, policy change or 
nation building. Finally, harambee also contributed to the establishment of a hierarchy of 
ethnic groups in Kenya, and longstanding and still prevalent feelings of injustice regarding 
the unequal distribution of state largesse to certain ethnic groups: wealthier communities, 
under this scheme, become wealthier faster because of their greater access to internal 
community funds, organising ability and technical capacity (Holmquist 1984, 80). 
During Kenyatta’s time the Nubians’ position in Kenya was characterised by 
invisibility on multiple fronts. As a small minority predominantly in an urban population, the 
Nubians were sheltered from the tensions around land that were brewing in places like the 
 
35 Wananchi is Swahili for ‘ordinary citizens’ or ‘the people’. 
Rift Valley and they did not suffer the same variety of high-profile landlessness as former 
Kikuyu squatters. Yet their anomalous position in the city generated a different kind of 
disadvantage for this community. Though they were not targets of hostility or exclusion from 
the state and its resources, their invisibility in the city and the assumptions that urban areas 
were not sites of ethnic contest over land meant that the Nubians’ primary concern, land  
rights to Kibera, which they believed would in turn secure political membership and 
citizenship, was ignored. 
Though the Nubians reside predominantly in Nairobi they were not immune from the 
consequences of a culture, fostered by Kenyatta, of treating land as a patronage resource. In 
fact, their urban locale made their land even more attractive for such uses. As described  
above, even before independence ‘land grabbing’ had taken place, by independence in 1963 
only 1,150 acres was remaining of the original 4,197.9 acres of Kibera and the Nubians 
numbered approximately 3,000 out of 9,000 Kiberans at that time (Amis 1983, 115; Clark 
1978–1979, 36; Kibra Land Committee 2001). From 1963 land grabbing accelerated,  
primarily for National Housing Corporation Projects designed to redress the severe housing 
shortage. This was enabled by a decision in 1966 by the District Commissioner of Nairobi   
that Kibera would be treated as ordinary state land and there would be no special rights for   
the Nubians (Osborn 2012, 89). Population growth and land use also increased through the far 
more insidious upsurge in informal and illegal housing structures and small rooms as low-cost 
rental properties for the rapidly increasing numbers of rural Kenyans who had migrated to the 
city in search of economic opportunity. At first, under the only Nubian MP, Yunus Ali (MP 
from 1969 to 1974), the Nubians welcomed a large influx of Luos who were fleeing 
persecution in Kikuyu dominated areas of Nairobi after the assassination of the Luo politician 
Tom Mboya and the ethnic violence that followed in 1969. But this welcoming attitude 
reached its limits when the Nubians lost control of Kibera. 
Mwangi Maathai, who was MP for the area after Ali (from 1974 to 1979), was a 
Kikuyu with high-level connections to Kenyatta as a result of his senior position in the 
G(K)ikuyu, Embu Meru Association (GEMA), Kenyatta’s ethno-regional support base. 
Maathai, whose presence as MP in a major Nairobi constituency was in keeping with the 
patterns of political power of the era permitted a major, mostly illegal and informal influx of 
other Kenyans – especially Kikuyu investors – into Kibera, treating it as a ‘patrimonial cash 
cow’ (Osborn 2006, 30) and reflecting the height of ethnicised patrimonial distribution of 
land and economic opportunity at that time.36  The provincial administration was also staffed 
with people associated with GEMA, including Chief Kamau Kariuki, who wielded 
considerable control over the area in ways that benefited Kikuyus wanting to establish 
investments in Nairobi.37  During this period, the population of Kibera increased from 20,000 
in 1975 to 60,000–65,000 in 1980 (de Smedt 2011, 97). The influx of non-Nubians, 
particularly Kikuyus, to Kibera when it was under Kikuyu control had a transformational 
effect on the nature of the area. 
The Nubians failed to integrate with the newcomers to their area, maintaining what 
Clark (1970) described as two separate populations in Kibera; a population of young, 
heterogeneous, migrant labourers and a population of homogenous (Nubian) landlords 
depending primarily on rental income. The Nubians maintained a sense of community among 
themselves through a large number of associations and the exclusion of non-Nubians, 
prompting Clark (1970, 16) and Atieno-Odhiambo (1977, 8) to label the Nubians ‘urban 
villagers’. Clark (1970, 9) reported that Nubians (the landlords) were significantly less 
educated, had much lower incomes and were much more likely to be unemployed than other 
residents of Kibera. 
In political and administrative terms the Nubians’ influence was limited even before 
but especially after the influx of outsiders to Kibera. In his one term the Nubian MP Yunus 
Ali was unable to secure any of the Nubians’ goals, despite raising the land issue in 
Parliament (de Smedt 2011, 94). A number of Nubians were involved in local chapters of 
KANU (Johnson 2009, 127), though none other than Yunus Ali in any significant capacity 
36 The informal rental sector is extremely lucrative (and Kibera one of the most lucrative of all locations) with 
returns on investment within one year, and on-going tax-free income (Syagga et al 2002, 15). 
37 Chief Kamau Kariuki was Chief for Nairobi West from 1972 to 1979. 
nationally (Interviews 19, 35). There were occasional Nubians in the lower levels of the local 
administration who were helpful with small administrative issues, for example Nubians were 
able to get ID cards when they were made universally compulsory in 1978. However, access 
to the state’s resources were at such a low level, and the Nubians were such a minority in an 
urban context, that Nubian chiefs were not able to make a significant difference to livelihood 
or political status of the Nubian community. The repercussions of this position, like the 
repercussions of many economic and political dynamics fostered under Kenyatta, would 
become much more significant under and after Moi. 
The Kenyatta period was, thus, one of severe deprivation for the Nubians in terms of 
land and enrichment of others with greater access to patronage networks that extended right to 
the Presidency through elites associated with GEMA (Amis 1983; Osborn 2012, 97). In this 
context, as de Smedt (2011, 99) explains, within a few decades of independence ‘[i]t was   
clear that the Nubis did not have any special position anymore in Kenya, no leverage with the 
Kenyan government, and no one to stand up for them’. The Nubians’ relative inability to  
make in-roads into the patrimonial networks that represented the most likely avenue to 
development, however unreliable even for the poor of the big tribes, served to also position  
the community on the margins of other economic opportunities and politics. While the  
Nubians were able to avoid being targets of hostility or outright exclusion during this period, 
others were able to more successfully navigate and exploit the patrimonial possibilities of 
Kibera and Nairobi. The Kenyatta period instead laid much of the groundwork for the 
Nubians’ later more severe marginalisation. 
In relation to the Kenyatta era, Tamarkin argued in 1978 that ‘[t]he heyday of 
‘tribalism’ in Kenyan politics was on the eve of independence in the early 1960s when 
political alignments were tribally based’ (313) and ‘Kenyan politics is basically class politics’ 
(312). Though the Kenyatta era was not one of open and widespread ethnic conflict, with 
hindsight it is clear that it laid the foundations for a far more tribalistic politics under Moi and 
the major ethnic conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s. Far from Kenyan politics being class 
politics, as Tamarkin argued, the establishment of vertical channels of patronage, governance, 
administration, development and control that began with the Executive President and reached 
out through the provincial administration and politicians to their ethno-regional bases 
neutralised the political salience of class and refocused political attentions on ethnicity. 
Patronage became the primary route to resources, power, prestige and security and, as a result 
of the tribal delineation of administrative units, patronage networks tended to be ethnic 
networks. Furthermore, Kenyatta cemented a hierarchy of ethnic groups, established first by 
the colonial powers, with Kikuyus on top. Perceptions of historical injustice associated with 
the Kikuyus’ perceived position of privilege have been major drivers of later ethnic conflicts 
(cf. Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004, 9). 
 
Moi (1978–2002)  
When Daniel arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta upon his death in 1978, within a short time he 
found himself facing a very different, far less favourable set of circumstances for governing 
Kenya. The economy had slowed by the late 1970s and early 1980s and the benefits of the 
coffee boom and popular support arising from land settlement schemes were running out  
while population and debt were both increasing. Together, these factors left Moi with far  
fewer patrimonial resources with which to build a support base. At the same time, his need to 
garner support within political circles was greater than Kenyatta’s. Moi never enjoyed the 
same popular or elite legitimacy as Kenyatta, who had independence struggle credentials and 
ethnic and political influence that Moi could not match. Further, senior posts in ministries, the 
civil service, the provincial administration and the security forces were, when Moi arrived at 
State House, stacked with Kenyatta supporters, not all of whom were happy that Moi, of the 
Tugen ethnic group (a sub-group of the Kalenjin), had taken over the Presidency. With his 
leadership, legitimacy and control under greater pressure than Kenyatta’s ever were, Moi 
resorted to extreme lengths to maintain his position as President and his control over the 
direction of the country. In doing so, Moi eroded many of the patrimonial networks  
established under Kenyatta, but he also significantly eroded Kenya’s democracy. Ultimately, 
despite early promises and signs of a broad trans-ethnic ruling coalition, Moi did not 
undermine the primacy of ethnicity in politics but only altered its nature. 
Moi took the centralisation of power and strengthening of the Office of the President 
even further than Kenyatta. To consolidate his position in the early days of his regime, Moi 
had to dismantle Kenyatta’s ethno-regional base, the GEMA coalition, within the cabinet, 
parliament, ministries, provincial administration and security forces, which he achieved 
through widespread staffing changes in the first three years in power (Barkan and Chege  
1989, 434–5; Hornsby 2013, 335–8). Though Moi was loyal to Kalenjin allies, he did not 
simply replace one ethnic elite with another but rather built trans-ethnic coalitions, including 
with loyal Kikuyus. In addition to shifting staff, Moi also moved important government 
functions and ministries, such as defence, lands and settlements directly into his own office 
(Hornsby 2013, 344). In 1982, not satisfied that staffing and institutional changes would bring 
about adequate control, Moi began reducing the powers of the provincial commissioners and 
strengthening the districts, emasculating the middle men to shorten the distance between the 
President and the wananchi, further strengthening his personal position (Barkan and Chege 
1989, 439; Throup 1993). Throughout his rule and on top of formal changes, Moi also  
engaged in establishing new networks of patrimonialism that would replace Kenyatta’s and 
instead advantage the new leader. Corruption and prebendalism became key features of Moi’s 
rule throughout the 1980s (Hornsby 2013, 369). 
Particularly after a thwarted coup attempt in 1982 Moi also resorted to more overt 
control tactics within and outside of parliamentary politics. He modified the constitution in 
1982 to make Kenya a de jure one party state and then exerted even further control within 
KANU by continuing to dismiss and relocate MPs, provincial administration staff and civil 
servant staff to prevent them consolidating any power of their own. He also eliminated 
political dissent outside of electoral politics detaining activists, particularly middle class and 
professional activists – academics and lawyers (Mazrui and Mutunga 1995) – and opposition 
politicians including Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia and Raila Odinga, son of Oginga 
Odinga. Moi also deployed outright violence in the suspected assassination of politician 
Robert Ouko in 1990, the violent suppression of the Saba Saba pro-democracy 
demonstrations on 7 July 1990 that were animated in part by Ouko’s murder, and the 
extrajudicial detention and torture of suspected members of the underground Marxist group 
Mwakenya and other suspected dissidents. Furthermore, Moi took the use of the provincial 
administration for coercive purposes to even greater extremes than had been seen under 
Kenyatta. Particularly before the return to multipartyism, when his control over the 
administration began to wane, his use of the provincial administration became even more 
brutal and partisan (Osborn 2012, 113). 
Moi’s efforts to centralise control in his own office even extended to harambee. As  
with the provincial administration, Moi’s objective was to cut out the middlemen and exert 
more direct control over local processes, in this case development processes. Given the 
importance of harambee during the Kenyatta period to the development and maintenance of 
the stature and influence of local public figures, it was crucial for Moi that the social and 
political benefits associated with delivering development goods not be available to those who 
might seek to undermine him. Moi, a true populist who also had genuine concern for the 
welfare of the wananchi, became personally involved in grandiose harambees across the 
county, mobilised state resources around mega-projects to boost his own close allies 
(especially around election times), used the harambee gatherings as opportunities to announce 
new populist policies and ordered the provincial administration to closely monitor harambees 
to further prevent the influence of those who did not support him (Barkan and Chege 1989, 
437; Cheeseman 2009, 103; Holmquist 1984, 83–4). In addition, in 1982 Moi introduced 
‘District Focus’, an effort at administrative decentralisation for development projects that 
would address the growing inequality in the country and in particular improve development in 
rural areas loyal to him (Hornsby 2013, 424). With KADU as his first, ‘District Focus’ has 
been described as Moi’s second majimboism; an attempt to promote ethno-regional equality 
through decentralised decision-making (Barkan and Chege 1989, 437). However, neither 
harambees nor ‘District Focus’ resulted in greater democratic involvement of the wananchi in 
decision-making but simply served to enhance local administrative but not political power 
(Barkan and Chege 1989, 440–46; Hornsby 2013, 425). 
The coercive tactics Moi deployed against opposition leaders and activists, and his 
localised approach to development, limited democracy in serious ways. However, Moi 
became most infamous internationally for the rigging, coercion and violence associated with 
elections. In 1988 Moi went so far as to initiate queue voting rather than voting via secret 
ballot, a move which significantly eroded whatever legitimacy remained for him in the eyes 
of the Kenyan public (Cheeseman 2009; Throup 1993). The coercive handling of the 1988 
election in particular was so severe that, in conjunction with the other dictatorial activities of 
the Moi regime and in tandem with political change across the continent, Kenya’s pro- 
democracy movement began more forcefully to call for democratic change. This movement 
focused on a return to multipartyism and efforts to limit the powers of the President, features 
that, along with effective decentralisation, have preoccupied reform efforts in Kenya since. 
By the early 1990s it was no longer feasible for Moi to maintain such overt control   
over elections. Domestic pressures for reform grew significantly after the murder of Robert 
Ouko and the Saba Saba demonstrations in 1990, and civil society organisations (particularly 
the Law Society of Kenya and the National Council of Churches of Kenya) teamed up with an 
emerging opposition leadership in Kikuyu leaders Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba to 
demand a return to multiparty politics. In the post cold war environment, international support 
for Moi’s dictatorial ways was also decreasing, culminating in the Paris Group meeting of 
1992 where bilateral donors and international financial institutions, who had considerable 
leverage given the rapid growth of aid debt in the 1980s, agreed to withhold all non- 
humanitarian aid until political reforms were undertaken (Cheeseman 2009, 97; Hornsby  
2013, 421–4). Moi relented and allowed multipartyism to return but retained high though less 
absolute levels of control over the country. Moi and KANU retained control of parliament    
and the Presidency for another decade. In 1992 Moi won 36 per cent of the presidential vote, 
and KANU 100 of 188 seats (despite obtaining only 30 per cent of votes)38; and in 1997 Moi 
won 40 per cent of the presidential vote though KANU achieved only a four-seat majority in 
parliament. 
Though there was a formal return to multipartyism, the irregularities associated with   
the 1992 and 1997 elections were numerous and severe. Members of the electoral commission 
were hand picked by Moi; gerrymandering, including by changing the constitution, was 
rampant;39  civil servants were ordered to support KANU; there were widespread irregularities 
in voter registration; media coverage was biased; KANU’s extensive patronage networks   
were used to essentially bribe voters with cash and food; the oppositions’ freedom of  
assembly was restricted; there was outright fraud in tallying; and the provincial administration 
stuffed ballots (Brown 2001, 726–7; Cheeseman 2009, 98; Mazrui and Mutunga 1995; Rutten 
et al 2001; Throup 1993; Throup and Hornsby 1998). 
 
Most significant for its influence on later elections, however, was the violence that took 
place particularly around the 1992 election. In 1992, government-sponsored ethnic cleansing 
left 1,500 dead and 300,000 displaced. The violence was predominantly in the Rift Valley, 
where ethnically mixed groups had settled during the settlement schemes of the Kenyatta era, 
and around the borders of former colonial reserves where boundaries between ethnic 
‘territories’ were in question (Médard 1996). Politicians openly advocated ‘expulsion of 
“non-autochthonous ethnicities from the ‘KANU zone’”’ (Brown 2001, 727), meaning that 
Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kisii were evicted from Kalenjin or Maasai ‘territories’; a pattern 
repeated in 2007 (Anderson and Lochery 2008; Médard 1996). In 1997 there was violence on 
the Coast in the lead-up to the election, motivated by Mijikenda grievances over their 
exclusion from land rights since independence, and in the South-West, over the presence of 
ethnic ‘outsiders’ in Maasai Trans-Mara district (Hornsby 2013, 602). After the 1997 election 
(in early 1998), violence erupted in Laikipia district between Kikuyu and Samburu and Pokot 
38 The first past the post and various sizes of constituencies enabled this majority. 
 
39 Including, in August 1992, changes to the electoral system to require 25 per cent of the popular vote in five of 
eight provinces to become President, which, given the fractured nature of the opposition, only Moi could achieve. 
pastoralists, leaving 60 dead, and then in Nakuru between Kalenjin and Kikuyu, killing more 
than 120 (Hornsby 2013, 619). Over the 1990s more than 1,000 people were killed in the Rift 
Valley and more than 250,000 displaced in ethnic violence (Anderson and Lochery 2008, 
329). Perpetrators of these acts of violence have never been prosecuted. 
Though Moi argued that it was multipartyism that led to the chaos, a convenient fiction 
given his aversion to it, in fact it was the intimidation and physical elimination of the 
opposition and the highly parochial, exclusionary and territorial nature of the majimboism he 
advocated (Anderson and Lochery 2008, 337; Médard 1996, 72). These episodes of violence 
revealed, perhaps more than any other episodes in Kenya’s history, the truly xenophobic 
nature of Moi’s majimboist approach to decentralisation. The effect of these episodes of 
violence was not only to ensure that elections took place in a climate of fear but also to 
significantly exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions, especially in the ethnically heterogeneous Coast 
region and border zones of the Rift Valley. These events firmly planted injustices in the 
historical memory that, when connected with the land distribution injustices of the Kenyatta 
era, acted as seeds of serious future unrest. 
This would have been a particularly difficult context for any opposition to make 
headway but it was particularly so for Kenya’s young opposition which was deeply fractured. 
In late 1991 two parties were formed. The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) 
was initially a pressure group formed by a trans-ethnic coalition of opposition politicians, 
activist lawyers and clergy; while the Democracy Party of Kenya (DP) was formed by a  
group of Kikuyu opposition leaders led by former Vice President Mwai Kibaki. A series of 
fractures within FORD ensued in 1992, some along ethnic lines, resulting first in the 
formation of FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya, and later in an even more fractured proliferation 
of political parties, all of which had ‘a restricted ethnic appeal’ (Throup 1993, 391). The 1997 
election was held in similar circumstances but with a slightly different array of opposition 
parties (predominantly DP, the National Democratic Party, FORD-Kenya and the Social 
Democratic Party). In both the 1992 and 1997 elections, as leaders and politicians put their 
personal ambitions and those of their ethnic groups ahead of any national democratic project, 
personality and ethnicity got in the way of a democratic program that could have united these 
opposition forces against Moi (Mutua 2008, 164; Orvis 2001). 
The 1990s was therefore a period of frustration for those within and outside Kenya who 
were expecting a rapid and uninterrupted transition to meaningful democracy. International 
actors were more interested in stability and neoliberal economic reform (which did take   
place) than major democratic change, even approving the 1992 and 1997 elections as ‘free   
and fair’ against their better judgment (Brown 2001). The domestic pro-democracy movement 
received little support from major, influential donors but made steady progress towards 
building popular support for democracy, focusing particularly on the need for constitutional 
reform to limit the powers of the Presidency (Mutua 2008). The Citizens’ Coalition for 
Constitutional Change (4Cs) and the National Convention Executive Council were founded in 
1997, both comprised of an inclusive and trans-ethnic mix of civil society organisations and 
activists, lawyers (including the Law Society of Kenya and the International Commission of 
Jurists (Kenya Section)), human rights advocates (particularly the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission), clergy and some politicians. They proposed an alternative vision for Kenya,  
one in which liberal democratic principles of individual human rights, accountability and the 
rule of law would govern the behaviour of their leaders and enhance opportunities for   
citizens’ participation in democratic decision-making. During this period, their target was less 
ethnicised than the authoritarian, even dictatorial nature of Kenyan politics. 
However, their efforts to bring about constitutional reform and deepen democracy 
faced an array of barriers. The dictatorial nature of the Moi regime had dulled Kenyan 
democracy in many senses. On the one hand, Moi’s highly personalised rule and the 
enhancement of the powers of the President made some dent in the ethnic patrimonial 
networks that were established through parliamentary politics, the civil service and the 
provincial administration under Kenyatta (Barkan and Chege 1989, 447). However, the 
erosion of these networks did not serve to enhance either democratic class-based or 
nationalist solidarities in the Kenyan population. Rather, if Moi replaced an ethnic 
patrimonial political culture with anything in the 1990s, it was a majimboist approach to 
recognition and distribution. Moi’s attempts to reduce disparities and inequalities in access to 
resources and political power were focused on inequalities between ethnic groups and  
regions, rather than between classes (Barkan and Chege 1989, 436). At the elite and middle 
class level there may have been some trans-ethnic organisation against Moi but at the 
grassroots, people’s experiences of politics, administration and development continued to be 
strongly conditioned by the privileging of local ethnic identities and alliances. This ripened 
the country for a rapid return to localised, personalised and ethnicised patrimonialism upon 
Moi’s departure at the 2002 elections. 
Throughout the 1980s, when Moi was at the peak of his authoritarianism, the Nubians 
again held a low profile as Kibera became consolidated as one of Nairobi’s most densely 
populated slums. With Philip Leakey, a European-Kenyan loyal to KANU, as MP from 1979 
to 1992, Lang’ata constituency was not subject to the same ethnicised national-level politics  
as much of the rest of the country during this period. With the departure of Kenyatta from the 
Presidency and Moi’s dismantling of GEMA influence, Kibera saw the ends of Kikuyu 
influence, including the removal of Chief Kamau Kariuki, a GEMA figure, from Nairobi 
West, where Kibera is located (Osborn 2012, 107). The Nubians supported Leakey and 
KANU during this time and in 1984 were able to secure title deed for the central mosque in 
Makina village in Kibera, with Leakey’s support (de Smedt 2011, 111). However, little other 
progress was made on development or land title for either the Nubians or anybody else living 
in Kibera. Like other parts of Nairobi and Kenya, the economic hardship following the 
mismanagement of economic planning under Kenyatta, oil price shocks and rising debt led to 
degradation of public services such as roads, water and garbage collection (Hornsby 2013, 
444–5). Under Leakey, the influx of outsiders into Kibera and construction of informal 
housing continued, though at a slower rate than under Maathai, until the point where there 
was practically no space left on which to build. The size of the land decreased from 800 acres 
in the mid-1970s to 700 acres by 1980, and to only 550 acres by 1990 (de Smedt 2011, 92, 
100, 104). 
The return to multipartyism in 1992, however, changed the nature of political life in 
Kibera in radical ways and the Nubians’ position in it. After a tense election in which 
opposition fractures were played out with violent consequences in Kibera, Raila Odinga, son 
of independence leader Oginga Odinga, won the seat of Lang’ata on the FORD-Kenya ticket 
and Kibera became a hotspot for the playing out of national political competitions for nearly 
two decades.40 As Osborn (2012) argues, this election marked the decline of the power of 
 
KANU and the provincial administration in Kibera, the rise among young Luo residents of 
the personality cult around Raila and of militant youth gangs associated with political parties 
who came to control the area (cf. Katumanga 2005). 
During the 1990s, while the Luo community in Kibera, mostly tenants of Kikuyu and 
Nubian landlords, vehemently supported Raila, the Nubians largely continued to support 
KANU. Combined with the tenant–landlord dynamic of the relation between these ethnic 
groups, the Nubians’ position began to shift from one of relative anonymity or invisibility to 
one in which they periodically became targets and perpetrators of violence. In 1995 Nubian– 
Luo tensions erupted in four days of violence after a Nubian youth was found dead near the 
FORD-Kenya office in Kibera (Osborn 2012, 124). Seven more would die in that conflict, 
and a further 15 in conflict in 2001, which also displaced 30,000 people (Osborn 2012, 127). 
Characterised as ‘rent riots’, the 2001 clashes were, like the conflicts in 1991 and 1995, 
fuelled by much higher level political posturing as both Moi and Raila, in a temporary 
alliance at this point in the lead-up to the 2002 election, made populist remarks to gatherings 
in Kibera suggesting rents were too high. The attacks that ensued cemented the ethnicisation 
of the tenant–landlord consciousness in Kibera, as Luo tenants attacked Nubian and Kikuyu 
landlords and vice versa (Katumanga 2005, 512–3). 
While for many Kenyans the authoritarianism and economic despair of the 1980s made 
them some of the most difficult years since independence, for the Nubians it was the 1990s, 
40 In the lead up to the elections there were violent incidents in Kibera between Raila supporters and those who 
supported Kimani Rugendo, both of whom were members of FORD until the party split in October 1992 to form 
FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili. 
with the return to multipartyism, and the hyper-politicisation of daily life in Kibera, that were 
among the most challenging periods of postcolonial history. While previously they had 
suffered from invisibility and neglect, it was during this period that they began to become 
targets of violence.41  Kibera was the key to Raila’s parliamentary success and Raila held on 
 
his shoulders the aspirations of the Luo community, who had been isolated from the upper 
echelons of political power since Kenyatta. Kibera thus became one of the most highly 
politicised sites in the country (de Smedt 2009; Osborn 2008). This climate also had the effect 
of weakening the authority of the provincial administration in the area at a time when, for the 
first time since before independence, a Nubian, Ali Hussein Morsal, occupied the position 
(from 1992 to 2003) (Osborn 2012, 125). The Nubians, by virtue of being located in Kibera, 
found themselves not with an opportunity to improve their lot in an emerging democracy but 
caught up in one of the most political, emotional and longstanding ethnic conflicts in Kenya: 
between the Kikuyu and the Luo. 
 
Kibaki, Raila and Uhuru 
 
It is the period from 2002, when Moi and KANU finally lost power, which constitutes the 
primary period of study for this book. Moi was constitutionally prevented from running for 
President and made grave miscalculations in supporting Uhuru Kenyatta (son of Jomo 
Kenyatta and current President of Kenya) as his successor as Uhuru had little support at the 
time from elsewhere in KANU or among Kenyans. Against this weak candidate, the 
opposition finally cohered to bring former Vice President Mwai Kibaki and the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) to power. In NaRC, Kibaki was able to unite a trans-ethnic 
coalition of disparate political parties, including FORD-Kenya, the National Party of Kenya, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (by now Raila’s party), the National Alliance Party and other 
smaller parties. Kibaki won 63 per cent of the presidential vote and NaRC won 125 (of 210) 
 
41 Described in more detail in the next chapter, it also during this period that broader security concerns facing the 
country, including the large influx of refugees from Somalia, led to more discriminatory procedures applied to non-
indigenous and Muslim groups, most notably in the form of discrimination in access to ID cards. 
seats, KANU winning only 64. It was a resounding defeat for Kenya’s oldest and once 
extraordinarily powerful political party. The 2002 election was less violent and more fair than 
1992 and 1997, and also drew out trans-ethnic voting patterns that represented a significant, 
albeit temporary, change in the relationship between ethnic groups and political parties 
(Anderson 2003). The year 2002 was the dawn of a very hopeful era for Kenya’s pro- 
democracy movement. There were signs of progress towards democratic change as major pro- 
democracy civil society figures such as Maina Kiai, John Githongo and Makau Mutua took 
responsibility for anti-corruption, human rights and truth commission institutions 
(respectively). Policy changes took place to depoliticise and bureaucratise the provincial 
administration, especially in urban areas (Osborn 2012). There was even a commission to 
investigate land injustices under the previous regimes, the Ndungu commission.42 
The new government also made more effort to achieve meaningful and fairer 
development for citizens. As a result of better economic planning and management, economic 
growth accelerated with GDP climbing from 2.9 per cent in 2003 to 7.1 per cent in 2007, the 
highest in 20 years (Hornsby 2013, 731). In the transition to the new regime in 2002, it was 
formally recognised that harambee had become an instrument of corruption and patronage  
and so MPs were prohibited from making harambee donations. Harambee was replaced in 
2003 with a new method of development distribution: Constituency Development Funds 
(CDF) (Cheeseman 2009, 104).43  However, like many of Kibaki’s reforms, the 
implementation and results did not meet expectations. CDFs continue to be highly localised 
and ethnicised modes of distributing development resources, similar to how they were under 
Kenyatta only now more formalised and institutionalised: MPs retain administrative control 
 
42 Formally known as the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal / Irregular Allocation of Public Land. An earlier 
commission, the Njonjo commission (formally known as the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System) 
was conducted in 1999 under Moi but it was more focused on the broad legal framework for land administration. 
43 Harambee continues to be practiced among local communities and politicians continue to make large and visible 
donations to these projects in indirect ways but they are no longer the primary state-sanctioned method of 
distribution. 
via Constituency Development Committees and so patronage networks have not been broken. 
The new system does have some formal features that mitigate some of the negative 
consequences of harambee: it weakens the connection to the Executive and it entails quotas 
for particular areas to mitigate extreme inequalities in development. Combined with changes 
to the provincial administration to reduce corruption, such as the cycling of Chiefs in urban 
areas to new locations every two years (Osborn 2012), this suggests that access to 
development and authority will no longer be a matter of ethnic privilege. Overall, though, 
citizens, politicians and civil servants continue to understand development, as well as control 
and governance, as flowing through localised patronage networks whether through selective 
allocation of funds, irregular tendering and procurement procedures or other means 
(Cheeseman 2009, 106). 
The pro-democracy movement saw the answer to the problem of shallow, episodic or 
poorly implemented changes as a fundamental overhaul to be achieved through a new 
constitution. The first major prospect for this change was the constitutional referendum of 
2005. In 2002 a draft constitution, referred to as the Bomas Draft, was arrived at after ‘broad 
participation and extended debate’ (Lynch 2006a, 239). This popular draft sought to limit the 
powers of the President and decentralise governance and administration in ways that would 
empower ‘divisions’ and ‘locations’ at sub-district level over the provincial administration 
(Lynch 2006a, 239). Despite its popularity, Kibaki and his allies in government – who now 
stood to lose from the changes – rapidly undermined it by pushing changes to the Constitution 
of Kenya Review Bill through parliament and having Attorney General Amos Wako revise   
the draft in ways that retained the powers of the President, diminished the role of the   
proposed Prime Minister and proposed an elected district administration answerable to central 
government (Lynch 2006a, 239). David Anderson’s observation in 2003 that NaRC was about 
stability, not reform, was proven true (Anderson 2003). 
In the face of the major changes made to the Bomas draft, NaRC split into warring 
parties, proving the trans-ethnic alliance to be deeply fragile. Part of the cause of 
disagreements within NaRC about the constitution was concern about the impact of different 
institutional design on different ethnic groups (Lynch 2006a, 236), in itself signalling 
ethnicised political priorities. Differences of opinions, however, between ethnic leaders were 
not all so principled. Many of the disagreements between members of NaRC over the 
constitution were more squabbles over personal deals made within NaRC before the 2002 
election as well as perceptions that Kibaki was betraying those agreements and reaping all the 
benefits of state control for himself and his Kikuyu allies. The constitutional referendum, and 
the breakdown of NaRC that occurred around it, returned Kenya to a political culture of 
personalised, localised, populist politics. 
Fifty-seven per cent of Kenyans rejected the constitution in the 2005 referendum, the 
results of which indicated a major move towards increasing ethnicisation of Kenyan politics, 
and an undermining of the trans-ethnic allegiances that helped NaRC to power in 2002. 
Voting patterns and theatrical campaigning activities revealed that the ethnic allegiances may 
have shifted from Kenyatta’s original Kikuyu–Luo alliance at independence but the ethnic 
nature of elite and grassroots political groupings remained the same. Kikuyus in Central 
Province largely voted yes with Kibaki, while Luos, Kalenjin and to a lesser extent Kamba 
and Luhya voted no with Raila Odinga (Lynch 2006a, 248). 
The outcome of the referendum and the changes in the political party landscape that it 
gave rise to meant the 2007 election was always going to be tense. The personalisation and 
ethnicisation of politics during the referendum campaign eroded the development of 
programmatic political agendas and instead promoted a ‘winner takes all view of parties’ that 
was inherently ethnic (Mueller 2008, 200). Multipartyism had not expanded policy 
competition but rather inter-ethnic competition enabled by the opening up of ‘spaces for the 
‘venting’ of long-entrenched elite and communal cleavages’ (Berman et al 2004, 9) such as 
those seen in Kibera in the 1990s. In particular, 2007 was seen to be the Luos ‘turn to eat’, 
and many favoured Raila Odinga to replace Kibaki as President. Many Luos saw this as the 
only just way to address the marginalisation of Luos from national politics. Since the 1969 
murder of Tom Mboya, Kenyatta’s closest Luo ally within KANU, Oginga Odinga (Raila’s 
father) had been the most prominent Luo politician but had always been locked out of the 
establishment (Lynch 2006a, 234). The cult around Raila was at its strongest not only in 
Nyanza, the traditional home of the Luo, but also in Kibera in Raila’s constituency of 
Lang’ata. 
When the results of the tally were delayed and Kibaki was sworn in as President in a 
media blackout, without widespread and credible endorsement of the tally, violence erupted   
in the Rift Valley and Kibera. Far from being spontaneous, the violence was both highly 
predictable and, indeed, pre-meditated. Given the history of xenophobic and autochthonous 
violence in the Rift Valley, Raila and his party, the Orange Democratic Movement’s (ODM) 
evocation of a majimboist ideology in their election campaign in the region was a high-risk 
strategy (Anderson and Lochery 2008, 329). When Raila was perceived to have been robbed  
of the Presidency and the majimboist cause and perceived promise of eviction of interlopers 
lost, Kalenjin and other ethnic groups in the Rift Valley embarked on a pre-planned and pre- 
resourced campaign of violence against ‘outsiders’ (Anderson and Lochery 2008;  
International Crisis Group 2008, 11). In Kibera, the violence took a similar but different form. 
The emphasis was not on land but on a lost ‘right’ to control the state by the Luo, and  
violence took a retaliatory form against Kikuyu landlords and tenants. The Nubians’ peculiar 
position in Kibera again became apparent as they were not targeted in the violence, seen as 
inconsequential to the larger ethnic politics of the nation. Instead, from their ‘impartial’ 
vantage point they were able to shelter potential victims of violence.44 
This harrowing episode in Kenya’s history shattered many foreigners’ perceptions of 
Kenya as a stable democracy and in fact only highlighted deep structural truths about the 
country. By 2007 Kenya had experienced over four decades of politics characterised by 
localisation (but not meaningful political decentralisation) of governance, administration and 
development, and pressures from above and below to develop and maintain ethnic 
patrimonial networks. Because of the territorialised nature of Kenya’s ethnic demography, 
  
44 The support among some Nubian leadership groups of ODM and Raila may have also served to protect the 
Nubians from ethnic violence during this period, but this support was not universal among Nubians. 
locked in during the colonial Native Administrations and subsequent regularisation of those 
settlement patterns, this localisation of political and communal life always made Kenya 
vulnerable to ethnic conflict of this kind. Furthermore, the strengthening of the Presidency at 
the expense of other institutions, including the judiciary, meant that Raila and his allies would 
not take their dispute regarding electoral results through institutional channels (Cheeseman 
2009, 111). 
After a month of violence in which over 1,000 were killed and 300,000 displaced, a 
power sharing agreement was reached in February 2008. The new regime now consisted of 
Kibaki as President and Raila as Prime Minister. The ‘Agenda 4’ reforms, as they came to be 
known (which grew out of the peace and power sharing negotiations), laid out the priorities  
for Kenya’s government if it was to stabilise the nation and avoid a repeat of the election 
violence. Priorities identified included judicial, police and land reforms; problems of poverty, 
inequality, regional imbalances in development and youth unemployment; the need for 
transparency, accountability and an end to a culture of impunity; and the goal of consolidating 
national cohesion and unity (Kanyinga and Long 2012). Both class and ethnic divisions were 
thus identified as threats to stability and democracy. 
One of the most important steps on the road to this reform was the long awaited change 
to the constitution, which was finally achieved in 2010. Perhaps because the post-election 
violence was something of a tipping point and public pressure for change was more 
widespread and articulate than ever before (Kanyinga and Long 2012), all sides of politics 
cohered around a draft constitution for the first time in Kenya’s history.45 The constitution 
 
was voted in with 67 per cent of the vote and a 72 per cent turnout, the highest in Kenya’s 
electoral history. Most importantly, the constitution weakens the power of the President and 
allows for a more devolved two-tiered system of government and the establishment of new 
bodies, Counties, to work for local interests, with which the provincial administration will 
  
45 There were some dissenting elements, including Christian churches that objected to the acknowledgment of 
Muslim Khadhi courts and the legalisation of abortion in medical emergencies. 
eventually be harmonised (Kramon and Posner 2013).46  After nearly two decades of debate 
about the nature of decentralisation, this devolution is to be distinguished from a territorial 
and autochthonous majimboist approach to decentralisation. The new constitution also 
promises dramatic land reform, including more local management of lands and caps on 
ownership. The challenge now for Kenya is to consolidate these democratic gains and move 
towards implementing a more enduring set of reforms around the major issues of land, 
impunity, institutional strengthening and addressing diffuse violence in the country (Mueller 
2008). 
The current government that must implement this new constitution has inherited from 
all its predecessors a regime of recognition and distribution that will make this task 
particularly challenging. The liberal-democratic ideals enshrined in the 2010 constitution will 
be in tension with the priority afforded by leaders and citizens to ethnicity. The historical 
development of Kenyan institutions has culminated in a politico-economic system where 
power and resources are centralised in the state and their distribution is largely in response to 
ethnic obligations. Whether in relation to land distribution, development funds or  
bureaucracy, relationships between citizens and their leaders are conditioned by expectations, 
perceptions and experiences of the personal capacity of particular individual leaders to make 
and fulfil promises related to the delivery of power and resources (Lynch 2006a). Legitimacy, 
authority and esteem are therefore directly connected to personal wealth or the capacity to 
extract wealth from the state. The state, the arena of national citizenship, then becomes 
something to be captured in order to fulfil obligations to subnational communities (Chabal  
and Daloz 1999; Ndegwa 1997, 604). Lynch (2006a, 253) accurately observes that: 
[w]hile ethnic politics is frowned upon in the abstract, on the ground, and in a 
perceived reality where others are looking after  their  own  community, 
individuals often seek out ethnic patrons, and give their loyal support to, and 
admire  leaders  …  who  show  themselves  to  be  interested  in  the  well-being  of 
 
46 There are now 47 Counties whose boundaries are congruent with pre-1992 Districts. 
their  communities,  and  who  bravely  stand  up  to  promote  and  defend  these 
interests. 
In order to meet this demand, one must become skilled at competing in the national arena for 
resources to channel back home to needy members of the community (Lonsdale 1994, 138–9; 
see also Cheeseman 2009). Though formal rules of liberal institutions apply, in practice very 
different norms of personalised and localised development and governance subsume liberal 
principles of impartial and universal equality of access to and treatment by the state. 
The Nubians would theoretically stand to benefit from a shift from ethnic 
patrimonialism to a more liberal model of politics. In part because of their small number and 
in part because of their ethnic stranger status, the Nubians have had little access to civil  
service patronage networks, as discussed in Chapter 3. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s 
different Nubian groups have developed relationships with different political parties. They 
have so far secured many promises (including for land title from both Raila Odinga and  
Uhuru Kenyatta) but little action. Furthermore, sometimes in quite formal ways, the Nubians 
find themselves disadvantaged or discriminated against by a system that favours other tribes. 
The distribution of development funds via harambee or CDF has clear disadvantages for an 
ethnic minority with no territorial majority in any district. The Nubians fall into this category, 
outnumbered as they are in Kibera being only 10,000 in a Kiberan population of around 
350,000. As ethnic favouritism abounds in the distribution of CDFs the Nubians are only able 
to access its benefits on the rare occasion when they can successfully position themselves as a 
potential voting block in pre-election periods. There are no constitutional or legislative 
provisions suggesting that Nubians are not entitled to ID cards yet the Nubians struggle to get 
them. The problem is in the bureaucratic apparatus that processes ID card applications and 
unofficial sanction of these discriminatory processes from the Ministry of Immigration and 
Registration of Persons. Likewise, there is no list in the constitution or anywhere else (other 
than the 1969 census) of the 42 tribes but those who are assumed to be on it do not suffer the 
same discrimination in encounters with state bureaucracy as those assumed to be non- 
indigenous.47 Most strikingly, there is definitely no constitutional or legislative sanction of the 
notion that particular ethnic groups ‘own’ particular parcels of territory in Kenya, yet this, 
perhaps more than any other issue explored in this book, is a central aspect of Kenyan   
political culture. In Kenya, then, the problem is that ‘while the state may be neutral ... access 
to the state remains ethnified’ (italics in the original, Kymlicka 2004, 66), and, as argued in 
Chapter 5, territorialised. This affects all aspects of the civil service, including experiences of 
law and law enforcement, individual identification regimes (ID cards), collective 
identification regimes (censuses), the National Land Registry and electoral commissions (to 
name just some of those most relevant to this study), and not only for the Nubians. 
In 2013, after the research for his book was conducted, Kenyans elected Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto, as President and Vice-President respectively. Both are currently 
being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity committed 
during the post-election violence. Their mandate to govern is weak, with Uhuru having won 
only 50.07 per cent of the vote in a disputed election. Opposition candidate Raila Odinga 
raised a dispute in the courts, with little support from anyone for a return to the streets, 
representing progress in terms of institutional reform of the judiciary. However, it remains 
concerning that Uhuru and Rutos’s ascension to State House is, at least in part, attributable to 
their expert manipulation of public opinion to foster the idea that the International Criminal 
Court is prosecuting only Kikuyu (Uhuru) and Kalenjin (Ruto) leaders, leaving Luos (Raila) 
to enjoy impunity. The future is thus ambiguous: on the one hand, incumbent leaders show 
little inclination to unwind policies and political practices they benefit from, yet on the other, 
the new constitution and broad support for democratic reforms suggest a transformation may 
be possible, even if slow. 
 
The Ethnic Patrimonial State and its Contenders 
 
Kenya, then, is perhaps at a turning point in terms of its recognition and distribution regimes 
and the construction of citizenship. The country’s postcolonial history has witnessed multiple 
47 Though people of all tribes suffer extortion and requests for bribes. 
struggles over the construction of citizenship and the recognition and distribution regimes that 
shape it. For many contingent reasons, indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity has won out   
as the most salient principle governing belonging and access to rights and political 
participation. Ethnic recognition has occupied a privileged place in ordinary peoples’ 
experiences of politics and the state. Contestations around this order have centred around 
nationalism, redistributive politics and liberal democracy but none of these agendas have so  
far trumped an ethnicised approach to citizenship and political life. 
Kenyatta’s early nationalist agenda was significantly limited in its nature as well as its 
scope and influence. While Kenyatta was committed to Africanising the state, once that was 
achieved he demonstrated hollowness in his vision for a united country. Perhaps compelled   
by the pressures of high expectations around development combined with a highly divided 
polity, Kenyatta opted to entrench the ethnicised patterns of governance, development and 
control rather than to articulate or advance a vision of a more cohesive nation. The variants on 
nationalism that have emerged since – for example in the ‘Tribe Kenya’ movement 
campaigning around ethnic enumeration in the 2009 census or the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission  though eliciting rhetorical popular appeal have made little practical 
impact. It may, however, be too early to pass judgment on these nascent attempts at building 
national cohesion. 
Despite the scale of deprivation (between 34 per cent and 45.5 per cent of Kenyans live 
in poverty) (United Nations Development Program 2014; World Bank 2014) and the extent of 
the inequality (a very high gini coefficient of 39 per cent in rural areas and 49 per cent in  
urban areas48) (World Bank 2014), an agenda for redistributive politics has also received only 
limited support in Kenyan politics over the years. The early independence socialists – Oginga 
Odinga and the KPU – made little headway in the face of the formidable Kenyatta and 
KANU, whose interests lay in the preservation of the colonial economic order. Few  
politicians other than Odinga, Bildad Kaggia and JM Kariuki have made such calls. Since the 
 
48 A gini coefficient of 0 per cent would represent perfect equality. 
1990s, civil society has often linked its appeals for democracy to similar appeals for 
redistribution. For some activists, social and economic change is just as much a human right  
as political freedoms. The 1990s movements to advance liberal democracy through respect   
for human rights and law recognised that Africa occupies a different position in global 
political economy compared to the global North, the home of liberal democracy. Influential 
activists in the human rights movement called for a brand of liberal democracy that can also 
address the ‘impoverishment of the people of the Third World by western engines of 
globalization’ by ‘mobilizing the people of these societies to agitate against oppression, 
foreign domination and exploitation’ (Mutunga and Mazrui 2002, 128; Mutua 2008). Yet,  
little effort has been made to build class-consciousness in Kenya, and, as we have seen above, 
vertical patronage networks and localised and ethnicised approaches to politics and 
development have served only to build solidarity amongst the elite class and preclude 
solidarity among the poorer classes. Ideas of ‘equality of opportunity’ rather than equality of 
income and a self-help mentality have continued to dominate Kenya’s political culture and 
notions of the good citizen. In this context, the young and the poor have instead retreated to 
more familiar and reliable means of dealing with material inequality: ethnic patronage. As 
Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka (2004, 12) explain: 
The failure of postcolonial states to  service  competently  and  without  bias  the 
most elementary material and security needs of their citizens has compounded 
reliance on kinship and ethnic networks by individuals and groups seeking ways 
to cope with unrelenting economic hardship and for sanctuary from elite- 
orchestrated political violence. 
Without any more fundamental change, socio-economic inequalities and deprivation persist in 
Kenya and, in a vicious circle, have the added effect of further fuelling inter-ethnic 
competition. 
Calls for liberal democracy have been the most successful of alternative political 
agendas. The pro-democracy movement that took off in the 1990s, closely linked to the 
human rights movement, has achieved some major gains, particularly since 2008 (Mutunga 
and Mazrui 2002). After more than two decades, Kenya’s institutions are beginning to form 
and articulate a vision of the Kenyan nation that privileges respect for law and order and 
human rights, the development of meaningful forms of accountability to the people, checks 
and balances on power and an end to elite exploitation of the state and of ethnic interests 
(Mutua 2008, 10). This vision, at least in formal terms, is starting to resemble those of a 
liberal democratic state. Multipartyism is here to stay, the judiciary and some other state 
institutions have undergone reform, the 2010 constitution promises legislative and policy 
change in key areas, including land administration, and has brought about a new form of 
decentralisation that carries with it the possibility of democratic devolution of powers rather 
than majimboist fears and parochial politics. Yet, whether or not these formal changes will or 
should also translate into ‘a [liberal] set of cultural norms and values subscribed to at the core 
by officialdom and the public at large’ (Mutua 2008, 11; cf. Cheeseman 2009, 94) remains to 
be seen. 
I propose in this book that part of the reason that a liberal agenda has had only limited 
success is that, at least in a ‘pure’ version that emphasises individual equality and is blind to 
difference, liberalism is unable to account for the lived experience of politics, development 
and authority in Kenya. Calls for a purely liberal transformation of Kenyan politics would be 
futile. Tensions between liberal values of individual equality and the need to address serious 
disparities in the citizenship of the poor and/or minorities are evident, for example in the 2010 
constitution and a recent legal decision regarding minorities in Kenya (cf. Kymlicka 1995). 
The 2010 constitution deals substantively with concerns common to minorities, such as land 
rights and land reform; it provides protected opportunities for minority participation in 
government; and many of its more general reforms, such as institutions around land and 
registration of citizens have the potential to empower minority citizens (Sing’oei Abraham 
2013, 19).49  In 2012 when a group of minorities sought to make use of these protections in 
court, the court’s response concerning redrawing of electoral boundaries illustrated the 
tensions between liberal ideals and minority protections in Kenya. The court protected 
minority rights, but it was in a distinctly illiberal, though important, manner. For many 
petitioners, the court required that minority demographics be taken into account in the 
redrawing of electoral boundaries so that minorities might have an opportunity to elect ‘one   
of their own’ (Minority Rights Group International 2013). This decision departed from the 
liberal emphasis on individualism and impartial representation. Nevertheless, in practice, the 
decision is more likely to better position minorities in the recognition and distribution regimes 
that prevail.50 
 
The position of minorities like the Nubians – and the efforts in law, institutional design 
and practice to enhance their citizenship – illustrate the limits of a purely liberal approach to 
any transformation of Kenya’s recognition and distribution regime. In Kenya, group  
identities, particularly indigenous and autochthonous ethnic identities, are an inescapable part 
of political life that cannot simply be erased by the ‘correct’ liberal institutional design. 
Struggles between these competing visions of Kenyan citizenship will continue, and it  
is as unlikely in Kenya as it is anywhere else that there will ever be a definitive and fixed kind 
of Kenyan citizenship. Yet, the great force with which indigenous and autochthonous  
ethnicity influence understandings and practices of citizenship requires interrogation, and that 
is the purpose of this book: to illustrate ways in which incentives for maintaining the status 
quo are greater than those for changing it. It has been in the interests of elite politicians to  
keep calls for nation building, redistribution or liberal democracy at bay, and they have been 
supported in their resistance to these alternative principles by the wananchi, who for better or 
worse have found ethnic patrimonialism to be their best bet for development and political 
49 While implementation of all the constitution’s provisions have been slow, implementation of those relating to 
minorities has been particularly so (Sing’oei Abraham 2013, 19). 
50 Though in practice poor voter education meant this was not the outcome of the 2013 election for many 
minorities. 
influence. It is this latter dynamic that is of particular concern to this study, for despite the 
significant disadvantages they face under this system, Nubians by and large seek to be 
included in it rather than to alter it. The following chapters seek to make sense of why this is 
the case. 
Chapter 2: ID Cards and the Limits of Citizenship as Status 
   
 
‘What would it mean to you to have some Nubian land in Kenya?’  
‘I think that will be my pride. It will sustain my culture. And at the end of the day it’s going to 
give me the identity, because I’ll freely go for birth certificates, I’ll get my ID without any 
problem. That will be a way to recognise that Nubians are part of the Kenyan community.’ 
– Mabruka, Nubian 
   
 
Prevailing attention to the Nubians in Kenya has been from local and international NGOs 
concerned with the discrimination Nubians face in accessing ID cards and their subsequent 
statelessness. The notion that citizenship consists primarily of status and possession of 
individual rights underpins the prevailing focus on the Nubians’ condition. This chapter 
examines the identification regime that documents Kenyan citizens and the Nubians’ period   
of exclusion from it (from the mid-1990s). In doing so, the chapter establishes what exactly 
has made the Nubians of Kenya stateless until recently. The chapter goes on to explore the 
extent to which ID cards confer citizenship by according individual recognition and access to 
rights for Nubians and connects this significance to a liberal conception of citizenship. An 
approach to remedying citizenship inequalities that draws on liberal principles of individual 
rights and formal recognition of individual status has dominated most efforts to address the 
Nubians’ marginalisation in Kenya, whether efforts by international NGOs or efforts not 
explicitly for the Nubians but more generally for a constitutional, liberal approach to 
governance in the country promulgated by the pro-democracy movement. However, a liberal 
approach to citizenship falls short of fully accounting for how and why the Nubians have 
experienced denial of, and more recently contingent access to, ID cards. The chapter  
concludes with a discussion of the way in which the Nubians have made sense of their 
experience of exclusion from and inclusion in the Kenyan identification regime in relation to 
their collective identity and the implications this has for the constitution and attainment of full 
citizenship in Kenya. The chapter argues, overall, that though Kenya’s citizenship laws and 
institutions may be liberal on paper, they are not in practice. 
 
Statelessness, Liberalism and (In)Equality  
According to both the 1963 and 2010 constitutions of Kenya, although the Nubians are  
entitled to Kenyan nationality, their citizenship has been continually cast into doubt (Sing’Oei 
2011a, 50). From around the mid-1990s to the late 2000s, the Nubians were considered 
stateless because of severe discrimination faced in attempting to acquire Kenyan ID cards (M 
Lynch 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and United Nations 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 2010; Makoloo 2005; Manby 2009b, 122–6; OSJI 2011a; 
Sing’Oei 2011a). Though all Kenyans must apply for the card, the process for Nubians and 
other ‘non-indigenous’ ethnic groups was, and to an extent still is, made more difficult. The 
political disadvantage this entails has been articulated by influential NGOs including OSJI  
and Refugees International as one associated primarily with a lack of documented national 
identity (a legal condition characterised by lack of protection of rights). For communities like 
the Nubians and others around the world, such as the Biharis in Bangladesh and the ‘erased’  
in Slovenia, research and advocacy over the past decade have led to improvements in 
constitutional rights to citizenship and registration processes. However, the identity and 
nationality documents now available to many of these formerly stateless people go only part  
of the way towards making them equal with their co-citizens. 
An approach to research and advocacy that so emphasises individuality and status is 
embedded in liberal political traditions, underpinned by the value of individual autonomy and 
associated principles of protection of private liberties or rights by a minimalist state. The 
liberal citizenship tradition can be understood as a set of principles and practices which 
construct citizenship in this state-, status- and rights-centred way, rather than in terms of civic 
allegiance, political belonging or engaged political community (cf. Stewart 1995). As a 
political doctrine, liberalism first emerged in seventeenth-century England, where the greatest 
threat to equality and autonomy seemed to come from undue interference from state and 
society in people’s private lives (Locke 1986; Mill 2010). The rule of law and an impartial 
bureaucratic state that can enforce it therefore emerged as the ideal governance structure (Isin 
and Turner 2007, 6). Citizenship came to mean legally prescribed rights to state protection of 
one’s privacy and autonomy. 
In keeping with this emphasis on autonomy in private life, the liberal political tradition 
turns a blind eye to difference associated with citizens’ (or non-citizens’) private lives, 
including identities such as ethnicity. Instead, the tradition emphasises equality in the form of 
universalism (Young 1989, 253). The liberal tradition tolerates diversity as long as it remains 
confined to people’s private lives and does not impinge upon the freedoms or equality of 
others. From this perspective the only aspects of identity relevant to citizenship are those 
pertaining to individual legal entitlement to a nationality, facts such as place of birth and 
nationality of parents. Other aspects of identity, including ethnicity, ought not to be relevant 
to citizenship lest they corrupt the principle of equality of individual rights and status. From 
the liberal perspective, difference is only relevant if it is associated with discrimination, of 
which the liberal tradition is, rightly, heavily critical. 
This emphasis on the value of autonomy also makes liberalism a distinctly 
individualistic political doctrine. Traditionally, liberalism has conceived of autonomy in an 
atomistic sense – as the thoroughly individual formulation and exercise of preferences and a 
view of the good life. It is a doctrine that pays little heed to the ways in which a person’s 
world view is influenced by others and instead is suspicious of such influence as an erosion of 
autonomy and a threat to equality in formulation and exercise of opinions. Relations of duty 
between citizens, and between citizens and the state, are therefore kept to minimal 
requirements of taxation, military service and parenting (Oldfield 1990; Young 1989, 253;  
Isin and Turner 2007). As a result of these conceptual and valuational emphases, we can say 
that liberalism holds a ‘thin’ notion of citizenship, manifest and operationalised primarily in 
formal legal status. 
Liberal states, therefore (in theory), engage in practices and deploy technologies that 
affirm this doctrine. The difficulties liberal states face recognising group rights, such as 
indigenous rights, are an example of this. Another example is the implementation of 
identification technologies. Identity and nationality documentation are one of the most 
common ways through which states confer legal citizenship status in a universally same and 
equal way to all those who are legally entitled to it. Identification regimes, such as national ID 
cards, (ostensibly) guarantee state protection of individual rights and affirm citizens’ equality 
with each other. It is for this reason that activists have focussed on the fair and accessible 
provision of ID cards to all entitled citizens and why the pro-democracy activists in Kenya, in 
their push for constitutional change over recent decades, have called for fair and equitable 
citizenship laws that would confer citizenship on all those with a right to it grounded in birth 
and parentage.51 
 
In many ways the challenges to equality and autonomy that liberalism sets out to 
address are still threats: states and societies can be overly intrusive in people’s private lives 
and inequality is a fact of all political communities. However, it is not clear that purportedly 
‘liberal’ technologies like ID cards even operate, in practice, according to liberal principles. 
Many have expressed great concern that ID cards are in fact anti-liberal to the extent that they 
are a significant intrusion of the state into its citizens’ private lives.52 The concern I raise here 
  
 
51 Citizenship reform was never a major target for change in the efforts of the pro-democracy movement outlined 
in Chapter 1. Other issues, including curbing presidential power and bringing about effective decentralisation 
dominated this movement. The minor changes made regarding citizenship in the 2010 constitution are discussed 
further below. 
 
52 Studies of the sociological and political implications of identification regimes that are based on compulsory ID 
cards have tended to focus on cases in Europe, the United Kingdom, North America and Australia, with a few 
studies available on Asia and the Middle East. Foucauldian theories of discipline, normalisation and 
governmentality, and exploration of the ways in which identification regimes make the population ‘legible’ have 
dominated studies in this field especially in relation to biometric identity cards. This is particularly so since 11 
September 2001, as surveillance for security purposes has increased to the point where it threatens democratic 
principles of autonomy and privacy (Lyon 2001, 2009; Lyon and Bennet 2008a; Scott 1998). However, the various 
problems associated with identity cards in Kenya are of a qualitatively different nature, not related to the 
intrusiveness of identity cards. 
is a slightly different but related one. Contrary to strict liberal approaches to citizenship which 
see it as a status pertaining to individuals and controlled by an impartial, bureaucratic state, in 
the case of the Nubians we see that ID cards operate as citizenship technologies within a 
complex social and political context which determines the limits of the equality they can 
confer. Rather than acting as universalising equalisers, there is a difficult tension in the  
Kenyan identification regime between equality and inequality, difference and sameness. The 
supposedly liberal technology has taken on distinctively illiberal characteristics. 
The relationship between citizenship (as status) and equality is significantly more 
confused than implied by the liberal tradition – both its principles and its practices. The case  
of the Nubians bears this out and in doing so serves as a warning to people concerned with the 
inequality facing stateless peoples: the pursuit of equality is not over once documentation has 
been won. In what follows, I explore the realities of the Kenyan identification regime,   
drawing out its liberal and anti-liberal tendencies. I go on to explain this with reference to the 
central role of difference (ethnic and indigenous) in the construction of the Kenyan polity, 
which is then taken up in more detail in coming chapters. 
 
The Kenyan Identification Regime 
 
In order to understand the operation and significance of the identification regime in Kenya 
and its impact on the Nubians, it is necessary to comprehend both its emancipatory and 
repressive potentials (Caplan and Torpey 2001, 5). On the one hand, modern mass societies 
that entail the regular interaction of total strangers require tokens of identity in order to 
function smoothly (Caplan 2001; Gates 2008). Tokens such as ID cards, which recognise and 
represent a person’s identity, operate as passes which state and other agents can use to verify 
not only an individual’s identity but also their right to access various aspects of modern 
society and citizenship (Caplan 2001, 50). Individuals who possess these tokens of 
recognition find themselves able to access social, political and economic goods that they are 
entitled to by right (such as education, healthcare or the ballot box) and also access full and 
deep participation in the private sector (for example, engagement in commerce) (Lyon and 
Bennett 2008b, 10–11). In this sense, when operating according to liberal principles, 
identification regimes can have an emancipatory effect. 
However, on the other hand, insofar as they perform an important act of recognition, 
identification regimes that involve identity cards also carry the potential for anti-liberal 
repression. The driving concern behind establishing identification regimes has been security 
and the perceived need to control the population (Piazza and Laniel 2008). Often  
identification regimes have their origins in times of war or other threat, where the state deems 
it necessary to differentiate between certain categories of desirable and undesirable people, 
often citizens and strangers. As a result of these powerful functions, ID cards have been a 
mechanism for determining membership and excluding unwanted others. By establishing a 
regime of readily legible individuals, social sorting becomes possible in a way it never was 
before (Lyon 2001), enabling relations of alterity and, in the Kenyan case, favouritism and 
preferential access to the state. Often this is achieved either through information that is visible 
on a uniform ID card or even visibly different ID cards, for example of different colours for 
different ethnicities or alien cards (Mehmood 2008, 122). Through categorising or sorting 
individuals, the state is able to simultaneously consolidate and fortify both its own population 
of nationals and a community of others (cf. Noiriel 2001). Mechanisms such as these  
constitute a symbiotic process of stabilisation of the insider (national, citizen) and the outsider 
(foreigner, stranger, deviant) (Mehmood 2008, 122). 
The Kenyan identification regime, though liberal in theory, entails both these 
emancipatory and repressive potentials. Inherited from the Afrikaners in South Africa, British 
colonies adopted a system of identifying male ‘natives’ in Africa as early as the beginning of 
the nineteenth-century (Longman 2001, 347). In Kenya, the 1915 Native Registration 
Ordinance created the first identification system in the country, mandating what was called a 
‘kipande’, a loathed copper tin worn around the neck with registration papers inside (Berman 
and Lonsdale 1980; KNCHR 2007, 3). In 1947 the Registration of Persons Ordinance made 
registration compulsory for men of all ages. In 1978 this was extended to women and in 1980 
the compulsory age was raised from 16 to 18 (KNHCR 2007, 3). While its original purpose 
was to control the labour force, particularly in mines and plantations, the system leant itself to 
identification in other ways. Controlling labour meant also controlling movement, and 
controlling movement meant identifying ‘home’. Kipandes were one of the most important 
mechanisms for identifying particular individuals with their Native Reserves and keeping 
them there under control of their Native Administration. This served to fortify ethnic identity 
amongst those communities recognised as tribes at the time. 
Today, all Kenyan citizens are required by law to acquire an ID card within 90 days of 
turning 18. In order to do this they must complete an application form at the local chief’s 
office for submission to the local branch of the National Bureau of Registration and provide 
supporting documents that prove both their age and their entitlement to citizenship on the 
basis of having a parent who is a Kenyan citizen. However, the ID card is not in itself proof 
of citizenship. In fact, there is no single document that can stand as proof of Kenyan 
citizenship (KNCHR and UNHCR 2010, 14). In practice, the ID card is simply the most 
important of many identity documents, including birth certificates (which include an explicit 
statement to the effect that they are not proof of nationality), passports, school leaving 
certificates and other similar documents (Interview 57). Although tribe no longer appears on 
second generation ID cards (introduced in 1995), it is part of the application form and district 
of origin, largely synonymous with tribe, does appear on ID cards.53 
An ID card is a necessary condition of full citizenship in Kenya. Though the ID card is 
not legally proof of nationality, this is not well understood amongst the general population. 
Rather, because of its importance, people generally believe it is the Kenyan citizenship 
document. It is required to get a passport, obtain formal employment, enrol in any form of 
tertiary education, purchase property (including land), engage in any commerce (including 
opening a bank account) and in many cases it is even required to obtain casual, informal work 
or participate in micro-finance schemes. Despite the clearly important role of an ID card in an 
  
53 Second generation ID cards are plastic and include a photo of the person, whereas first generation ID cards were 
paper without a photo. 
individual’s day-to-day life, the understanding of the law and administrative procedures 
relating to acquisition of ID cards is confused within the general population (for an example 
see Mwaura 2009; KNHCR and UNHCR 2010). This is in large part because the issuance of 
ID cards has been fraught with problems. The Minister for Immigration and Registration of 
Persons has himself acknowledged a range of problems related to the registration offices 
(access, resourcing, delays, inefficiency), the information collected (the sensitivity of tribe 
and place of birth), the behaviour of registration officers (discrimination in relation to gender 
and ethnicity, and corruption for material and political gain, for example through mass 
registration before an election), and the system itself (its colonial roots, the redundancy of 
having a separate voting card) (Waitere and Kirwa 2008).54 
 
However, the most controversial issues associated with ID cards relate to ethnicity. The 
requirement to state and then have the registrar code one’s tribe on the application form, and 
the inclusion of ‘district of origin’ on the card itself, have led to abuse of the cards amounting 
to ethnic discrimination, most notably in violent incidents after the 2007 election when people 
were targeted if their ID card showed they were from the ‘wrong’ district. However, not only 
can ID cards in Kenya facilitate inter-ethnic divisions, they also serve to distinguish between 
which individuals are outsiders and which are ‘rightly’ Kenyan. In this sense, the divisive and 
repressive potential of ID cards is two-fold. 
 
The Nubians as Stateless 
 
In Kenya, security concerns have driven not only the establishment of the identification 
regime, but also significant changes that have occurred in its administration since the late 
1980s. Throughout the 1990s there was a heightened sense of insecurity amongst Kenyan 
officials and decision makers. The early 1990s marked the beginning of a major influx of 
Somalis into Kenya as refugees, escaping the collapse of the Barre regime in Somalia and 
living in either the UNHCR refugee settlement Dadaab or with extended family in various 
 
54 In the 2013 there were conflicting experiences regarding voter registration and ID cards, which will be further 
complicated again if and when biometric ID cards are introduced, as planned. 
parts of Kenya, especially North-Eastern Province (which borders Somalia) and Nairobi. 
Given the memory of the Shifta war of the mid-1960s, the growth of extremist Islamic groups 
and terrorism in Somalia and later the bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi in 1998, 
as well as the perceived threat to borders posed by the regional presence of various Somali 
clans, the supposed Somali threat has been a significant influence on Kenya’s immigration 
and registration of persons policies.55 
 
In 1989 these combined threats prompted the government to introduce vetting for 
certain categories of people applying for ID cards. Most dramatically, a screening of all 
Kenyan Somalis took place from 1989 to 1991, during which many Kenyan Somalis had their 
ID cards confiscated (Lochery 2008; Manby 2009b, 121). Following from that exercise, 
vetting became policy not only for Somalis but also for individuals from all other ethnic 
groups with a presence across borders and individuals from marginal ethnic groups applying 
for ID cards in cosmopolitan, urban centres (KNCHR and UNHCR 2010, 15). In 1992, when 
multiparty democracy returned to Kenya, the makeup of constituencies mattered in a 
significant way for the first time since independence. This may also have been a motivating 
factor insofar as vetting enabled ‘cleaning up’ of voter registries by denying ID and therefore 
voters’ cards to certain segments of the population. The introduction of second generation ID 
cards in 1995 and the requirement for all citizens to renew their ID card at that time 
represented a significant opportunity for the government to vet potential non-Kenyans and 
confiscate their ID cards. 
In a presentation by the Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons (2005) to 
the Nairobi Province Vetting Committee Members, a justification for vetting was provided 
with reference to the prevalence of cases in which non-Kenyans have been able to acquire 
Kenyan ID cards through various forms of corruption. These included monetary bribes, clan 
loyalties, forged documents and crash registration programmes before elections when rules 
  
55 The Westgate mall terror attack of September 2013, which took place after the research for this book was 
conducted, has further increased pressure on Somalis in the same way. 
and regulations are relaxed in order to boost voter registries in particular ways.56 All of these 
administrative problems were exacerbated by the influx of refugees from Somalia and 
Ethiopia. To the extent that the problem of non-Kenyans acquiring ID cards is a result of the 
government being unable to control its administration, this already signals an illiberal 
bureaucratic apparatus responsible for the implementation of this ‘liberal’ technology, yet 
deeper, even more formalised illiberal practices represent an even greater challenge to the 
liberal nature of the Kenya’s citizenship regime.57 
The process of vetting is administrative rather than statutory.58  It is provided for by  
legislation, which understandably permits further investigation into ID card applications if 
there is doubt over a person’s nationality. However, there is no legislation providing 
procedural rules about how this should happen or which people should be subjected to it. As 
such, it is an informal, sometimes arbitrary and certainly discriminatory process (Kenya 
Human Rights Commission 2009; KNCHR 2007, 14; Manby 2009b; Sing’Oei 2008, 2011a). 
Generally, when applying at the local branch of a National Registration Bureau, if a person is 
to be vetted they have to present themselves to a committee for which the Provincial 
Administration is responsible. Formerly, these were central at Nyayo house in Nairobi, 
however, since the mid-2000s they have been handled at the district level.59  The committee 
 
interviews the applicant (and if necessary the parents of the applicant), ensuring the 
authenticity of documents by doing background checks. Often the committee requires people 
to produce impossible to acquire documents, such as grandparents’ birth certificates, 
56 On corruption in general in relation to registration of persons, see also KNCHR 2007; KNCHR and UNHCR 
2010, 16–17. For examples of reports of forged documents, see Daily Nation 2009a; Jubat and Ongeri 2009. 
57 To further demonstrate this point, 56 per cent of Nubians who have passports were vetted for a second time with 
their passport application, after already satisfying the ID card vetting committee, demonstrating the state’s mistrust 
in its own procedures (OSJI 2011c). 
58 The account of vetting provided here was accurate at the time of research in 2009–2011. 
 
59 Vetting committees are composed of the district commissioner or officer as chairperson, the district registrar as 
technical adviser and secretary, an immigration officer (where applicable), a civil registrar, National Security 
Intelligence Service, chiefs and assistant chiefs, and appointed elders. 
affidavits (which can be costly) or members of the committee may make demands for bribes. 
When these demands cannot be met, or the documents cannot be acquired, the applicant will 
face endless delays and often give up. There is no clear understanding of the basis for 
decisions made to grant or deny an ID card and the committees are not required to give one. It 
is also not clear whether vetted individuals who do receive ID cards after this process are then 
considered citizens by birth or by registration. Citizenship by registration is an inferior 
citizenship because there are more grounds on which it can be revoked (2010 Constitution 
chapter 3, section 17) and citizens by registration are prohibited from running for President or 
acquiring dual nationality (2010 Constitution chapter 9, section 137, 1; interviews 54 and 
57).60 
 
Among Nubians, 44 per cent reported having been vetted when applying for an ID card 
(OSJI 2011c). The following account from Mohamed (Interview 34), a youth from Kibera, 
serves to demonstrate the process. Mohamed first applied for his ID card in 1997 and  
acquired it in 2001: 
Okay before I take my ID it was the bomb blast in Nairobi in 1998, so by then 
I've already applied so I was just like keeping waiting for two to three months. 
When I went there they start telling me 'No, you  need  to  go  and  be  vetted'. 
'Why?' 'Because you are a Nubian, you are a Muslim'. So I had to be taken to 
vetting in Nyayo House, 44th floor, the officer who was in charge there write for 
me so many things. My great grandparents birth certificate—so I was very 
annoyed with him. But he just took—I didn't show him that I was very annoyed, 
but deep in my heart I was very annoyed because, like, my father was born in 
Kenya, my grandfather was born in Kenya, my great grandfather—was not born 
in Kenya. So I was very annoyed, writing for me to bring all these documents. I 
60 Nobody I spoke to in my research was able to verify whether the Nubians, or any other group, are being 
registered as citizens by birth or citizens by registration. Jill Cottrell Ghai, a constitutional expert, suggested it 
might make the Nubians more vulnerable if they began trying to resolve this question, as if the government were 
reminded of the possibility of revoking their citizenship problems could ensue (Interview 54). 
didn't bring. I just left and just come home—Yeah. So it took me two years. A 
friend of mine, she was a lady, a good friend of mine, she was the one who 
helped me until I get my ID. In 2001. 
Insofar as any international attention has been directed at the Nubians, it has been to  
narratives like this and associated complaints of rights deprivation (KNCHR and UNHCR 
2010; M Lynch 2008; Makoloo 2005; OSJI 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). Organisations such 
as OSJI, the Minority Rights Group and Refugees International as well as UNHCR have 
therefore considered the Nubians stateless. 
Concepts of statelessness have their origins in instruments of international law 
promulgated after World War II. Statelessness is most commonly conceived as a condition 
characterised by lack of protection directly resulting from lack of nationality, either in law (de 
jure) or practice (de facto). The Nubians cannot be considered de jure stateless because under 
the operation of Kenyan law they should be entitled to citizenship. According to the 1963 
constitution (in effect during the main period of field research), at independence citizenship 
should have been granted to all British Protected Persons residing in Kenya.61  Failing this, 
 
Article 87(1) of the 1963 constitution says that Kenyan citizenship should be automatically 
granted to all those who were born in Kenya and who have one parent also born in Kenya. As 
the Nubians arrived in Kenya from as early as 1897, and today 99 per cent of Nubians report 
that their parents are Kenyan (OSJI 2011b), either or both of these provisions should mean 
that Nubians are automatically considered Kenyan citizens (cf. Manby 2009b, 30). The 2010 
constitution contains similar provisions.62  However the Nubians’ citizenship has been 
continually cast into doubt (Sing’Oei 2011a, 50). 
 
61 All residents of British colonies were British Protected Persons, a lesser status than British subject, a category 
which was equivalent to a full citizen and was only available to people born in the British Isles and their 
descendants (Manby 2009b, 27). 
62 The 2010 constitution contains some changes in relation to citizenship. These include, as stated earlier, citizens 
by registration are not entitled to dual citizenship (which was not available to anyone in the previous constitution), 
nor are they entitled to serve as President; gender discrimination has been eliminated so that now women are able 
Constitutional right alone is not enough to guarantee access to citizenship. Rather, 
constitutional provisions need to be made effective through appropriate administrative 
procedures (Batchelor 1995, 112). As long as people who identify as Nubian are routinely 
denied a Kenyan ID card prior to vetting, they can be considered de facto stateless or simply 
stateless (Manby 2009b, 122–6; Sing’Oei 2011a).63  Groups like the Nubians are not 
considered nationals until they have passed successfully through the vetting process, meaning 
that before that stage they effectively have no citizenship. This is in contrast to the many 
other Kenyans who are assumed to be Kenyan on the basis of their ethnicity and for whom 
getting an ID card is just a formality. Many Kenyans lack birth certificates, and most lack 
their grandparents’ birth certificates, yet still manage to acquire an ID card without 
 
to pass their nationality onto their children and to foreign husbands; and, importantly, documentation is guaranteed 
for all individuals who are entitled to citizenship. The 2010 constitutional provisions relating to citizenship were 
given effect in the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011, and the Citizens and Foreign Nationals 
Management Service Act 2011. The former Act allows the possibility of granting citizenship-by-registration to 
stateless people: ‘15 (1) A person who does not have an enforceable claim to the citizenship of any recognized  
state and has been living in Kenya for a continuous period since 12th December, 1963, shall be deemed to have 
been lawfully resident and may, on application, in the prescribed manner be eligible to be registered as a citizen of 
Kenya if that person (a) has adequate knowledge of Kiswahili or a local dialect; (b) has not been convicted of an 
offence and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or longer; (c) intends upon registration as a citizen 
to continue to permanently reside in Kenya or to maintain a close and continuing association with Kenya; and (d) 
the person understands the rights and duties of a citizen. (2) Applications under this section shall be made within a 
period of five years from the date of commencement of this Act and may by notice in the gazette be extended by 
the Cabinet Secretary for an additional period of three years.’ Aside from the vague wording of some of these 
conditions, the retention of the category of citizens by registration is problematic insofar as it is a second-class 
citizenship – revocable and not entailing all the rights of citizens, including to dual nationality and to run for 
President. 
63 A guideline produced by UNHCR (2012) in relation to the definition of statelessness suggests that the common 
 
distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness is unhelpful. It offers authoritative advice that the definition 
of statelessness should ‘encompass not just legislation, but also ministerial decrees, regulations, orders, judicial 
case law (in countries with a tradition of precedent) and, where appropriate, customary practice’ (UNHCR 2012, 
5). 
difficulties of this kind. Even if certain Kenyans do not actually possess an ID card, for 
example if they haven’t been able to access a registration office, they are not likely to be 
stateless because, given the opportunity to apply, they would not be assumed to be foreign. 64 
In practice, the determination of who is entitled to an ID card therefore entails  
significant ethnic discrimination. The KNCHR (2007, 10) argues that ‘[t]he Nubians are not 
classified among the recognized ethnic groups in Kenya. For this reason, all Nubians are 
vetted. The underlying assumption of vetting the Nubians, is that they [are] foreigners, unless 
proven otherwise.’ This general approach is part of a wider pattern of ethnic discrimination in 
many postcolonial African states, which favour ‘indigenous’ groups at the expense of those 
perceived to be non-indigenous, turning the colonial order on its head by privileging natives 
over settlers (Lochery 2008; Manby 2009b, 38). Categories of people such as detribalised 
natives, who were neither fully settler nor native, have found themselves left in the 
postcolonial regime with neither the still-privileged status of the settler (the option of British 
citizenship) nor the regular status of a full citizen. Instead, they are ethnic strangers (Mamdani 
1998, 2001a). Research with vetting committees and district registrars conducted by OSJI in 
2010 exposed the outright discriminatory application of the vetting, with a Mombasa registrar 
explaining that: 
You know, cases of indigenous Kenyans, like Mijikenda or Giriama, there is no 
way you will subject him or her to vetting—When you talk of Asians or Arabs, 
they are not indigenous Kenyans and that is why we ask them for extra birth 
certificates, like for their parents and grandparents (OSJI 2011b). 
  
 
64 Many Nubians acknowledge that there is an illegal demand for Kenyan ID cards from people not entitled to 
them, for example some Ugandan Nubians or Somali Somalis, and as such some, including the Kenya Nubian 
Council of Elders (KNCE), have no in-principle problem with the vetting process as a measure to ensure national 
security. However, they do and should maintain that it is ethnically discriminatory to vet someone purely on the 
basis of their ethnicity, especially if they are able to provide the requisite evidence to prove, with the standard 
documents, that a parent was Kenyan and that they are therefore entitled to citizenship. 
Early in 2011, Arab and Asian Kenyans brought a case to the High Court in Mombasa against 
the Registrar of Persons about discriminatory vetting (Muslims for Human Rights, et al. v. 
The Registrar of Persons 2011). The judge deemed a confidential circular from the 
Immigration department to be unconstitutional as it requests the vetting committees to target 
these specific communities (OSJI 2011b). The case was suspended pending the establishment 
of the Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service (provided for in the 
Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service Act 2011), which should standardise the 
process for acquiring an ID card. If this service succeeds in making the Mombasa High Court 
case redundant and eliminates vetting on the basis of race or ethnicity, this will clearly have 
important and very positive consequences for the Nubians, as well as other groups like Arabs, 
Asians and Somalis. 
 
ID Cards and Disaggregated Citizenship 
 
Prevailing studies of statelessness by NGOs like Refugees International, OSJI and agencies 
like UNHCR, though not satisfied with the current ad hoc and precarious arrangement, have 
their goals largely fulfilled by the now high rate (87 per cent) of ID card acquisition amongst 
the Nubians. Yet, the reality of ID card possession is not one of equal, universal citizenship.  
In Kenya, the relations of interdependence between ID cards and other components of 
citizenship does not fit the liberal model, whereby the ID card marks citizenship as status and 
acts as a token to access rights and opportunities for political participation. Rather, the ID  
card is a precondition for only some other component of citizenship; and it seems there are, in 
fact, other preconditions for accessing an ID card, including forms of political belonging that 
the liberal tradition eschews. 
The ID card does, in practice, operate as a precondition for access to some rights. Most 
commonly people talked about the impossibility of getting a job, even casual labouring jobs, 
without an ID card (Interviews 2b, 12, 21, 29, 39, 41b, 43, 45a, 46, 48). A number of people 
reported that they were only able to purchase land (outside Kibera of course) (Interviews 30, 
32, 40, 41b), or open bank accounts (Interviews 2b, 12, 30, 33, 46, 48) after they eventually 
acquired an ID card. Even membership in small women’s self-help groups required ID cards 
(Interview 33). Though not many people raised it in interviews, an ID card has historically 
been required to get a voting card and so people without one could not exercise this important 
political right in past elections (Interviews 21, 48).65  Some people also complained that 
 
without an ID card they felt vulnerable walking around in public, fearing they could be 
arrested or at least extorted by the police for not carrying one even though it is not a legal 
requirement (Interviews 2b, 29, 32). It is also not possible to enrol in tertiary education 
without an ID card, and only 2 per cent of Nubians have been able to reach this level of 
education (OSJI 2011b).66 
 
Though many Nubians lack the means to travel, international travel was an option for 
some people and one they often missed out on because of difficulties getting an ID card. Even 
after obtaining an ID card, Nubians suffered further difficulties getting a passport. For  
example one young woman missed out on a Masters scholarship at a top American university 
(Interview 45a) and another missed out on a volunteer exchange opportunity with a different 
American university (Interview 41a). Young people without ID cards are unable to travel to 
Saudi Arabia in search of work (Interviews 41b, 51). A year working there as a driver or 
domestic employee could result in sizeable remittances to families at home and enough 
savings to buy a small piece of land and construct a small house for a new family (though 
outside Kibera). Difficulty accessing passports also makes it more difficult to undertake Hajj 
and visit Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam for those with the means (Interviews 24, 
65 Though the government has plans to combine the ID card with the voting card in a new third generation 
biometric ID card, there is no publicly stated date of implementation for such a project. In the 2013 election, 
electronic voter registration and biometric voter identification were used for the first time, with multiple problems: 
nearly three million people eligible to vote were not registered, allegedly because they lacked a voting card, and 
only 40 per cent of the electronic voter identification equipment functioned on the day (Independent Electoral 
Boundaries Commission 2013). Even with these electronic measures, or with a third generation ID card, proof of 
citizenship such as has been historically difficult for the Nubians is or will still be required. 
66 Though it is common to talk about stateless people being denied education, in Kenya this only applies to tertiary 
 
education because ID cards are only acquired at age 18. 
44).67 Even local travel within East Africa, for example to Uganda or Tanzania to visit 
extended family for weddings and funerals or to study (Interviews 26, 35, 43, 46), was made 
more difficult for some without a passport. 
However, though the ID card is a precondition for access to these rights it is not 
adequate guarantee of their enjoyment or security. The material and intersubjective conditions 
in which Nubians must make use of and enjoy these rights is still limited by other factors that 
are outside of (but, as we have seen, continue to heavily condition) the identification regime. 
The ID card is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for equal citizenship with other 
Kenyans. So, while the ID card makes opening a bank account, buying land or travelling a 
technical possibility, many Nubians continue to lack the material means to make these rights   
a reality. This is true of many, even most, Kenyans. The intersubjective conditions, which   
also impact on the material conditions, are more unusual for the Nubians. While they may 
formally have access to rights, they lack the confidence and authority from others to claim 
them. Further, the security of the Nubians’ sense of political belonging remains weak despite 
the conferral of ID cards, for political belonging is determined far more by other factors. 
In some sense, the ID card does also operate as a precondition for a sense of political 
belonging but not nearly as much in its presence as in its absence. In other words, though  
there is some sense of political belonging conferred by the ID card, the sense of not belonging 
imposed upon a citizen when he or she is denied an ID card is much greater. The ID card  
holds a far greater promise of citizenship than it can deliver. Jamia (Interview 31) said of her 
ID card, when she finally got it, that it means, ‘I am a Kenyan! That shows I am a Kenyan! 
And I am proud to be a Kenyan.’ Yet, experiences of misrecognition or non-recognition 
associated with ID card denial were much more profound, associated with feelings of being 
undeserving (Interview 37a), being foreigners (and particularly inferior or dangerous ones 
who are ‘not to be trusted’) (Interview 45a) and even being refugees (Interview 43). As such, 
  
67 During my research I heard rumours that temporary passports were sometimes issued for this purpose, but I was 
unable to verify this. 
the sense in which an ID card constitutes membership in the political community, a vital 
component of citizenship, is quite weak. As coming chapters will demonstrate, and as the 
language of alterity and even abjection adopted by the Nubians suggests, the membership 
component of citizenship is determined in far more influential ways by other factors. 
Citizenship status then, in the form of an ID card, is not nearly as interdependent a component 
of citizenship as one might expect in a liberal democracy. 
 
Recognition and Redistribution Regimes 
 
The denial and the eventual granting of ID cards has been experienced and made sense of by 
many Nubians primarily in relation to their collective ethnic identity and the recognition (or 
non-recognition) of that identity, and of the Nubians’ collective rightful place as a tribe of 
Kenya. When trying to explain to me why they thought they had been discriminated against in 
their personal pursuit of their own ID card, people frequently switched rapidly from the 
singular to the plural and launched into a discussion of the perception that the Nubians are 
non-Kenyans. In doing so, these narratives of denial ceased to be personal and individual and 
instead became narratives of collective denial based on collective identity, and specifically   
the notion that this identity is a foreign one. When asked what he thought was the basis of 
discrimination when he applied for his ID card, Mohamed (Interview 39) said, ‘Basically I  
will think because I am Nubian, because people maybe think these are not Kenyans, they may 
think these are Sudanese.’ 
Many Nubians feel themselves to be in the predicament of having no ID card together. 
An individual Nubian is not really vetted, stalled or denied an ID card that he or she should be 
entitled to because of doubts about the basic facts of place of birth and parentage; the facts a 
liberal tradition holds as the only ones that should be relevant to access to citizenship and 
nationality. Rather, as described in detail above, the process of vetting is being applied to all 
Nubians precisely because they are Nubian, because they are perceived to be foreigners. Their 
ethnicity, and not only their birthplace and parents’ birthplace, are made relevant in this 
process. When asked why she thought Nubians she knew had been refused ID cards, Mabruka 
(Interview 48) responded, ‘Because the Nubians are not amongst the tribes in Kenya, the 42, 
so we’ll be put like Others.’ The resolution of nationality for one Nubian by granting an ID 
card does not, therefore, necessarily solve either that individual’s other interdependent 
citizenship deficits (as described in coming chapters) or the on-going denial of even formal 
membership to other Nubians. 
Despite its claims of universality, and the uniformity of ID cards which do not bear a 
person’s ethnic identity explicitly, the process of applying for an ID card involves reference 
to tribe both explicitly on the form – where there is a space for the registrar to issue a code 
alongside the applicant’s declaration of the tribe – but also clearly in the mandate of the 
district vetting committees to target specific tribes. Like the other political mechanisms of 
recognition and modes of access to rights and participation discussed in this book (collective 
census recognition and ethnic homelands), ID cards highlight and reinforce the salience of 
ethnicity for citizenship (cf. Gates 2008; Steinwedel 2001). 
The Nubians’ experiences demonstrate the limits of the liberal citizenship tradition in 
Kenya and its ability to confer the political equality it purports to promote (cf. Appadurai 
2006, 60). As a political doctrine that emphasises individualism and conceives of a political 
community in the thin sense of a group of people sharing a common status, liberalism fails to 
account for the ways in which political communities are experienced, constructed, enjoyed 
and denied. In Kenya this is on the basis of collective identities, in this case, indigenous 
ethnic identities (Berman 2004, 39). 
Equality of citizenship, then, requires more than equality of documentation and legal 
status (although as we have seen, the Nubians do not yet really have that either). For the 
Nubians, ID cards have some effect on the context in which a Nubian can consider himself or 
herself a citizen, but this effect is limited. In practice ID cards confer a formal authority to 
claim the rights of a citizen and act in political ways, for example to vote, but the 
intersubjective experiences that engender the confidence and self-assuredness required to feel 
that one has the authority to speak as full member of a political community are determined by 
other factors. The invocation of a community of citizens, against a community of outsiders, is 
largely (though it would be an exaggeration to say wholly) performed through means other 
than ID cards, means that are less formal and less individual. The ‘boundaries of identity and 
the realm of not belonging’ (McNevin 2011, 15) are shaped by considerations of indigeneity 
and ethnicity. 
 
Nubians’ Responses to the ID Card Challenge  
A number of legal cases have been brought to various bodies seeking to remedy ethnic 
discrimination through the liberal means of the law. In 2003, Yunus Ali (the former Nubian 
MP), with CEMIRIDE, brought a case to the Kenyan High Court about discrimination in 
access to ID cards, and in June 2004 a large crowd of Nubians marched through the streets of 
Nairobi to the High Court in support of the case, though in the end it was inexplicably stalled 
and subsequently abandoned. In March 2011 the African Committee of Experts on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, in a case brought by OSJI and the Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa on behalf of the Nubians, ruled that the Kenyan state has violated the 
rights of Nubian children to a nationality, though it is too early to comment on the 
implementation of this decision (OSJI 2011d). Since 2010 a decision has been expected on a 
case at the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights in the Gambia, also brought  
by OSJI, the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and CEMIRIDE, which 
addresses the citizenship issue as well as a range of other related rights violations (OSJI 
2011a).68  These cases make the distinctly liberal argument that the problem with the Nubian’s 
access to citizenship is one of fair, impartial and universal laws implemented unfairly: a 
discrimination problem. In 2009 the Minister for Immigration and Registration of Persons, 
Otieno Kajwang’, agreed, admitting that the vetting of members of the community is 
discriminatory and needed to be revised as ‘all Kenyans are equal’ when it came to 
registration as citizens (Daily Nation 2009b). Theoretically this is the case. However, the 
relative success of other, less liberal means of protest compared to these legal cases is 
testament to the extent to which both the deficit and its remedy are not only a matter of 
68 Reasons for the lengthy delay in a decision on this case are not clear, including to the lawyers concerned. 
discrimination. After all, if that were the extent of the problem, it could be remedied simply 
by a more properly liberal application of the technology. 
While these cases wait to be decided or implemented, Nubians continue dealing with 
discrimination in access to ID cards in the ad hoc and precarious (though relatively more 
effective) ways they have done for the past few years. Since vetting committees have become 
more decentralised in some places (Nairobi, Eldama Ravine, Kericho, Kibos and Kisii), the 
Nubians have succeeded in getting ‘their own people’ onto the district committees to vouch 
for the identity and Kenyan nationality of applicants.69  Nevertheless, despite the presence of 
 
Nubian elders on district vetting committees and international pressure, the majority of 
Nubians (56 per cent) got around the vetting in different ways: by bribing, lying about their 
name and/or their tribe or purchasing counterfeit IDs (OSJI 2011c). Many Nubians I spoke to, 
indeed many non-Nubians, recognise that paying ‘kitu kidogo’ – something small – is an 
ordinary procedure when dealing with the provincial and district administration, as it is with 
traffic police and various other state agents. However, lying about one’s name and tribe in 
order to be automatically considered Kenyan, or resorting to a counterfeit ID as a result of 
being denied the authentic ID that they are entitled to, are not ordinary measures. By 2011 87 
per cent of Nubians aged over 18 held an ID card and 8 per cent a passport, leaving 13 per  
cent still stateless (OSJI 2011c). These gains were achieved not by a more impartial 
implementation of the law but indeed by a more partial application of it: one that is more 
generous to the Nubian community. 
These solutions are far from ideal. They are deeply fragile, only reinforcing the more 
structural problems associated with the Kenyan identification regime and leaving the regime 
in tact in ways that remain problematic for other communities that suffer similar problems 
(the Galje’el, for example). The Nubians’ experiences of this regime are illuminating of the 
great incentives in place for adherence to and reinforcement of the prevailing recognition and 
  
69 Anecdotal evidence from 2011 suggested that Nubians are again being referred to central vetting committees at 
National Social Security Fund building without Nubian elders who can vouch for their identity. 
distribution regime. With few material resources and few connections to people with the 
capacity to address the issue head-on (CEMIRIDE and the Open Society Initiative for Eastern 
Africa are the exceptions here), and understandably little faith that legal cases would 
necessarily make much difference anyway, it is not difficult to comprehend why the Nubians 
would instead seek to carve out a space for themselves within this regime to address the short 
term and immediate problem of ID cards for their youth. In the next two chapters I further 
explore the nature of the recognition and distribution regime that underpins the Nubian’s 
problems with ID cards, and further analyse the ways in which the Nubians’ strategies for 
remedying their citizenship deficits do more to reinforce the existing regime than transform it. 
Chapter 3: Indigeneity and Collective Recognition 
   
 
‘People have used our history against us. “These are outsiders, they should not be given land, 
they’re not indigenous!”’ 
– Ismail, Nubian 
 
  
In the previous chapter, I argued that formal, legal status – particularly in the form of ID cards 
 
– is a component of citizenship that, counter-intuitively, is not strongly interdependent with 
other components of citizenship. Beyond formal recognition of citizenship status and formal 
possession of individual rights, there are other components of citizenship that Nubians 
experience as less secure and of a lesser quality than the most robust citizenship available in 
Kenya. This chapter examines Kenyan political culture to understand the role of ethnicity in 
citizenship, and in doing so draws out the relation between collective ethnic recognition, 
rights and participatory parity. In the Kenyan context, there are deeply embedded 
institutional, social and political mechanisms that establish membership in a tribe as a pre- 
requisite for full membership in the national political community. Furthermore, the 
understanding of which tribes rightly count as Kenyan is heavily influenced by notions of 
indigeneity. The political rhetoric in Kenya of pride in ethnic diversity only extends as far as 
the 42 ‘recognised’ tribes. In restricting recognition to those groups, the Kenyan state 
promotes a different kind of distinction to that between different tribes: that between 
indigenous and stranger ethnic groups. Nubians, then, want their (ethnic) difference to be 
recognised in order to reinforce their (indigenous) sameness and therefore their access to full 
citizenship, including development opportunities, administrative and electoral influence, and 
land. In making these general arguments, I highlight the point that in Kenya claims for 
recognition of collective identity are therefore not necessarily claims for preferential, special 
or different treatment, but can be claims for equal citizenship. Throughout the chapter I draw 
particularly on material related to the 2009 Kenyan census to demonstrate these points in 
more detail. 
Census Categories and Kenya’s 42 Indigenous Tribes  
There is no tool more widely used than a census for counting and knowing national 
populations. Yet, far from being a straightforward counting exercise, a census in fact  organises 
the population and categorises citizens (ethnically, linguistically, religiously, racially) by 
coding and naming, or not naming (Ferrando 2008; Hirschman 1987; Kertzer abd Arel 2002; 
Urla 1993; Uvin 2002). In the 2009 Kenyan census, the most comprehensive conducted in its 
50-year history, the most controversial categorisation – in particular given the 
recent memory of the 2007–2008 post-election violence – arose in the question, ‘What tribe 
are you?’70 The emotive nature of this question is perhaps demonstrated best by the fact that 
although it had been asked in all previous censuses, in 1999 the statistics generated from the 
question were deemed too sensitive for public release. Traditionally, in Kenya, it is tribalism 
– divisions between Kenya’s 42 tribes – that has attracted public, academic, civil society and 
NGO attention. Inequalities in access to land and the power and resources of the central state 
have led to persistent inter-ethnic tensions and occasional outright violence. In the census, 
concern about the potential misuse of the statistics to facilitate patrimonialism and resource 
grabbing, and thereby exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions, was widespread. Many could not see 
the relevance of tribe in development planning, seeing only potential for misuse of the figures 
to direct development funds to ‘one’s own’ (Wanyeki 2009). Others, however, argued that 
tribe is part of who Kenyans are and should not be ignored, so the question should be asked 
(for example see Okulo 2009).71  
70 While this was the most controversial question, the most controversial issue in relation to the census was 
undoubtedly the corruption and ethnic favouritism in recruitment of enumerators – prized employment 
opportunities – and the on-going disputes over their payment. It is difficult to underestimate the way in which this 
issue overshadowed the tribe question and any other issue related to the census. This is an example of the ways in 
which ethnic patrimonialism operates in Kenya, as discussed further in other parts of this chapter. 
71 Aside from these main schools of opinion, there was a smaller group consisting of some tribes (and sub-tribes)  
historically counted as ‘Others’ or included in bigger umbrella tribes such as the Kalenjin or Luhya who pledged to 
boycott the census (Matoke and Juma 2009). Nubians were not part of this initiative. In addition, Kenyans of 
European or Asian origin cannot be coded by tribe, though they are coded by race, and were largely left out of the 
In the weeks leading up to the census, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and the 
government tried to defend the inclusion of the tribe question, consistently claiming that the 
census is simply a tool for government planning. The head of the Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics, Anthony Kilele said, ‘[m]ost people are looking at the question on tribe as a tool for 
political purposes. Yes, I know some people can use statistics badly given the chance, but let 
us not bring politics into every issue, as this will be a purely professional exercise. We are 
getting the information so that it can be used by planners and for statistical reasons’ (Kiare 
2009). 
However, it is widely accepted that there is, in fact, no such thing as an apolitical, 
neutral, purely ‘scientific’ census. Censuses, like all statistics do not simply deliver raw, 
apolitical data. Rather, they shape the population and the citizenry, both in the historical  
record and in the present in the moment of enumeration – that is, in the interaction between 
citizen and enumerator as state agent  and in public debates (Andersen 1983; Appadurai 2006; 
Ferrando 2008; Starkweather 2009; Urla 1993). Censuses determine what is known about a 
country, what is not known, and what options people have to identify themselves. As Kertzer 
and Arel (2002, 36) argue, in a census, ‘[w]e witness the struggle among a multiplicity of 
actors over that most basic of powers, the power to name, to categorize, and thus to create 
social reality’.72  As in Kenya, 65 per cent of countries that conduct national censuses insist on 
categorising individuals by ethnicity at the same time as counting them as part of the national 
whole (Morning 2008, 239). Nevertheless, the fact of categorising by ethnicity and the 
options available for responding to this question, as well as the publication and use of the 
  
debates surrounding the tribe question. Their responses to the ethnic coding in the census would be an interesting 
area for future research. 
72 The political debates discussed here are distinct from another way of viewing censuses as political, that is to 
 
adopt a Foucauldian view that would understand a census as a tool of governmentality and biopower, rendering 
individual bodies intelligible by the state and therefore governable. It is something like this view that Benedict 
Anderson (1983, 166) is getting at when he explains that ‘census makers [have a] passion for completeness and 
unambiguity. Hence their intolerance of multiple, politically ‘transvestite’, blurred or changing identifications.’ 
resulting statistics are often controversial. The division of a population by ethnicity has the 
potential, in certain circumstances, to threaten national cohesion and the supposedly superior 
salience of national identity by departing from the liberal emphasis on difference blindness 
and instead recognising difference. 
The Kenyan census can be considered a paradigmatic case of a highly political census 
environment. Here, it is not the potential for divisions between ethnic groups inherent in 
counting them that I intend to examine, though that is politically important. Rather, I focus on 
the determination of which ethnic groups are counted at all, and what that means for 
citizenship. That is, it is not the divisions between ethnic groups per se, but between insider 
and outsider ethnic groups that are of most relevance to this study. In Kenya the popular   
belief that the country is made up of 42 tribes comes not from any constitutional or legislative 
list but from the available codes dictated by the state for answering the tribe question in the 
1969 census. That census explains the selection of available codes as being based on the 40 
tribes of the 1962 census, the last conducted by the colonial government, with the addition of 
two groups of Somali, marking a striking form of continuity with the colonial regime 
(Statistics Division 1970, ii). The 1962 census states, ‘the indigenous African and Somali 
population of Kenya was grouped into 40 tribes; immigrants were classified by country of 
origin. The indigenous tribes were divided into eight major groups on the basis of ethnic, 
linguistic and geographical considerations … The grouping is of course somewhat arbitrary in 
many cases’ (Statistics Division 1966, 34).73  Though the 42 are not listed anywhere else 
 
73 The 1979 census counted 38 ethnic groups, the main changes being the collapse of the Kalenjin sub-groups into 
the one umbrella Kalenjin group, the separation out of Basuba from Luo, and the addition of El Molo, a 
numerically very small group, as a separate tribe. No reasons are given in the report for this change. The general 
explanation for the groupings is as follows: ‘The grouping of indigenous African tribes was done mainly on ethnic, 
linguistic and geographic considerations. Generally, the tribal classification has been restricted to main tribes only 
and sub-tribes have not been separately indicated’ (Central Bureau of Statistics 1979, 25). In 1989, the census 
inexplicably counted 40 tribes (Central Bureau of Statistics 1994). In 1999 the results of the ‘the tribe question’ 
were not released. The 2009 coding is discussed further below. The reasons for these changes are ultimately 
unclear, and they seem to have had little effect on altering the notion that Kenya is made up of 42 tribes. 
official, this is poorly understood by the population at large and even by politicians and civil 
servants. It is common to hear people talk of the 42 tribes in the constitution, or some kind of 
list controlled by parliament, though neither the 1963 nor the 2010 constitution, nor any 
legislation includes any such list. As such, the census has, in this sense, been the primary site 
of official recognition of ethnic groups throughout Kenya’s independence. The intimate 
connection between the census and recognition as Kenyan was exploited in the advertising 
campaign for the 2009 census, which included the phrases, ‘Nipo!’ (I am here!) and, 
‘Natambulika!’ (I am recognised!), alongside photos of 28 different faces representing the 
socio-economic, racial and cultural diversity of the country. Though these faces included, for 
example Kenyan-Asians, in practice such non-indigenous Kenyans are not afforded nearly the 
same recognition and presence as ‘indigenous’ Kenyan tribes. 
 
Indigeneity 
 
After two United Nations (UN) decades of Indigenous People and the adoption of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September 2007, there is still no accepted 
definition of the term ‘indigeneity’. Early in the 1980s, the first UN Decade of Indigenous 
People, the emphasis within the context of debating a definition was on occupation of an area 
pre-invasion and on-going distinction from the mainstream community in terms of way of life 
and socio-economic condition. This definition made sense in the context of contemporary 
settler societies like Australia, Canada and North America. However, its applicability in 
Africa, Asia and to a lesser extent South America was a source of contention (Igoe 2006; 
Kenrick and Lewis 2004).74 From the 1990s as Africans came to the table with the UN 
 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, they sought to shift the definitional emphasis 
from temporal priority, which was difficult to prove and did little to distinguish between 
African groups, to self-identification, marginalisation and non-dominance (Hodgson 2002, 
2011, 75–6; Karlsson 2003; Saugestad 2001; Sylvain 2002). It is now widely (though not 
 
74 Most notably in the late 1990s UN special rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martínez suggested that groups in Africa 
and Asia cannot claim indigeneity (Martínez 1999, 15). 
universally) accepted that indigeneity is not an essential(ising) cultural label but rather a 
relational concept denoting a particular relationship between marginalised minorities and the 
state (Barnard 2006; Barnard et al. 2006; Saugestad 2001, 306). 
The absence of any essential(ised) criteria to determine indigeneity has led to the 
characterisation of the term as polythetic in nature, meaning there are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for its use (Barnard 2006, 7; Igoe 2006; Saugestad 2001, 306). This 
character lends the term well to strategic deployment as marginalised groups seek to improve 
their position vis-à-vis other citizens and the state. The international indigenous peoples’ 
movement has gained significant momentum and worked with a number of African groups to 
achieve recognition from international bodies as indigenous and subsequently grant them 
access to assistance from international donors and NGOs, and sometimes land rights, 
development resources and new channels of patronage (Geschiere 2009, 66–96; Hodgson 
2011, 63–104; Lynch 2011a, 148). Consequently, the international indigenous movement 
constitutes an attractive arena for the practice of extraversion, of looking beyond the local and 
out to the global, actively forging relations of various degrees of beneficial dependence 
(Bayart 2000; Igoe 2006). 
Indigenous status is therefore sometimes characterised as a status entailing special, 
extra or supplementary rights and resources to those accessible by ordinary citizens. 
Kymlicka (2008) notes that the international human rights regime, particularly the UN, has 
established an approach to minority rights that promotes accommodation (meaning something 
akin to self-determination) for indigenous minorities, while it only advocates integration for 
other kinds of minorities. Kymlicka (2008, 16) explains: 
if they present themselves to the international community as a national minority, 
they get nothing other than generic minority rights premised on the integration 
model; if they come, instead, as an indigenous people, they have the promise of 
rights to land, control over natural resources, political self-government, language 
rights and legal pluralism. 
This has led Kuper (2003) to criticise the indigenous peoples’ movement as the product of 
ambitious and sometimes self-serving NGOs, and the notion of indigeneity as meaningless.75 
However, Kuper fails to appreciate that the benefits sought through identification as 
indigenous can be understood not so much as superior to those of other citizens but rather as 
remedial. Indigenous identity can then be understood, at least in part, as an affirmative action 
strategy aimed at achieving equality for communities who have typically suffered historical 
marginalisation and material deprivation. Kenrick puts it that, ‘these are not ‘special rights’, 
only special circumstances’ (Barnard et al. 2006, 20). Given their historical disadvantage and 
the increasing benefits associated with indigenous status, it is unsurprising that groups such as 
the San in Southern Africa (Barnard 2006; Sylvain 2002), Maasai in Tanzania and Kenya 
(Hodgson 2009, 2011; Igoe 2006;), Endorois in Kenya (Lynch 2012; Sing’Oei 2011b) or the 
Mbororo in Cameroon (Pelican 2009) have sought to ‘brand’ themselves as indigenous in 
order to access these benefits (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). 
Nevertheless, even when asserted to achieve not prestigious rights or superior status but 
to pursue remedy for past injustices, the prevailing understanding of indigeneity in Africa is 
one that emphasises the politics of difference. It is an approach that sets indigenous people up 
as citizens plus and emphasises the ‘special problems, and therefore special needs’ of ‘a 
special type of traditional community’ (Saugestad 2001, 301, 305).76  Prevailing studies of 
indigeneity that endorse the recognition of indigenous identities do so on the basis that 
equality requires equal recognition of different, authentic identities as opposed to equality 
based on the ‘dignity’ principle, which tends towards a universalising approach to equality; 
one that resists acknowledging difference for fear it will undermine equality (Taylor 1994, 
27). 
One way of articulating this approach is through the ‘native slot’ thesis. This thesis sees 
self-identifying indigenous groups as reaching out to fill the ‘native slot’ – the space made 
75 In a more sophisticated form the term has been criticised as a way of maintaining domination of the 
marginalised populations usually understood as indigenous. See James Suzman in Kuper (2003, 399). 
76 See also Barnard (2006, 8). On the idea of citizens plus see Cairns (2000). 
available by anthropology, and more recently by the international indigenous peoples 
movement, for people with certain characteristics to obtain a particular status (Karlsson 2003; 
Li 2000). Seen this way, other researchers, international movements, NGOs and donors seek 
out indigenous peoples to be examined or assisted, and certain groups of people respond by 
reaching out to fill that slot. Indigeneity in this sense is an act of strategic positioning 
(Hodgson 2011, 4–9; Li 2000). 
In Kenya groups like the Maasai, Ogiek and Endorois claim the ‘special’ indigenous 
status, connecting themselves to the global indigenous peoples’ movement (Lynch 2012; 
Wachira 2008). The 2010 Kenyan constitution also adopts the ‘special’ understanding of 
indigeneity, focusing on protecting cultural and especially ecological rights. Section 260 
defines marginalised communities as including, among other categories, ‘an indigenous 
community that has retained and maintained a traditional lifestyle and livelihood based on a 
hunter or gatherer economy’. 
However, two quite different conceptions of indigeneity are in operation   
simultaneously in the country. Standing in some tension with the ‘special’ understanding of 
the term, there is a second meaning given to indigeneity in Kenya. Indigenous people in  
Kenya are not only those who are defined by marginalisation, self-ascription or non- 
dominance. Rather first-occupation in the sense of having been a ‘tribe of Kenya’ when  
Kenya as such came into being seems to be the more common requirement for identification  
as indigenous. Temporal priority, albeit in a quite generalised form, has not vanished from the 
praxis of indigeneity in Kenya. Consequently most (but not all) of the population fall into one 
of the 42 tribes and are implicitly considered indigenous. It is perhaps most explicit in the 
1979 census, which discusses the grouping of ‘indigenous Kenyan Africans’ into a list of 
tribes. The implication of this categorisation is that people who do not belong to a tribe in the 
list of Kenyan tribes cannot be indigenous. The idea that ‘all Africans are indigenous’ is often 
brushed over as being only a weapon wielded by African states that are reluctant to grant 
affirmative action-type rights to minority indigenous groups, when in fact the implications of 
this idea for contemporary politics deserve more attention (Hodgson 2009, 18).77 
Indigeneity in Kenya is more often the norm than the special exception. It is not only a 
status that entails special rights (certainly not to accommodation akin to self-determination, as 
Kymlicka observes); nor is it only a status aimed at remedying past injustices by asserting 
special rights and seeking special assistance. Rather, it is more commonly a status denoting 
equality in sameness (rather than difference) and rightful belonging to the Kenyan nation. 
Recognition as an indigenous tribe therefore has important repercussions for both the material 
and intersubjective conditions of citizenship.78 
 
Census Recognition and the Nubians 
  
The Nubians as Others  
Prior to 2009, it is unclear how the Nubians were counted in national censuses. None of the 
figures for either ‘Sudanese’ (1962); ‘Non-Kenyan African – Sudanese’, ‘Non-Kenyan 
African – Others’ (1969); ‘Other Kenyans’ (1979); ‘Other Africans’ or ‘Tribe Unknown’ 
(1989) correlate with independent research on population and housing in Kibera, or 
approximate Nubian population figures today (Amis 1983; Clark 1970).79  In any event, all 
  
77 Elsewhere Hodgson (2011, 4) appeals that we take the role of the state more seriously when attempting to 
understand strategic indigenous positionings. I agree, but while Hodgson’s (2011, 157–9) case leads her to suggest 
that the Tanzanian state ultimately made indigenous positioning a weak strategy for the Maasai, the Nubian case 
suggests that the Kenyan state encourages indigenous positioning, but indigeneity of a different kind. 
78 The significant exceptions to this belonging regime are Kenyan Asians, Arabs and Europeans. In the 1979 
 
census it states that ‘non-African Kenyans were groups [sic] into 4 groups. These groups are Kenyan Asians, 
Kenyan Europeans, Kenya [sic] Arabs and other Kenyans’ (Central Bureau of Statistics 1979, 25). This suggests 
that these racial categories are considered non-indigenous but Kenyan nationals. 
79 The 1989 figure for ‘Other Africans’, 14,471, does approximate the possible population of Nubians in Kenya at  
that time given that it is currently around 20,000–30,000. However, it is slightly lower than likely and it no doubt 
includes many more individuals who are not Nubian, and are themselves excluded from the list of tribes in other 
ways (Central Bureau of Statistics 1994). 
these terms are very poorly defined and suggest either non-citizens or even non-Africans. For 
example, where the categories originate, in the 1969 census it states, ‘Africans who are 
nationals of Kenya are shown by tribe’ (Statistics Division 1970, ii). As discussed above, 
those not listed as a tribe in the 1979 census are clearly not considered indigenous. The 1989 
census had no definitions or explanations at all and the 1999 census results for the tribe 
question were never released. 
‘Others’ are almost certainly the most politically charged group to emerge from any 
census that uses the category, absorbing all those inexplicable anomalies that do not fit in a 
given year into the census makers’ understanding of the ethnic, religious or linguistic makeup 
of the national community (Andersen 1983, 166–70). Insofar as it has the power to categorise 
and characterise groups according to ethnic and racial hierarchies, the census possesses the 
potential for powerful forms of recognition or misrecognition that impact upon the extent to 
which people feel respected as equals, and can therefore develop the sense of confidence and 
authority that constitutes (in part) membership and enhances real opportunities for political 
participation and real capacity to enjoy rights. Amongst the Nubians this was very apparent. 
The lack of recognition in the census and in society in general, or misrecognition as  
Sudanese, was associated with a high degree of disrespect that eroded peoples’ confidence in 
their place in Kenya. The feelings associated with being relegated to the category of Other 
were described as embarrassing or humiliating, ‘like the other tribes who are just here by 
mistake’ (Interview 30) or in other ways somehow lesser, like foreigners, children, vagrants  
or even animals. Hassan (Interview 6) thought the label might be because ‘we used to be 
called like refugee, they used to refer to come from Sudan’, a notion Hassan and many of his 
peers associate with a distant past. In some cases it was even perceived as not being visible or 
audible at all, for example Jamia (Interview 31) said, ‘[w]e are so minority that no one even 
could consider—even if you go to the hospital you will be asked “Nubi – from where? 
Sudan?” You see! You will just be like oh God, I am nothing in Kenya! So our voices could 
not be heard.’ These intangible consequences of being classified as Other in the census are 
important for explaining the Nubians’ citizenship deficits, but the significance of broader 
recognition as an indigenous tribe of Kenya goes even further to explain such deficits, which 
have distinctly material consequences. 
 
The material stakes of recognition  
The Nubians experience their small population as a liability (de Smedt 2011, 189). This is 
expressed, for example, in a widespread belief amongst the community in an inflated 
population figure of 100,000 to 200,000 and a similarly widespread reluctance to accept the 
more accurate but much lower figure of 20,000 to 30,000. However, the Nubians’ citizenship 
deficits are more than the result of being merely a numeric minority. As Appadurai (2006) 
argues, minorities are made in contexts of uncertainty, in order that a majority population is 
able to achieve a sense of ontological and material security.80 
 
The reasons why being a numeric minority leads to disadvantage are found in the 
privileging of indigenous ethnicity in Kenya’s recognition and distribution regimes. In a 
liberal democracy in which individual universal equality is the overriding principle of 
recognition and distribution, small population numbers alone ideally do not result in the same 
kind of disadvantage facing this community. The small population of the Nubian community 
only becomes a liability for them because of the primary role that group identity plays in 
citizenship in Kenya. Far from being of only symbolic importance, recognition as an 
indigenous tribe of Kenya, combined with consolidation of a community in a given territory 
(discussed in the next chapter), increase the chances of being able to dominate both 
 
80 Appadurai’s argument is that in the age of globalisation and associated heightened uncertainty, minorities 
become targets of violence as majorities seek to relieve their anxiety about their incompleteness, or about the 
threat of becoming a minority. This argument does not map neatly onto the multi-ethnic context of Kenya, where 
the majority is itself a plurality of ethnic groups. Nor does it apply straightforwardly to the Nubians, who have 
only rarely been targets of violence. However, in a more general sense, for the reasons described in the following 
paragraphs, the Nubians and other minorities are victims of structural disadvantage (perhaps amounting to a kind 
of violence) not in the pre-meditated way that India’s Muslims have been (in Appadurai’s primary example), but 
nevertheless with consequences; and not because of a single ethnic majority but because of a multi-ethnic group 
that coheres around its indigeneity. 
administrative and electoral units and enjoy the associated access to the state and its 
resources. 
In 1962, immediately prior to independence and after the 1962 census, the Kenya 
Regional Boundaries Commission (1962, 4) recommended administrative boundaries that 
grouped populations in large part on the principle of either ethnic homogeneity or 
compatibility, stating that: 
We were told by delegation after delegation that they regarded the Commission 
as the last chance they would have of achieving association with the people with 
whom they felt they had similar customs, language and other affinities and that if 
they could not obtain their wishes in a constitutional manner they would feel 
compelled to do so by force. 
From the consultations of the commission in 1962, up to and including the Interim 
Independent Boundaries Review Commission of Kenya, formed in 2009, the determination of 
boundaries around administrative and electoral units has been contested in part because of a 
desire, articulated here, to retain a certain degree of cultural homogeneity in local populations 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, because there is a great deal at stake (Anderson 2010, 
30–32; Fox 1996, 597; Lynch 2011b; Statistics Division 1966, 36). 
In Kenya, majimboism has been the most dominant model of decentralised political 
organisation. It is an organising principle according to which access to rights, resources and 
power is predominantly at the local level, and depends predominantly upon membership in   
the locally dominant ethnic community. Debates over majimboism have taken place in Kenya 
around independence, again during the transition to multipartyism under Moi in the early 
1990s, and most recently in the constitutional debates of 2000–2004 and 2010. Majimboism is 
a doctrine of political and administrative organisation that favours a high degree of 
decentralisation ostensibly in order to protect the interests of minority (ethnic) communities 
from state domination by the big tribes. During the later colonial period when Africans were 
permitted to engage in formal politics, African politicians were encouraged to build their 
power bases only at the local level. Locally based ethnic welfare associations developed and 
African political parties were either not permitted at all (from 1953 to 1955), or only  
permitted at the district level (Anderson 2010, 25–6; Nasong’o 2007, 28; Ogot 1995a, 52–3). 
At independence KADU, made up predominantly of politicians (including future President 
Moi) representing the smaller tribes in the Rift Valley and on the Coast, wanted protection of 
the interests of the regions and so advocated for a majimboist constitution. A settler politician 
at the time, Michael Blundell, who was also a member of KADU, cited land, education, the 
police and the composition of the civil service as some of the interests that needed  ‘protecting’ 
(cited in Anderson 2010, 28). KADU succeeded in establishing a majimboist political and 
administrative structure in the 1963 constitution but, as described in Chapter 1, it was rapidly 
dismantled after independence by Kenyatta’s KANU. The centralised state that Kenyatta 
formed persisted until the 2010 constitution. However, while Kenyatta centralised power and 
resources, he did not fully dismantle the provincial administration itself (rather bringing it 
more firmly under his control), and it was the persistence of this administration, with its roots 
in the colonial era of Native Reserves and Native Administration, that allowed Moi to 
reinvigorate a majimboist politics upon the return to multipartyism in 1992 (Anderson 2010, 
44). This marked the most violently expressed period of majimboism in Kenya’s  history, 
when Moi used a highly xenophobic majimboism instrumentally to prove to Kenyans that 
multipartyism would only lead to chaos (Anderson 2010, 34–43; Ndegwa 1997, 610). 
Ordinary Kenyans have not always supported the majimboist national politicians, even 
in the heartland of majimboism, the Rift Valley, where in 2002 the anti-majimboist NaRC 
received over 40 per cent of the vote (Anderson 2010, 46). Kenyans supported  
decentralisation but without insidious majimboist tendencies in the Ghai constitutional review 
of 2000 to 2004 (headed by Professor Yash Pal Ghai and henceforth referred to as the Ghai 
Constitutional Review) and the 2010 constitutional review. This leads Anderson (2010, 47) to 
conclude that ‘[a]t each critical juncture, thus far, political inclusion has triumphed over  
ethnic exclusivity. But this does not imply that ethnic political claims have diminished’. As 
Anderson (2010, 51) notes in a postscript to the same chapter, the post-election violence of 
2007–2008 proved that although ordinary Kenyans rightfully abhor the violence now 
associated with majimboism, the fear, suspicions and xenophobia that underpin the   
majimboist position persist, and, ‘the claims of the majimboists once again sit very firmly at 
the centre of Kenya’s political agenda, their sinister threat of violence no longer latent and 
implied but vividly apparent’. While decentralisation is not necessarily in itself problematic, 
majimboism often has been in practice because it is has arisen within a politics of fear and has 
developed insidious, xenophobic and exclusionary tendencies that have come to characterise 
decentralisation of governance, development and control in Kenya since independence 
(Anderson 2010, 29; Ghai 2008; Ogot 1995b, 259). 
In units of the provincial administration – ethnic groups who are able to 
demographically dominate a province, district or location – have preferential access to 
development resources that are administered through this arm of government and therefore 
also to channels of patronage.81  Education is the only arena in which quotas have been official 
policy, with provincial and national secondary schools reserving a high percentage of places 
for students from the district and the province in which the school is located (Daily Nation 
2011; Otieno 2010). Yet, similar principles apply informally but predictably to employment 
opportunities in the armed forces, police and civil service, and the distribution of 
Constituency Development Funds. Ethnic communities expect any of ‘their own’ in office to 
deliver these goods to their ethnic kin (Cheeseman 2009, 106; de Smedt 2011, 219–22; 
Haugerud 1995; Lynch 2006a). Boundaries have often been drawn and redrawn, and new 
units added (27 new districts under Kibaki, for example), to extend and/or redistribute these 
patronage opportunities (Cheeseman 2009, 205). As such a small minority in Kibera, the 
Nubians have missed out on these opportunities. In provincial administration in Kibera there 
has been one Nubian chief and occasional assistant chiefs since independence, but there is no 
    
81 It remains to be seen what difference the institutional transformation to Counties as the primary unit of 
devolution will make to these patterns. This process began in 2013. 
location that is demographically dominated by Nubians and therefore consistently controlled 
by a Nubian chief. 
Similarly, electoral boundaries also work to serve the interests of locally numerically 
dominant ethnic groups. In a context where there is a majoritarian voting system and where 
ethnic voting blocks in parliamentary and city council (now county) elections are the norm, 
and subsequent administrative appointments are characterised by ethnic favouritism, 
disadvantages for minorities are seemingly inescapable (Baras 2011; Ghai 2003; Hornsby 
2001). National parliamentary election results for Lang’ata have traditionally reflected the 
ethnic demographics of Kibera, in keeping with general patterns of ethnic voting in Kenya 
that have been evident at almost every election since the return to multipartyism (except 
2002) (de Smedt 2009; Njogu 2001; Rutten et al 2001; Throup and Hornsby 1998). Since 
1992, and the prominence of Raila Odinga in Lang’ata constituency politics, the Nubians 
have lacked representation in high-level politics and have had only limited influence at lower 
levels. No Nubians have been elected MP since Yunus Ali in 1969, and very few have been 
able to accrue the financial resources to even contest an election. In the Nairobi County 
Assembly at the time of this research there are two Nubian elected Members of the County 
Assembly (MCAs), for Makina and Lindi wards, and two Nubians have been Councillors in 
the past.82  One of these, Gore Mohamed (Interview 50), the former Nairobi City Council  
Councillor for Makina ward, evaluated his performance as Councillor in terms of what he has 
been able to deliver to the Nubian community explaining, ‘I can say comfortably since I was 
elected, I have recruited about 25 youths, yeah—armed forces, forestry, yeah, through our  
MP, through the Prime Minister. So whenever there was a slot somewhere he would say this  
is for the Nubians.’ Yet this small contribution, while meeting expectations for some families, 
has made little impact on the community’s bigger goals. Councillor Babu, now MCA Babu of 
Makina ward, was less patrimonial with his position, but that is the exception rather than the 
  
82 The Nairobi City Council and associated Nairobi City Councillors have been replaced, following the 2010 
Constitution, with the Nairobi County government and Members of the Nairobi County Assembly. 
rule. While many Nubians outwardly expressed pride that Babu is a non-tribalistic politician, 
they were also happy to benefit from Gore’s more patrimonial approach. Ogot (1995b, 249) 
explains that, ‘political parties in Kenya have been, in reality, coalitions of ethnic-based 
factions … the political and economic goals are thus viewed not in terms of individual 
welfare and happiness but in terms of ethnic security and welfare’. As such a small 
community, despite occasional electoral success at low levels, Nubian candidates and 
politicians struggle to get their community’s needs on the agenda of any major political party 
in any meaningful way. 
Gore’s position in the Nubian community is indicative of the pressures that come from 
above and below not only to sustain patronage as the primary mode of distribution but also to 
do so in increasingly localised ways. The more local the administrative boundaries in which 
resources are allocated, the greater the chance that someone from your ethnic group, or even 
someone you have a close personal relationship with, will occupy an administrative or 
political position and therefore have opportunities to channel development resources, 
including development funds, educational and employment opportunities, to you and your 
family. At the same time, the more local the boundaries, the more chance that you could be 
appointed or elected to a position of influence and establish your own networks of clients that 
could serve as a power base as your political or administrative career grows. 
The presence of Nubians in the provincial administration and elected positions in the 
Nairobi City Council (now Nairobi County Assembly) and Kenyan parliament is not 
necessarily disproportionate given the Nubians’ small population. However, the concern is   
not so much the absence of Nubians from influential roles but the consequences of that for the 
community’s citizenship and development. Abbas (Interview 40) put it this way: ‘since we   
are not that many there’s nobody really to present Nubian views on issues, you see, so until  
we get to the point whereby we raise to the political ladder, then we will always remain 
oppressed, marginalised’. In a context where ‘every tribe has got a Godfather, every tribe has 
got somebody to lean on’ (Interview 17), a lack of representation constitutes a serious 
disadvantage in terms of citizenship. 
The 2009 Census: Towards Recognition?  
In the 2009 census there were major changes to enumeration of tribe and the Nubians were 
counted for the first time. This act had significant symbolic importance, not to be discounted 
for its positive impact on the intersubjective context of the Nubians’ citizenship. The KNCE 
were officially notified by the Minister of State Planning, National Development and Vision 
2030 (2009) that, ‘you shall be encoded as the 43rd tribe of Kenya during the August 2009 
census’. Many people understandably interpreted the code as meaning exactly that: the 
Nubians were the only tribe added to the list of indigenous tribes. In fact, the Nubians were 
given code ‘220’ and were one of many new tribes to be coded. All minority and sub-tribes in 
Kenya were coded, more than doubling the number of tribal codes by including some newly 
recognised tribes and breaking down others into umbrella and sub-tribes. Results were 
released for 111 tribes, though only the biggest 24 were publicly highlighted (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics 2010, 397–8; Oparanya 2010).83 
 
One interpretation of the decision to count 111 tribes is therefore that it represents a 
seeming collapse (in symbolic terms) of qualitative hierarchical codes that render some  
groups indigenous and some groups as Other. However, the lack of either disclosure by the 
state or questioning by the public about the basis of the ethnic enumeration suggest this is not 
so, or at least not meaningfully so. The reasons for the major changes in the enumeration and 
 
83 The 111 tribes include tribes counted alone as well as sub-tribes. In counting these tribes, I excluded the 
umbrella tribes (Luhya, Mijikenda, Swahili, Kalenjin, Kenyan Somali) as they are reported as the sum of all their 
sub-tribes. The sub-tribes do, however, include categories such as ‘Luhya – so stated’ for all these umbrella tribes 
and these are included in the 111. In addition, the report includes the ‘ethnic affiliation’ (as all the categories are 
called) of ‘Kenya – so stated’, which was an option for the first time in the 2009 census, introduced for those who 
did not wish to state their tribe. The total for this category was 610,122, a significant but not overwhelming figure 
(out of a total population of 38,610,097). The 111 also includes Kenyan Arabs, Kenyan Asians, Kenyan 
Europeans, and Kenyan Americans, followed by a series of undefined categories that include Isaak, Leysan, East 
Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Other Africans, Asians, Europe, Americans, Caribbeans and 
Australians. With the exception of ‘Asians’, ‘Europeans’ and ‘Americans’, who if Kenyan are clearly counted as 
such, it is not clear whether these remaining categories are citizens of Kenya or the other country. 
reporting of ethnic identity are not clear and have never been publicly articulated. The 2009 
census enumeration is therefore more ambiguous in its handling of the issue of ethnic 
recognition than the simple codes suggest. 
To an extent, the approach taken to identification and enumeration can be interpreted as 
part of a more general move towards an inclusive and constructive approach to ethnicity and 
citizenship in Kenya. The period since Moi’s demise in 2002, and particularly the aftermath   
of the 2007 election, has been one of more self-reflective and public discussion about  
ethnicity in Kenya. The peace negotiations of early 2008, the Agenda 4 reforms and the 2010 
constitution have, to an extent, unveiled some of the underlying assumptions about who 
properly belongs in Kenya (Interview 57). At the Bomas conference in 2005, which debated 
the 2005 draft constitution, there was a short but significant (from the perspective of my 
argument) debate about the possibility of codifying the 42 tribes of Kenya in the new 
constitution, as Uganda has done.84  However, within a couple of hours the list was so 
 
unwieldy, complex and contradictory that the idea was abandoned (Interview 54). The 
preparation of legislation to give effect to the constitutional provisions for the advancement of 
‘minority’ and ‘marginalised’ groups is likely to require a refinement of definitions of these 
terms, which will inevitably entail debates about the nature of ethnicity and indigeneity in the 
country. For example, the constitution has provision for a new category of land – ‘communal 
land’ – which is to be vested in ‘ethnic communities’ or ‘communities of interest’. The 
legislation that will give rise to the more specific character of communal land will therefore 
require clarification of the criteria to be considered an ‘ethnic group’ (Interview 57). 
Not only formal institutional structures but also general political culture became the 
subject of institutionally mediated introspection. Agenda 4 Reforms brokered by Kofi Annan 
 
84 The Ugandan constitution explicitly grants citizenship by birth only to people whose parents or grandparents 
were members of one of the indigenous communities present in Uganda on 1 February 1926. These groups were 
debated in 1995 when 56 groups were decided upon and again in 2005 when another nine were added. Ugandan 
Asians argued that they should be considered indigenous but they were unsuccessful in having that claim 
recognised (Manby 2009b, 55–6). 
after the 2007–2008 post-election violence highlighted inter-ethnic relations and minority 
rights as areas in need of improvement. The Kibaki government was keen to demonstrate to 
international monitors that it was taking these issues seriously. The National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission, formed in 2009, ‘to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, 
good relations, harmony and peaceful co-existence between persons of different ethnic and 
racial communities in Kenya and to advice [sic] the Government on all aspects of ethic 
relations’ has rightly criticised official and unofficial systems for fostering ethnic   
parochialism (Kikechi and Jamah 2010). The Commission has been commendable insofar as  
it has explicitly brought these issues out into the open for the first time and has generally 
criticised the misuse of statistics relating to tribes (Baras 2011; Kikechi and Jamah 2010). The 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission has also taken part in discussions on ethnic 
conflict and discrimination. These institutionally mediated discussions represent an important 
departure from debates around the role of ethnicity in Kenyan politics that have primarily 
taken place in contests over majimboism, when discussions were deeply inflected with 
discourses of fear, injustice, chauvinism and xenophobia. 
Yet, efforts over the last decade to reflect upon and perhaps change the place of 
ethnicity in politics have focussed almost exclusively on harmonising relationships between 
the 42. Questioning the grounds on which the legitimacy and authority that particular tribes 
have to call themselves Kenyan and have privileged access to localised channels of 
recognition and distribution has largely been missing. The more insidious and fundamental 
question of who has control over recognition of ethnic groups, and through what processes, 
has never really been open to public discussion. Therefore, how the inclusive approach to 
ethnicity and citizenship evinced in the 2009 census enumeration translates into a meaningful 
inclusiveness remains to be seen. The various other mechanisms and beliefs that have grown 
up around the notion of the ‘42’ will not be easy to dismantle, particularly in the absence of 
any political will to do so. 
Nubian Responses: Asserting Indigeneity  
In this context of a struggle over the redefinition of the place of ethnicity in Kenyan politics, 
the Nubians find themselves in a difficult position, between calling for inclusion in or 
transformation of the Kenyan recognition and distribution regime. Though there is some 
ambiguity in the strategic response of the community, and some disagreement within the 
community about the best way to tackle their marginalisation as ethnic strangers, calls to be 
included in rather than to transform the status quo prevail. 
There are a number of options available to the Nubians that could contribute to a more 
transformative political agenda. In particular, identification not as indigenous but simply as a 
minority in need of special protections is more compatible with a (loosely) liberal democratic 
political culture. Such an approach would be more in line with that of pro-democracy activists 
who seek to guarantee universal human rights through liberal democratic institutions, but 
through a form of liberalism that is compatible with Kenya’s particular circumstances, 
including its ethnic diversity (Mutua 2008). Such an approach might entail, for example, 
affirmative action measures for minorities such as those provided for in the 2010 Constitution 
(as described at the end of Chapter 1). One highly educated Nubian, ‘Fatuma’ (Interview   
45a), explained: 
there was need for people from this community to be included in political and 
government structures. For the simple reason that as  a  minority  ethnic 
community, minority in terms of numbers, we don’t have the political clout to 
pass policies that are favourable to us. And some policies which  are  passed, 
actually are detrimental to us. 
An affirmative action mechanism in the form of ‘nominated’ seats to Parliament and Nairobi 
City Council was available under the 1963 constitution to ensure some representation for 
minorities. However, in practice it rarely worked that way and instead these seats have 
normally been used as bargaining chips to secure the contingent interests of dominant   
political players. In part because of the ineffectiveness of this mechanism, other Nubians have 
sought the establishment of other affirmative action measures. In the Ghai Constitutional 
Review, the submission prepared by the Nubian community emphasised the need for special 
provisions for minority representation in government (Nubian community 2000). Under the 
2010 constitution, marginalised and minority communities and groups are most notably 
entitled to affirmative action programs in relation to governance, education, employment, 
development of culture and language; access to water, health care and infrastructure (Section 
56); special representation in Parliament (Section 100) and County Assemblies (Section 
177(c)); and benefits arising from an ‘equalisation fund’ to remedy past material inequalities 
(Section 204). Furthermore, ‘protection of the marginalised’ is a national value under section 
10(2b). Presently, however, it is too early to tell how they will be legislated and whether or 
not the Nubians will, or will be able to, take advantage of them. 85  Pressure from other groups 
to promote this kind of minority protection, broadly compatible with the liberal principles of 
the pro-democracy movement, was already evident at the time of the census, when other 
minorities who were making similar arguments around the census threatened to boycott 
enumeration (Matoke and Juma 2009). 
However, Nubian leaders and community groups did not make liberal arguments of this 
kind in their calls for recognition. None of the Nubian leadership groups, including the KNCE 
that was most active on this issue, sought to join forces with other minorities in the boycott. 
 
85 Section 260 of the 2010 Constitution defines ‘marginalised community’ as ‘(a) a community that, because of its 
relatively small population or for any other reason, has been unable to fully participate in the integrated social and 
economic life of Kenya as a whole; (b) a traditional community that, out of a need or desire to preserve its unique 
culture and identity from assimilation, has remained outside the integrated social and economic life of Kenya as a 
whole; (c) an indigenous community that has retained and maintained a traditional lifestyle and livelihood based  
on a hunter or gatherer economy; or (d) pastoral persons and communities, whether they are – (i) nomadic; or (ii) a 
settled community that, because of its relative geographic isolation, has experienced only marginal participation in 
the integrated social and economic life of Kenya as a whole.’ The same section goes on to define ‘marginalised 
group’ as ‘a group of people who, because of laws or practices before, on, or after the effective date, were or are 
disadvantaged by discrimination on one or more of the grounds in Article 27 (4).’ What would count as a 
‘minority’ is not explicitly defined. 
Nor did any Nubian groups openly question the Minister’s authority to unilaterally declare 
them the 43rd tribe, or understand where ‘the list’ is kept, or the process through which it  
could be changed – a tactic which would have revealed the arbitrariness of the 42 and perhaps 
triggered a public re-examination of the myth. 
Instead, a far more common response among Nubians has been to reinforce the status 
quo and seek inclusion in it. In addition to its symbolic importance, many Nubians thought at 
the time that to be counted in the 2009 census would go some way towards remedying their 
marginalised position by identifying administrative units in which they were the dominant 
tribe, proving to decision makers, politicians and other communities how many they were, 
thereby also enhancing the possibilities of inter-ethnic patronage with national level 
politicians, like Raila, who may court their vote.86 
Some Nubians have expressed a desire for administrative and, more optimistically, 
electoral boundaries to be redrawn around their population so that they can demographically 
dominate. The expectation of the census result of 2009 was that it would prove their numeric 
dominance at least in a few locations (small units of the provincial administration) or wards 
(constituencies for the Nairobi City Council).87  This would place the Nubians in a more equal 
position to most ‘indigenous’ tribes of Kenya. Such ‘indigenous’ tribe, because of the 
tendency to redraw boundaries to create new opportunities for patronage, often have their 
interests protected in this way even if they are also numerical minorities. Amadi (Interview 
12) argued that: 
  
we want to elect our people, we want our region to be known, like Kibera. You 
see we have Kikuyu, Kikuyu constituency, people their people, but also we want 
   
86 Though this hope was largely based on the belief that the Nubian population figure would be much higher than it 
actually is. 
87 In 2002 Kibera was divided from one into three locations: Kibera, Laini Saba and Sarang’ombe. As Osborn 
(2012, 137) notes, there was also to be a fourth location, Makina, which would be the most likely to be Nubian 
dominated, but this never eventuated. 
Nubians constituency so that we can elect our leaders. They don't know our 
problems so that—you see—our MP's not a Nubian … he's a Luo from Kisumu. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in rural Nubian settlements, for example in Kisii where the 
local mosque leader informed me that the Nubians’ have (unsuccessfully) lobbied the local 
administration for Nubia village to be declared a separate ward (Interview 21). Muhidin 
(Interview 30) explained how he thinks a census code would facilitate such a scenario: 
We are the only indigenous people in Nairobi. If  it  comes  to  recruitment  of 
people in the army, we will get the priority, if it comes to this national youth, 
police or any other activities which involves assistance to indigenous people of 
that particular area, we will benefit! The bursaries, famine relief, we will also get 
our share as the residents of Kibera. 
The KNCE petitioned the government for a census code for more than a year in advance of 
the count. They held a press conference the day before the census, during which they voiced 
their grievance about being counted as Others in the past, and their hope that, as promised by 
the government, this year would be different. Issa Abdul Faraj, the chairman of the KNCE, 
stated that Nubians are Kenyan citizens ‘by ancestry’ and that they ‘came to Kenya like all  
the other tribes, from outside, suggesting that they are entitled to the same implicit  
recognition as indigenous. He further said that they are the ‘most marginalised of the 
marginalised’ and the ‘poorest of the poor’, suggesting that this was a result of their historical 
exclusion from the coding system and associated benefits. In making these arguments, the 
KNCE and others were positioning themselves as a marginalised minority, eager to be 
transitioned into the polity in the same way as other Kenyans – on the basis of indigeneity. 
Given their quite recent history in Kenya, a claim to indigeneity seems a peculiar one to 
make. However, when the incentives are considered, the emotional and pragmatic appeal of 
this strategy becomes clear. 
Contesting a history that places them as allied with the colonial power and not a 
legitimate part of Kenya, Nubians seek to position themselves as Kenyan by claiming 
indigeneity and its attendant promise of a better citizenship. In response to being perceived as 
foreigners or strangers, Nubians strongly resist a contemporary identification with Sudanese 
nationality (although they acknowledge their origins). Many Nubians emphasise aspects of 
their history that are consistent with Kenya’s contemporary goals as an independent African 
nation and downplay those historical circumstances that ally them with other countries, 
particularly Britain and Sudan. In particular, they rest their claim to indigeneity upon being 
the first to develop Kibera. 
For example, a press conference held by Zidu Guwa, a Nubian youth pressure group, in 
protest at the lack of consultation regarding the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP) in 
Kibera, focussed on the argument that ‘upgrading’ Kibera without taking into account the 
Nubian claim to the area was trampling on the ‘minority and indigenous rights’ of the 
Nubians, as ‘this is their indigenous home’. Another Nubian (Interview 55b), in reference to 
the land rents that he perceived the government collected from others in Kibera, argued that: 
It's time that maybe some of what they have, should come to Kibera to benefit 
the indigenous of Kibera. And if the people benefit, their lifestyle  will  be 
uplifted. They will be able to participate in the day-to-day life like those other 
communities which have been enabled for a long time. 
Many Nubians, and especially those involved in organised pressure and leadership groups (as 
the above quoted participants are), understand themselves as indigenous partly because they 
were the first to develop the land in Kibera (a point I return to in the next chapter), and partly 
because being indigenous to a particular area, especially a particular administrative district, is 
evidently understood as a precondition for control over and access to resources that are 
attached to that area. 
The Nubians’ self-positioning as indigenous to the city reveals the paradoxes of the 
cosmopolitan potential of urban life. One might imagine that the cosmopolitan nature of city 
life would erode patrimonial networks and the privileging of notions of indigenous ethnicity 
in the distribution of resources and the conferral of recognition as legitimate and equal 
members of the political community. Among the middle class this may be the case. Relatively 
wealthy and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods like Kilimani, Kileleshwa or Muthaiga are 
locations where ethnic identity has less impact on one’s ability to access resources and local 
political influence. They are also locations where citizens have less need for state-provided 
resources and less at stake in terms of political influence. The same cannot be said for 
Nairobi’s poorer neighbourhoods, including Kibera, despite their proximity to these more 
genuinely cosmopolitan areas. In this sense, the intersection between disadvantage wrought  
by ethnicity and that wrought by class is significant. In fact, the Nubians’ citizenship deficits, 
insofar as they relate to a lack of recognition as an indigenous tribe of Kenya, are made more 
difficult to remedy by their urban locale. In Nairobi it is far harder to make a claim to 
indigeneity (or autochthony, as we shall see in the next chapter) because of the city’s 
cosmopolitan nature, yet in practice there are few other alternatives for seeking reprieve from 
poverty and land insecurity that are as powerful. 
 
Native Slot or Native Norm? Indigeneity, Recognition and Redistribution in Kenya 
 
The perceptions Nubians have of the nature and cause of their disadvantage – and the  
strategic advocacy choices made by many groups in the community to remedy this perceived 
disadvantage – are illuminating of greater trends governing belonging and access to equal 
citizenship in Kenya, and the dual nature of indigeneity in the country as not only a special 
status but more commonly as the norm. Membership in a recognised indigenous tribe 
therefore becomes a strong dependent factor for accessing and enjoying other components of 
citizenship, including material fulfilment of rights and opportunities for political participation 
and influence. 
Li (2001, 650–51) explains that subaltern, marginalised communities have little choice 
in practice if they want to emerge from marginalisation, than to make their claims within the 
available ‘spaces of recognition.’ Nubians perceive that in order to gain the social and 
political standing and the possibility of exercising rights by participating in public affairs 
(aspects of citizenship that other Kenyan enjoy primarily at the local level), there must be a 
change in the way they are perceived: from ethnic strangers to an indigenous tribe. This  
places them in a position of having to find grounds on which to articulate first their visibility 
(as opposed to invisibility in the category of Other) but also their Kenyan-ness. In this regard, 
the strategy of claiming indigeneity can be about nothing more than equal status. Claims for 
recognition are not always a case of seeking some kind of absolute autonomy but rather ‘to 
become part of, and thereby transform, the state’ (Englund 2004, 3; cf. Hodgson 2009;  
Landau and Misago 2009). 
The case of the Nubians’ struggle for recognition as the 43rd tribe of Kenya illuminates 
 
the nature of indigeneity in Kenya. As discussed earlier, the recent literature on indigeneity in 
Africa has focussed on extraversion and strategic self-ascription of indigenous status for 
benefit in terms of political clout and (necessary) material development arising from a special 
status (Hodgson 2009; Igoe 2006; Lynch 2011b; Pelican 2009;). The emphasis has been on 
groups who have reached out to fill the ‘native slot’, that is, the space made available by 
anthropology, and more recently by the international indigenous peoples movement, for 
people with certain characteristics to obtain a particular prestigious status and extra benefits 
(Karlsson 2003; Li 2000). Indigeneity in this sense is an act of positioning (Li 2000). 
Although it can also be understood as an act of positioning, the Nubian case stands in 
tension with this understanding of indigeneity. Given their quite recent arrival in Kenya and 
the nature of that arrival as the colonial armed forces, the Nubians’ claim to indigeneity seems 
on the surface quite a strange one to make. The Nubian case suggests that in Kenya  
indigeneity is not necessarily a ‘slot’, a niche anthropological or political category that   
denotes distinction and a prestigious kind of belonging and bundle of rights. Rather it is the 
norm. Full citizens in Kenya are full citizens because they are tacitly considered indigenous. 
The Nubian case illuminates the extent to which the understanding and practice of indigeneity 
in Kenya departs from the understanding and practice described amongst distinct groups such 
as the Maasai, Endorois or Ogiek. 
In Mamdani’s (2001a) conceptual development of the category of ethnic stranger, it is 
precisely this predicament that he sets out to address. For Mamdani (2001a, 659), the 
postcolonial order is one in which the threat from other races has been supplanted by the 
‘threat’ from other stranger ethnicities, and rights, resources and power have been withheld 
from these groups accordingly: 
the nonindigenous in the postcolonial period are less and less racial, more and 
more ethnic. The clashes about rights too are less and less racial, more and more 
ethnic. Put differently, ethnic clashes are  more  and  more  about  rights, 
particularly the right to land and to a Native Authority that can empower those 
identified with it as ethnically indigenous. 
Mamdani emphasises here the circular nature of the relationship between rights and 
indigeneity. Indigenous status grants access to rights, power and resources (including land). 
At the same time, those who have access to these social and material goods (especially land, 
which I deal with in more detail in the next chapter) as a matter of course and by virtue of 
their ethnicity are understood as indigenous and rightful nationals. With indigeneity as a 
precondition for accessing full citizenship, those who are not recognised as indigenous 
through the available and prevailing channels of recognition (such as the census), suffer 
multiple citizenship deficits. 
Chapter 4: Autochthony and Belonging 
   
 
‘We are not after food, we are after title deeds.’  
– Mariam Yahya, Nubian 
   
 
In the preceding chapter I discussed the ways in which the ambiguous but critical notion of 
indigeneity dominates the recognition and distribution regimes that condition citizenship in 
Kenya. This chapter goes further to explore the nature of Kenyans’ relationship to land, and 
particularly tribal rural homelands, and argues that autochthony carries great salience for 
Kenyan citizenship. The extent to which this is so is evidenced in the Nubians’ struggle for a 
homeland, which is motivated by the understanding that a homeland will confer strong and 
secure membership in the Kenyan community. Among the Nubians’ citizenship deficits, the 
lack of an ethnic territory is experienced as the most severe because, more so than any liberal 
or nationalist notion of tribeless individual equality, in practice in Kenya an ethnic homeland 
is the foundation of membership and a precondition for other components of citizenship. 
The Nubian land claim is therefore ambiguous, collapsing the distinction between 
strategic deployment of identities and genuine attachments to them, investing almost 
autochthonous meanings in land that have come to acquire great significance for the 
community. The increasing salience of these meanings ultimately stems from the Nubians 
having ‘nowhere else to go’, that is, being in a socially, politically and physically precarious 
position in Kibera. In exploring this move towards autochthony the chapter also draws out the 
ways in which autochthonous discourses are dangerous and unstable and, while they help 
explain the nature and background of the Nubian land claim, they also carry conceptual 
inconsistencies and vast potential for political instability and undemocratic citizenship 
practices. 
The Politics of Place and First-Occupation  
In Francophone Africa autochthony has operated as a discourse in which people assert 
belonging since colonial times, but its popularity as a strategy is now increasing in other parts 
of the continent. Autochthony has its etymological roots in Ancient Greek, where ‘autos’ 
refers to ‘self’ and ‘chtonos’ to ‘soil’. Strictly speaking, an autochthonous community is one  
in which all members are directly descended from an original forefather who was, mythically, 
born of the earth where the community resides. Autochthonous communities have 
theoretically always been who and where they are; a pure community built on blood (descent) 
and soil (territory) (Loraux 2000). However, in Africa (and elsewhere), there is a growing 
trend of deploying autochthonous discourses without necessarily adhering strictly to this 
definition, instead resting claims on vaguer notions of first-occupation and permanent 
residence (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Jackson 2006; Leonhardt 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; 
Pelican 2009). These claims are often made as absolute claims, in keeping with the character 
of autochthony, even if they are widely known to have little basis in historical fact. The 
emphasis is less on a myth of an original man springing from the literal earth, and is instead  
on the idea that particular people were the first to use, understand or control the land and have 
stayed there ever since (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Geschiere 2004, 2009; Geschiere & 
Jackson 2006; Malkki 1992).88  Autochthony is therefore both politically destabilising and 
conceptually incoherent insofar as it is absolute in theory and rhetoric but slippery and 
unstable in practice (Geschiere 2009).  
Like indigeneity, autochthony carries notions of a more prestigious belonging based on 
being first, and both terms carry, at least in theory, associations with special rights (Geschiere 
2009, 11; Lonsdale 2008). Since the 1960s, and in Africa since the 1980s, indigeneity has 
largely been seen as a powerful and righteous tool for proclaiming these special rights and 
protections for unique peoples who perceive themselves to be at risk of domination. In 
  
88 For ‘understanding’, ‘control’ and ‘work’ as three idioms of connection to the land in Kenya, see Lonsdale 
2008, 306. 
contrast, with political roots as far back as Ancient Athens, autochthony is usually seen as 
dangerous, and the associated rights claims are seen as arrogant and chauvinist attempts of 
often already dominant groups to sustain their position (Gausset et al 2011, 139). 
Autochthony was resurrected as a core value of Nazism, when blood and soil were seen as the 
only moral basis for German citizenship. In African (and other) contexts both indigeneity and 
autochthony are strategic responses to political, social and economic exclusion, 
marginalisation or crisis, and both are therefore claims that are made not in a self-contained 
way but rather with explicit reference to outsiders. They operate as fundamentally relational 
concepts (contradicting the theoretical absoluteness of autochthony). The difference between 
the two is that claims of autochthony are almost entirely constituted by claims vis-à-vis others 
– specifically claims over relative rights to own and exclude others from territory. In contrast, 
claims to indigeneity in practice tend to include other substance – specifically claims that a 
group has a unique culture and way of life, and often also that the group is marginalised by 
the dominant society (Gausset et al 2011; Geschiere 2009).89  It is for this reason that 
 
autochthonous discourses tend to be even more politically problematic than indigenous ones.  
In the face of dramatic increases in exclusion, marginalisation and crisis in Africa – and 
in Kenya particularly since the economic downturn of the 1980s as well as the return of 
majimboist political rhetoric in the 1990s – the appeal of autochthony as a strategy for making 
sense of this new social, political and economic landscape, and for emerging from 
marginalisation is increasing (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Dunn 2009; Lynch 2011b). As economic 
opportunities have become more scarce, principles governing access to land and resources 
have become more and more exclusive, and temporal priority in its various guises   
(indigeneity and autochthony) has become a recognisable, comprehensible and well accepted 
way of anchoring claims to land, even if particular cases are often contested. In this way, as  
we have seen in the previous chapter’s discussion of the Nubians’ aspiration to be recognised 
as indigenous, autochthonous claims are also very often claims made by communities who are 
 
89 Though claims to indigeneity do also have a very central relational component. 
re-appropriating the terms set by the dominant society and making claims within the 
prevailing spaces of recognition (Li 2001, 650–51). As the rules of access to land and rights 
of exclusive control over land have changed and become increasingly autochthonous, 
Africans have ‘sought to negotiate new social identities in order to take advantage of 
commercial or political opportunities’ (Berry 1992b, 345–6). 
Ethnicity as a category of identity and social grouping is particularly adept at the kind 
of flexibility required to operate in the rapidly changing social, political and economic 
landscape of the African continent. While drawing on oral and written memories and 
histories, as well as cultural traditions, ethnicity can and does expand, contract and mutate in 
different circumstances depending on the utility of the options at hand (Lynch 2006b). 
Attempting to render an ethnic group indigenous, or autochthonous, has in recent decades 
become a particularly powerful trend in these on-going processes of adaptation. Groups who 
never thought of themselves in this way, like the Nubians, are beginning to do so, prompting 
Lonsdale (2008, 311) to conclude that ‘in Kenya, as elsewhere, ‘autochthony’ is a strategy 
rather than a fact’. 
As with indigeneity, there are compulsions and incentives constructed at both the 
national and global levels for asserting an autochthonous status. At the national level, as states 
fail to provide for their citizens and in some cases to even guarantee their physical safety, the 
protection of a homeland – in which rights to live on, use and govern the land are restricted – 
has obvious appeal. It provides advantages ranging from the possibility of subsistence 
agriculture on less congested pieces of land, to the possibility of a bounded political 
constituency or administrative unit in which a particular group can then dominate decision- 
making and take advantage of allocated state resources (Lynch 2011b). Autochthony is a way 
of gaining some economic security, control and predictability in the face of ‘the daily 
inequalities, the unpredictable inclusions and exclusions by which their states decide who is   
to gain from global linkages, and who bear their local costs’ (Lonsdale 2008, 312). At the 
international level it is not only the indigenous peoples movement, discussed in the preceding 
chapter, that is having unacknowledged and unintended effects on the consolidation of highly 
localised and parochial identities. Neoliberal agendas emanating from global multilateral 
institutions that have significant influence over aid and credit dependent countries place 
significant emphasis on decentralisation, encouraging newfound particular attention to the 
local (Geschiere 2009; Geschiere and Jackson 2006). Multilateral economic and governance 
institutions, international NGOs and states are increasingly encouraged to localise 
management of resources and decision-making, rendering local ‘homelands’ even more 
appealing. Viewed from these perspectives, autochthony can be understood as only ever a 
‘second-best strategy’, one adopted after the failure of the ‘normal’ (liberal) channels to 
guarantee the wellbeing of citizens (Lynch 2011b, 407). 
In the previous chapter, the self-ascribed polythetic nature of indigeneity was 
discussed. If determinations of indigeneity are highly politicised, then determinations of 
autochthony are even more so. Not only does an autochthonous status carry, by definition, a 
kind of natural right to land but it does so in insidious, apparently self-evident ways 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Geschiere 2009). When people make this claim it is to make 
that ‘natural’ right politically effective. Malkki calls such discourses an ‘arborescent culture’ 
because of their emphasis on terrestrial notions of membership such as ‘roots’ and 
‘homeland’ (Malkki 1992). In largely unexamined ways, these discourses make particular 
configurations of membership (inclusions, exclusions and the rights associated with both) 
seem natural and normal. 
The ‘naturally’ self-evident quality of such configurations of membership is deeply 
ambiguous, despite its strong rhetorical and political power (Geschiere 2009). Being more 
about relative rights over land than any substance (beyond often vague notions of first- 
occupation), autochthonous discourses are characterised by a deep ambivalence and plasticity 
which makes them highly amenable political instruments of exclusion, manipulable in 
whatever ways arise as necessary to exclude various kinds of ‘threatening’ groups (Marshall- 
Fratani 2006, 22). Jackson (2006, 109) describes how in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, the language of autochthony has fostered a paranoid obsession with outsiders in your 
homeland and nervous fear that you will be found to be less autochthonous in your area than 
some other group. The result is an obsession with impurity and infection of the body politic 
with ‘insects’, ‘vermin’ and ‘pathogens’, leading to an endless conflict, sometimes violent, 
over, ‘‘who is who’ and ‘who really belongs where’’ (Lynch 2011b). As Geschiere (2009, 
89–94) explains, the segmentary tendency of autochthonous discourses leads to the drawing 
of circles around autochthons at ever-closer range. 
This desperate search for those who do not belong is always endless because, as it is 
deployed in Africa, autochthony is never definitive (as the original definition of autochthony 
emphasises) but is rather always a matter of degree (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Kuper 
2003, 392; Kymlicka 2008, 15). Jackson (2006, 99), in his discussion of the more popular 
usage of autochthony discourses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo explains that 
‘autochthony operates as a loose qualifier, a binary operator: autochthony is adjectival, 
relational rather than absolute’. Even in Ancient Athens, though the origin myth implied an 
absoluteness and timelessness beyond comparison, the primary function of the myth was to 
justify the inherent right of rule of a very limited political community. Yet, in doing so 
autochthony denies the migratory nature of human history (Loraux 2000). As Lynch (2011b, 
392) compellingly points out, the status of a ‘true’ autochthon is impossible to determine, as 
much because of the impossibility of determining first-occupation in a continent with 
centuries of undocumented migration, as because of the: 
multiple and cross-cutting layers of ethnic appellations, which  result,   for 
example, from changes to administrative boundaries and colonial terminology; 
the lack of clear definitions for what constitutes an indigenous group but also 
race, nation, ethnic group, tribe or clan; and complex local histories of marriage, 
ethnic incorporation, tension and conflict. 
This obsession with eradicating outsiders and drawing impossibly clear boundaries and 
identities is one of the most powerful mechanisms available in the establishment and 
sustenance of particular groups as strangers, or allogènes as they are known in francophone 
countries (allo referring to ‘other’, and genes referring to ‘descent’ or ‘origin’). Especially in 
times of scarcity, constructing such stranger groups enables ‘autochthons’ to understand 
themselves as superior, and therefore, in the presence of allogènes, perceive themselves to be 
disadvantaged based on a belief in their superior rights (Marshall-Fratani 2006, 16). As Kuper 
(2003, 390) explains, when first-occupation is associated with superior status vis-à-vis ‘late 
comers’, salience attaches to the idea ‘that descendants of the original inhabitants of a country 
should have privileged rights perhaps even exclusive rights, to its resources. Conversely, 
immigrants are simply guests and should behave accordingly.’ Autochthony makes possible 
the categorisation of certain people as anomalous strangers, possessing different and 
sometimes no rights, an issue of tangible local concern (Geschiere 2009, 229).90 
 
A further negative aspect of this apparent ‘naturalness’ is its internal domination effect.  
Autochthonous discourses discourage contestations and questioning from within. These 
discourses entrench ‘the local appeal of communal association with a particular territory or 
geographic space’ (Lynch 2011a, 163), what Appadurai (1988) calls the ‘spatial incarceration 
of the native’, where being ‘native’ (you could say here being ‘autochthonous’) means being, 
‘not only persons who are from certain places, and belong to those places, but they are also 
those who are somehow incarcerated, or confined, in those places’ (Appadurai 1988, 37, 
emphasis in original). Physical, moral and intellectual immobility are the result, with  
particular peoples assumed to be firstly whole and tightly bounded, and secondly, only able to 
think and act with any reason within the confines of their particular niche – territorial, 
ecological, moral and intellectual (Appadurai 1988, 37–8). In the case of autochthonous 
claims, the groups making them can be understood to be engaging in a process of self- 
  
90 It would of course be naïve to presume that all people can fit into this typology of autochthon and stranger.  
There also exist populations who are considered neither autochthons nor strangers (Geschiere 2009, 124–29). 
Jackson (2006, 113–4) points out the pygmie people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Congolese 
Hutus (other Hutus are presumed to be Rwandaphone and therefore stranger) as examples. Marshall-Fratani (2006,  
12) highlights the importance of liminal spaces as those in which autochthonous discourses crystallise, because 
they are the spaces from which the discourse desperately attempts to evict all populations, the spaces which, once 
closed off forever, would represent complete control, a condition which is, of course, never possible. 
incarceration, as they develop, come to believe in and promote the idea that the only place  
they can belong is their homeland. Where once these native ‘prisons’ were the domain of the 
anthropologist, today they have become in extreme cases (such as the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ivory Coast and parts of Cameroon) the only zone of particular peoples’ access to 
full citizenship. 
Autochthonous discourses related to rights and belonging have important impacts on  
the character of the material and intersubjective conditions of political life, promoting the age 
old myth of a relation between blood, soil and citizenship. Struggles for autochthonous status 
are therefore also struggles over full citizenship. In an environment dominated by 
autochthonous discourses, in order to access full citizenship individuals and communities  
must (continuously) prove their descent, often in ethnic terms, from a community with an 
original attachment to a particular piece of land. As the influence of this discourse spreads, 
people(s) who cannot prove such an attachment – strangers – are vulnerable to deprivations of 
membership and rights. In extreme cases, people can be robbed of these aspects of citizenship 
not only at the local level, where autochthonous struggles most commonly play out, but also  
at the national level.91  Rather than constituting greater opportunities for democratic 
participation, this kind of localisation instead fosters greater parochialism and chauvinism. 
The incentive to make blood and soil claims could hardly be greater. These dynamics of 
citizenship require interrogation and serious consideration. In order to effectively mitigate the 
exclusionary potentials of autochthony it is necessary to try and understand the source of its 
emotional and political appeal, and the case of the Nubians helps us to do this (Geschiere 
2009). 
     
91 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ivory Coast, the most extreme cases of societies where 
autochthony discourses have taken widespread and explicit hold over formal and informal conditions of belonging, 
masses of people have been outright denied their citizenship in law and in practice (Geschiere 2009, 98–123; 
Jackson 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006). 
Marginalisation of the Landless in Kenya  
In Africa, the meaning and place of citizenship, belonging, and access to rights and resources 
have been interpreted and re-interpreted through land (Berry 1992a; Cohen and Atieno- 
Odhiambo 1992; Peters 2004). In contemporary day-to-day life most Kenyans, including 
those who live in urban areas and particularly Nairobi, consider themselves and their tribe to 
have a rural home, or shags as they are referred to in Sheng.92  For example, the Kikuyu 
consider their home as Central Province, the Luo as Nyanza, Luhya people as Kakamega, 
Kisii people as Kisii, and so on. The 1979 Kenyan population census states that ‘[i]t is clear  
… that for all tribes there is a province in which most of the tribe resides, or the home 
province’ (Central Bureau of Statistics 1979, 26), a statement that only accrued more 
supporting evidence in the decades after it was written. A host of contemporary social, 
cultural, political and economic practices sustain the notion of tribal homelands in Kenya. It is 
not uncommon for someone to ask where your shags is as an indirect way of asking what   
tribe you belong to. People return to their rural homes frequently for holidays, weddings, 
funerals and, importantly, to be buried, sometimes at great cost (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo 
1992; Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Shipton 1992). Perhaps most importantly, many Kenyans 
have been willing to defend their ‘homeland’ with violent means. In post-independence   
Kenya neither state nor society have been truly able (or willing) to nullify the deep-seated 
connections between particular ethnic groups and their parcels of land. 
In Kenya, as in many other African countries, contemporary land culture is often 
analysed with a heavy emphasis on the changes in configuration of the relations between   
land, community, identity, resources and power which occurred during the colonial period 
(Berry 2002, 641; Colson 1971). The establishment and consolidation of Native 
Administrations and Native Reserves, including both the actions of colonial officers and those 
of African intermediaries, as well as the changes in behaviour amongst ordinary Africans in 
response played a key role in this regard. This compartmentalisation of tribes resulted in a 
 
92 Sheng is an extremely localised form of Swahili spoken in Nairobi. 
political-institutional system of assumed exclusivity and cohesiveness of ethnic communities 
with customary rules relating to use, access to, and exchange of land and its resources in the 
particular parcels of land they were allocated (Berman 1998; Berry 2002). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the 1962 Regional Boundaries Commission divided Kenya into 
administrative units, taking into consideration the desires of particular groups to be part of 
‘culturally’ (ethnically) homogenous units (Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1962). 
The resulting character of these political and administrative units has been that governance 
institutions tend to favour the particular ‘home’ tribe in myriad ways. The colonial state 
administration was structured so that access to resources was only possible as a member of an 
ethnic group in one’s rightful territory. This increased the self-consciousness of ethnic groups 
and operated as a powerful incentive to adopt exclusive approaches to community and land.   
In this process, groups who did not fit into the colonial distribution of land and authority, such 
as detribalised natives or people of a non-dominant ethnicity, were rendered strangers in the 
units in which they found themselves (cf. Sorrenson 1968, 37–8). 
Though sometimes described as ‘customary’ rights, changes in land administration 
during the colonial period mean that contemporary ethnicised approaches to land owe more to 
colonial reconfigurations of the relationship between ethnicity and land than they do to 
‘traditional’ or pre-colonial communal tenure practices. During the later colonial period, land 
in Kenya was commodified. For the first time in East Africa the notion that land could be 
owned exclusively rather than only used, and that it could be profitable, was introduced and 
implemented through policy (Colson 1971). This approach was adopted with the intention not 
only of incentivising increased agricultural production but also of neutralising political   
dissent borne of land hunger in a fast-growing African population (Kanyinga 2009). 
Increasing land scarcity and associated competition over land accelerated a shift towards 
seeing land as exclusive property rather than a resource to be shared by all, but owned by 
none, in the interests of the community (Colson 1971). The patterns of distribution of 
commodified land had two very significant effects on Kenya’s future: ethnic territorialisation 
was entrenched and inter-ethnic tensions over land exacerbated; and an elite class was 
cemented and enriched at the expense of peasants and the landless. 
The 1954 Swynnerton Plan was the first large-scale program to demarcate and register 
land in the reserves, issuing private titles. The formal objective of this program was to  
increase agricultural productivity in African-owned lands, based on the assumption that 
privatisation would do more to achieve this than existing communal tenure arrangements. In 
addition, the Swynnerton Plan was designed to incentivise farming and thereby distract 
peasants from the burgeoning Mau Mau movement, and more generally from organising 
against the British colonial authorities and white settlers (Kanyinga 2009, 92). As 
independence approached, the early 1960s also saw the first Settlement Schemes where the 
government purchased settler farms on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis, for resettlement  
of African peasants and more prosperous African farmers. The intention was more to stabilise 
the Highlands by creating a stake for prosperous African farmers, and by finding somewhere 
for Kikuyu other than the Rift Valley and European farms, than it was to address the injustice 
of landlessness (Kanyinga 2009, 98–9).93 
 
Like the colonial authorities before them, the new Africanised Kenyan government was 
faced with the challenge of having to placate a still very large population of landless peasants, 
particularly Kikuyu who had been most displaced by white farmers. At the same time, the  
new Africanised Kenyan government also faced the urgent need to reinvigorate the flagging 
agricultural sector and broader economy, and integrate the nation. Therefore, after 
independence the postcolonial Kenyan state went much further with individual property   
titling than the colonial state or, indeed, than most other postcolonial African states. The 
registration and titling of land was believed (and still is in many development circles) to be  
the key to the development of the country, as private parcels of owned land could be used as 
collateral for credit from state or private institutions, which could in turn be used to develop 
  
93 Though these schemes also involved the excision of a land in Rift Valley Province (Nyandarua district) and its 
annexation in adjoining Central Province. 
the land and increase agricultural productivity (de Soto 2000; Peters 2004, 274; Manji 2006). 
It was also believed that the distribution of land would diminish the risk of a peasant uprising. 
However, the Kenyan state’s insistence on the expansion of land privatisation was also in part 
because the new elite in independent Kenya, like the European settlers who stayed, benefitted 
from such an approach for at least two reasons. In the first instance they were better  
positioned to purchase land or to acquire it through less fair means and secondly, they could 
drip-feed land to the landless to stave off resistance (Hornsby 2013, 366; Shipton 1992). 
Privatisation of land occurred through both an increase in settlement schemes and through the 
registration of land in the former reserves. 
As described in Chapter 1, the settlement schemes of the early postcolonial periods, 
including the One Million Acre scheme (started in 1962), enabled the purchase of white farms 
and then their distribution through purchasing schemes requiring deposits and entailing loans. 
Land was distributed in a combination of large farms, designed for commercial production  
and to provide agricultural leadership in different areas, and small farms, designed to provide 
land for peasants. Though 90,000 families were resettled on these schemes by 1978, the 
government was not successful in meeting the land needs of all Kenya’s landless (Hornsby 
2013, 303). By the same date probably around one quarter of the population remained   
landless (Hornsby 2013, 368). At least part of the reason for this was that so much land was 
distributed as large farms, purchasable only by the already wealthy, despite the mounting 
evidence that large farms did not, as initially thought, lead to greater productivity (Kanyinga 
2009, 103). In short, ‘the settlement schemes did not benefit those for whom they were   
meant’ (Kanyinga 2009, 104). They were merely able to prevent wide rebellion or the 
disruption of colonial-established economic structures that benefitted the new elite. By the 
early 1970s the government had moved away from settlement schemes and toward   
distribution of land through open markets. This only entrenched class formation as the already 
landed and the well employed were again in the best position to benefit from such a 
distribution method (Kanyinga 2009, 103). 
In settlement schemes, the privatisation of former reserves and the open market the 
needs of ordinary Kenyans (of all ethnicities) were secondary to the desire of elites to 
entrench their power and wealth. Rather than meet the material and political needs of the 
landless, the registration of large portions of land as freehold enabled the post-independence 
elite to portion it out to patrons to maintain a hold on political and economic power, often at 
the expense of indigenous and other marginalised communities whose rights are less 
protected under law (Shipton 1994, 364; Klopp 2000; Ndungu 2004; Wachira 2008, 6, 23). 
Adding an additional layer of complexity to this already multilayered land regime, 
illegal appropriation and allocation of land by government elites has been prolific in the post- 
independence era. Given the ethnicised nature of both the central state and the district 
authorities and land boards, irregular giving and taking of land has, at different points, 
deepened ethnic privilege for particular groups. However, as Klopp (2000) argues, the 
‘pilfering of the public’ in the form of irregular land acquisition constitutes a much graver 
injustice than even that. Under Moi, faced with much more limited access to land through 
settlement schemes that he could distribute for patrimonial purposes, the irregular   
privatisation of public lands for personal and patrimonial purposes reached its peak. In 
response, Kenyan civil society groups, including those associated with the pro-democracy 
movement, sought to contest the state’s interpretation of land as a private resource for the 
powerful and to bring irregular land acquisition or ‘land grabbing’ under public scrutiny. The 
Ndungu Commission of Inquiry into Illegal / Irregular Allocation of Public Land in 2004 
revealed alarmingly widespread injustices of this kind (Ndungu 2004). The result is both an 
exacerbation of land scarcity, and the heightening of political emotions around this issue. Not 
only is private land ethnicised but even public shared land is tenuous. Stopping and redressing 
land grabs is now often front and centre of citizens’ calls for reform and justice in the post- 
2007 environment. 
Yet, it is the ethnicisation of land that has been politicised far more since the return to 
multipartyism than the way in which land was used as the basis of ever increasing inequalities 
in wealth in Kenya. The registration of land in the former reserves was carried out by the 
district land boards and favoured the ‘original’ tribes of a given area while being hostile to the 
settlement of ‘outsiders’. With settlement schemes also designed to accommodate specific 
ethnic groups (Kanyinga 2009, 106), the result was a landscape in which most areas of Kenya 
are widely believed to belong to particular ethnic groups. Areas that occupy boundaries 
between groups, or which were once settled by non-Africans (the British in the White 
Highlands, or Arabs on the Coast) became deeply contested territories. 
In particular, these methods of redistribution of land in the Rift Valley were 
(necessarily, by this stage) a serious disruption of ethnic settlement patterns. The question of 
where to put the Kikuyu in both settlement schemes and distribution of land from former 
reserves was one of the thorniest faced by the Kenyatta government (Kanyinga 2009, 106). 
The general principles of private individual titling favoured the Kikuyu elite because of their 
position at the time: their population had outgrown their ‘traditional’ land; they were 
agriculturalists and so better suited to individual land than, for example, pastoralists; they had 
been participating in the capitalist market economy for longer so had more money to buy land 
in market-based distribution methods; and under Kenyatta they had more influence in the 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement and Ministry of Agriculture so had more access to allocated 
lands (Kanyinga 2009, 107; Ndegwa 1997, 608). While the Rift Valley had previously been 
occupied by Kalenjin and Maasai communities, and Central Province by Kikuyus, the period 
of white settlement had displaced these communities, and then the settlement schemes and 
willing-buyer, willing-seller system resettled them in ways that none felt did justice to their 
land rights. The Kikuyu were seen by the Kalenjin and Maasai to have unfairly benefitted  
from land distribution schemes, yet many Kikuyu remained landless and poor. These disputes 
lay the seeds for violent inter-ethnic conflict in the 1990s and 2000s when a lack of available 
land, combined with big-man and party politics, facilitated mobilisation around this issue. 
The land tenure system is, at the time of writing, in a state of transition. A well- 
regarded National Land Policy was passed by parliament in 2009, partly in response to the 
Njonjo and Ndungu land commissions and their damming findings about a lack of policy 
guidance and vast injustices and irregularities in land distribution (Kanyinga 2009, 113). If 
given effect in legislation, as required under the new Constitution (Article 63(5)) this policy 
will redress the major grievances associated with land in the country, including issues of 
distribution, structures of land ownership, taxation, historical injustices and the needs of 
disadvantaged groups. However, the legislation of this policy has been slow and flawed. 
Tensions between private property and customary land norms persist. Since 
independence Kenyan land law has designated all land as either freehold, leasehold or public 
land but has also recognised customary tenure for lands in rural areas that do not fall into any 
of the other three categories. Such land has been governed under the Trust Lands Act and is 
vested in county council trusts (Waiganjo and Ngugi 2001, 4).94  The 2010 constitution 
 
contains provisions for a new category of land, ‘communal land’, which, according to Article 
63(1), ‘shall vest in and be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or 
similar community of interest’.95  Yet it remains unclear what the character of this land will  
be, and how it will be implemented. 
  
 
94 Customary tenure systems vary between communities but have some characteristics in common including: rights 
to access based on membership in a political community or investment of labour or capital in the land; rights of 
control for the relevant authority in the community which can be enforced in relation to allocation, use and as a 
defence against outsiders; rights analogous to private property for individuals who are members of the community 
or who have invested labour; and a principle of equity in access to resources which by their nature must be shared, 
such as pastoral land (Shipton 1992; Waiganjo and Ngugi 2001, 3). 
95 According to Article 63(2) of the Constitution community land consists of: (a) land lawfully registered in the 
 
name of group representatives under the provisions of any law; (b) land lawfully transferred to a specific 
community by any process of law; (c) any other land declared to be community land by an Act of Parliament; and 
(d) land that is – (i) lawfully held, managed or used by specific communities as community forests, grazing areas 
or shrines; (ii) ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer communities; or (iii) lawfully 
held as trust land by the county governments, but not including any public land held in trust by the county 
government under Article 62 (2). This new constitution also requires that any ‘unregistered community land shall 
be held in trust by county governments on behalf of the communities for which it is held’ (Article 63(3)) and it 
further prohibits the sale, disposal and use of community land except in terms of legislation specifying the nature 
and extent of the rights of members of each community individually and collectively (Article 63(4)). 
The commodification and privatisation of land, and ethnic homelands, thus operate in 
Kenya as two distinct and frequently conflicting principles of land distribution. Although the 
statutory understanding of land is legally superior, and therefore individuals with titles have 
their rights protected in disputes against those with customary rights to the land, in practice 
the statutory rules do not always carry more weight in people’s actual use and transactions of 
land (Médard 2008; Shipton 1994; Wachira 2008, 7–8; Waiganjo and Ngugi 2001). As 
Shipton puts it, ‘market logic never simply shuts out political or cultural reason’ (Shipton 
1994, 365). 
The majimboism debates are particularly illustrative and illuminating of these 
conflicting approaches to land (and citizenship) in Kenya. The previous chapter discussed the 
majimboism debates in relation to political organisation but it has been the land aspect of  
these debates that has proven to be the most controversial. This was particularly so in the  
early 1990s as Kenya returned to multipartyism. Out of fear that the numerically dominant 
tribes (especially the Kikuyu) would dominate politics in a multiparty democracy (but also to 
prove to Kenyans that multipartyism would lead to chaos), Moi advocated majimboism as a 
defensive form of ‘protection’ of the rights of minority tribes, like his own Tugen. While 
decentralisation can have the effect of empowering minority communities, the majimbo 
position was more sinister, most notably in its emphasis on land rights only for locally 
indigenous tribes (Ghai 2008; Ogot 1995b, 259). Ndegwa (1997, 610) explains about Moi’s 
majimbo campaign: 
the majimbo rallies introduced a new lexicon of difference and intimidation, 
especially with reference to rights of access to and settlement on land and rights 
of political participation in selected regions. For instance, madoadoa (spots) and 
kwekwe (blemishes) referred to ‘contamination’ of the ancestral lands of the 
Kalenjin and Maasai in the Rift Valley region by migrant ethnic groups 
(especially Kikuyu). These new settlers were also termed chui (leopards), a more 
insidious reference to the interlopers as land-grabbers. 
The gist of the majimbo position was that ethnic homelands should be fortified not only as the 
primary locus of rights, duties and political participation, but also that in order to own land 
securely one must own it in ‘their own’ rural area (Anderson 2010, 41–2). Individuals who 
owned privately titled land in areas other than their ‘homeland’ (most notably Kikuyu 
individuals in Kalenjin areas and Arabs in Coast Province) have been driven out during 
violence in the Rift Valley and Coast Province in 1991–1992, again in 1995, and most  
recently in 2007–2008 when Raila Odinga’s ODM revived majimboist debates (Anderson and 
Lochery 2008; Médard 1996, 2008). 
Whether land is an ethnic or national resource is thus a question that remains 
unresolved. These competing approaches to land have led to a serious instability in Kenya   
that is most pronounced in ethnic territorialism (Peters 2004, 336). In Kenya, like a number of 
other African countries, autochthonous principles dominate the use, control, allocation and 
ownership of land (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 52–76; Médard 2008). As a result, people with   
weak claims to autochthonous status find themselves threatened on other peoples’ land, and 
those with no claim to autochthony in any part of the country find themselves in a relationship 
of severe alterity with their fellow citizens. It is in the context of these tensions surrounding 
land, exacerbated by the increasing scarcity of land and other development resources, that the 
Nubians perceive themselves to be in the position of having to carve out a space for their 
community. 
 
Nubian Struggle for Kibera  
Nubians all over Kenya have petitioned the government before and after independence for 
secure title for the land they were settled on. Kibera in Nairobi has been at the centre of the 
struggle and has proved the most difficult to secure.96  Almost from the very beginning there 
 
96 Of the Nubian settlements outside Nairobi that were part of my research, residents in the Nubian settlements in 
Eldama Ravine, Kericho and Kisii have been given allotment letters for individual title deeds. Residents in Kibos 
have been lobbying to get them but so far without any success. Allotment letters entitle individuals to purchase 
their plots of land if they can afford to. The grievance expressed in many of these communities is that they cannot 
was ambiguity surrounding the legal status of the land. As was common practice in the 
military at the time, the Nubians believed the British gave them the land in lieu of a pension. 
The colonial government, though agreeing it had a moral obligation to settle the Nubians 
somewhere, still considered Kibera Crown Land (Acting Commissioner for Local 
Government, Lands and Settlement 1931; Carter 1933, 171; Chief Native Commissioner 
1948; District Commissioner Nairobi 1931a, 1931b; District Commissioner 1936; Nairobi 
City Council 1959; Permanent Secretary for Housing, 1960; Usher 1928). The current 
government still consider the land as government land and the Nubians and all other residents 
as squatters (Kenya Ministry of Housing 2007, 8). 
Without any title to protect the Nubians’ ownership of the land the 4,197.9 acres 
originally gazetted as a military reserve has been encroached upon significantly, as detailed in 
Chapter 1. In the colonial period large pieces of land were appropriated on the fringes of 
Kibera for European sporting clubs and housing estates, and after independence the National 
Housing Corporation constructed a number of other middle class housing estates, almost all 
of which failed to benefit the Nubians.97  Since the 1970s congestion has increased 
 
significantly and now the small remaining piece of land, 550 acres, has become completely 
filled-in with informal housing leading to slum conditions. 
As long as they are considered squatters, all residents of Kibera face the threat of 
eviction and destruction of their residential and investment structures at any moment. For the 
Nubians, memories of forced evictions to make way for National Housing Corporation 
afford to buy the land, and they feel they should be given it as a matter of right. There is less concern in the rural 
settlements that individuals might sell their land and thereby break up the Nubian settlements. This may be   
because the land is of much less value than that in Nairobi, or it may also be in part out of a lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the land tenure system. Nevertheless, these settlements are considered by the Nubians as ‘Nubian 
villages’ within broader districts dominated by other ethnic groups. As such, they also wish to maintain these small 
enclaves as their own territory. 
97 A few families did take the option of a house in these housing estates, including Karanja estate, and they 
 
continue to own them today. The majority of Nubians in Kibera, however, frown upon those decisions, seeing 
them as undermining the broader Nubian effort to secure title for the rest of Kibera. 
Estates in the 1970s and 1980s from areas like Toi (now Fort Jesus), Lomle (now Ayany), 
Sarang’ombe (now Jamhuri) and Lang’ata make this fear an acute one (de Smedt 2011, 91–2; 
Kibra Land Committee 2001; KNCE 2005; Ramadhan 2004). A range of other problems 
related to security and physical wellbeing result from their landlessness and insecurity of 
tenure (KNCE 2005). Kibera’s residents frequently deploy the language of filth and danger, 
using words like ‘slum’ and ‘ghetto’ to emphasise the extremity of these conditions. 
Kibera has seen a number of violent clashes, in 1991, 1995 and most dramatically in 
2001 and 2007–2008. As described in Chapter 1, all of these conflicts were catalysed in one 
way or another by the big-men of Kenyan politics, including Moi but particularly Raila  
Odinga (de Smedt 2009; Osborn 2008). From 1992 to 2013, Kibera has been a crucial support 
base for Raila, and therefore a site of significant inter-ethnic violence connected with Luo 
aspirations to have ‘their turn’ at State House. The Nubians’ role and position in these clashes 
has depended on the nature of their political allegiances at the time, more than on their 
ethnicity per se. They were direct targets of violence in 1995 and 2001, when they were 
perceived to be supporting KANU rather than Raila’s various political parties. Conflicts in 
Kibera during this period thus took on a very strong ‘Nubian versus Luo’ ethnic dimension, in 
which ethnic leaders, including Raila, actively manipulate grassroots politics to their  
advantage (de Smedt 2011, 112; Dimova 2010; Shilaho 2006). By 2007, when the Nubian  
vote was divided between Raila’s ODM and Kibaki’s Party of National Unity, the Nubians 
managed to avoid the worst of the violence, which was instead directed at Kikuyu structure 
owners and tenants. Though from one perspective this dynamic suggests the Nubians are in a 
position to protect themselves from violence, and this may be true, it also underscores the 
extent to which the Nubians have been unable to dominate the land they see as their  
homeland. 
When explaining why the Nubians need their own piece of land, Muhidin (Interview  
30) said, ‘from recent tribal clashes arising from this general election some of our smaller 
tribes like ours, we don’t feel safe staying in these other people's big area. This is our only 
home, and we feel we are more comfortable here, and more secure.’ Though they can avoid 
being targeted in Kibera if they align themselves appropriately, this is a tenuous position that 
the Nubians rightly feel is not equivalent to the security other tribes have in their homelands. 
Amongst the community there is a widespread perception that if they had land title, they 
would hold some recognised legitimacy, authority and control over the area that would ensure 
their economic and physical wellbeing. Kibera is the only place Nubians can imagine 
establishing themselves as legitimate owners of the land. When I asked about how people 
would feel about the possibility of being compensated with land somewhere else, outside 
Nairobi, responses like Abdul’s (Interview 47) were typical, ‘not interior because there's what 
we call the tribal clashes, that's why we are afraid of’.98 It is precisely the ethnic contests over 
 
legitimacy of occupation and ownership of land in the Rift Valley or Coast that the Nubians 
wish to avoid by safeguarding their rights to land in Kibera. 
One of the reasons the Nubians’ prioritise land is its economic value. Without 
underestimating the other ways in which land is significant, it is widely acknowledged that 
land is relied upon as a source of livelihood, particularly in the face of post-independence 
economic uncertainty and land scarcity (Berry 2002, 651; Shipton 1994, 355; Shipton and 
Goheen 1992, 308; Wachira 2008, 23). This dependence on land is especially acute for 
marginalised communities who are excluded from other economic opportunities (Wachira 
2008, 23). For many Nubian families Kibera constitutes their most important source of 
livelihood in the form of rental properties, their primary ethnic economic niche since the 
decline of gin production in the 1950s and 1960s (de Smedt 2011, 145). By the early 1980s 
Amis’ (1984, 92) research on housing in Kibera suggests, referring to Nubian landlords, that, 
‘[i]n particular for those who are landless and without employment in Nairobi this sector 
[rental] provides the income for their survival’.99  Though most people who live in Kibera do 
so for financial reasons – to access employment opportunities in the city – the difference is 
   
98 By ‘interior’ Abdul is referring to rural areas of Kenya. 
 
99 Unfortunately there is no up-to-date data on the extent of the Nubians’ dependency on rental income. A 
comprehensive livelihoods study of the community would be beneficial in this regard. 
that the Nubians’ perceive themselves as having nowhere else they would be welcome to 
make a living. 
The location of Kibera, situated within walking distance from the Central Business 
District of Nairobi, and in the middle of an otherwise middle to upper class area, makes the 
land extremely valuable, prompting many to think about it not as land but as real estate. Many 
Nubians speculate that the government want to continue to hold this land in reserve so that it 
can be doled out for patrimonial purposes, as has happened in the past (Amis 1983; Osborn 
2006). The exploitation of positive media exposure around KENSUP suggests that 
contemporary politicians may view this upgrading project also as a patrimonial resource 
(IRIN 2009).100  Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the Nubians are now radically 
 
outnumbered in Kibera, which has a population of somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000, 
of which the Nubians are not more than 10,000 to 15,000. 
In many ways the Nubians already feel that they have been marginalised insofar as they 
are considered strangers and face regular discrimination. However, the fear and experience of 
being pushed not just to the margins of society and politics, but of being pushed out   
altogether – that is, the fear of abjection – is most apparent in the fear of being expelled from 
what they perceive as their land. Abjection operates through specific structures and processes, 
and in Kenya, autochthonous land allocation and deprivation are heavily implicated in the 
politics of abjection (cf. Ferguson 1999, 238). If they were to be expelled from Kibera the 
Nubians would be forced to find an alternative place to live in a country with little land left, 
where moving to another area entails the ever-present threat of violence inflicted against   
those who ‘do not belong’ (Ndegwa 1997, 610). The challenges to physical security and 
livelihoods in such a situation would be immense. Though the Nubians’ present condition is 
   
100 KENSUP is the most recent of a number of urban renewal and slum upgrading projects in Nairobi. It remains 
the most significant threat to the Nubian land title as it is backed by the Government of Kenya and UN Habitat. 
Nevertheless, it has been a deeply flawed project and there is no guarantee that it will continue as planned (The 
Friday Bulletin 2004; Huchzermeyer 2008; Omenya and Huchzermeyer 2006; Rono 2007). 
in no way a desirable one insofar as they are already marginalised strangers, expulsion from 
Kibera would represent something more extreme. 
As a result, the Nubians have taken a number of steps to attempt to secure exclusive 
land title, for their community alone, over what remains of Kibera. In rural areas, the most 
common form of communal land tenure is having the land scheduled as Trust Land, vested in 
a County Council Trust. However, the Nubians do not see this as a viable tenure option. 
Given the land they are seeking is extremely valuable commercially and in an urban area 
prone to land grabbing, as well as constituting a massive multi-ethnic settlement, the Nubians 
argue instead for what they see as a more legally robust tenure option: freehold communal  
title (cf. Bassett 2005; Shipton 1994, 365).101  Most (but not all) Nubians want communal 
rather than individual title in order to preserve the land for future generations. The fear 
associated with individual titles is that the desperate economic circumstances many families 
face will force them to prioritise their short term interests and the sell their plot to non- 
Nubians, and before long the land they have fought for will no longer be theirs (KNCE 2005). 
Though there is very widespread agreement within the Nubian community on their 
broad ambitions in relation to land, the specifics and the tactics are vehemently disputed. 
Some efforts have been made to address the land issue through state or regional institutions, 
but with no success. The Nubian MP Yunus Ali was unable to make any progress beyond 
raising the question in parliament a number of times. More recently, the African Commission 
case includes an argument that the Kenyan government has breached respect for property 
rights: ‘As a result of the historical failure to recognize Nubians as citizens and their on-going 
tenuous citizenship status, Kenyan Nubians have never been given legal protection for their 
ancestral homeland of Kibera, contrary to Article 14 of the African Charter’ (OSJI 2011a). 
However, this argument is largely overshadowed by five other arguments relating to the 
ambiguous citizenship status of many Nubians. The OSJI and CEMIRIDE, who have taken 
  
101 At the time of writing, the legal validity of such a form of tenure remains unclear as new land legislation is 
being drafted. 
on board this case, have been reluctant to address such an ambiguous and controversial land 
issue directly. Legal activism has proven to be a dead-end for the Nubians on this front.102 
At the family level, a significant number of Nubians have also purchased land, often 
through life-long saving and community cooperatives in peri-urban areas in order to mitigate 
the immediate risk of destruction of their homes and rental properties or loss of their 
livelihoods, for example from KENSUP (de Smedt 2011, 114). Typically, a family of up to 
20 or so members will pool their resources to purchase a plot within a larger cooperative, the 
leaders of which are then responsible for negotiating and executing the land purchase. Plots 
are on average one to two acres, and they take many years to pay off. However, very few 
Nubians live in these areas and most of the plots in the cooperatively purchased lands in 
places like Athi River and Kisaju are undeveloped. After raising the funds for the plot, most 
families struggle to raise further funds to either farm it or put up structures. But more 
importantly, families do not really want to live there. At the time of this research no more 
than one or two families lived permanently on their peri-urban plot. These plots appear to be 
more a form of insurance than a genuinely preferred option for settlement. They are a 
strategic attempt to mitigate the risks of living in Kibera. As Makkah (Interview 41c) 
explained this is: 
kind of a security—we have at least somewhere we can build a permanent home, 
and live peacefully without being questioned—because—we bought it, we paid 
for it, and we can live there without—the government  asking  us—unlike  in 
Kibera [where] we can’t build a permanent home. Yeah, it’s just shanty, 
shanty—and all the time there is conflict— 
   
102 Other communities have had more success with legal activism. The Endorois are a small community in Kenya 
who took a case to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The February 2010 decision was a 
landmark one in which the Commission ordered the Kenyan government to return Baringo National Park to the 
Endorois community on the grounds that it is their right as the indigenous people of the area. However, the transfer 
of land title is still pending nearly five years after the decision (Lynch 2012). 
The purchase of these plots is an act of balancing different forms of insecurity and inferior 
membership. The risks are in both locations: in Kibera, the risk of displacement because of 
the formally illegal nature of the settlement, and in both Kibera and peri-urban areas, the ever 
present risk of inter-ethnic violence. In the peri-urban areas that risk is perceived to be from 
the ‘true’ autochthons of those areas. 
Given the weakness of Kenya’s judicial institutions, particularly in relation to land, it is 
unsurprising that the Nubians do not see the courts as a viable option for securing their right  
to land. The purchasing of plots elsewhere is also not a fool-proof solution to the Nubians’ 
physical and economic insecurity, and it is far from adequate in terms of conferring a sense of 
rightful place in the country. Consequently, like many other Kenyans, a number of Nubian 
groups have exerted most of their advocacy energy on this issue to developing relations of 
patronage with Kenya’s big men. However, without ‘one of their own’ in any position of 
influence the Nubians’ have not only attracted little meaningful patronage attention, but also, 
since the return to multipartyism, find themselves divided on which patrons to build 
relationships with, further weakening their chances of success. 
One of the leading Nubian groups has advocated since the late 1990s for the Nubians to 
be given title on the Community Land Trust model, by which the freehold title is vested in a 
trust and structures are owned according to conventional individual private property norms 
(Bassett 2005). Other leadership groups have pushed for a full 780 acre title, the acreage they 
believe to be remaining in Kibera,103  though by mid-2013 there was broad agreement that 
something around 300 acres would be more politically feasible, allowing another 250 acres to 
remain government land inhabited by other Kibera residents and available for KENSUP. 
Multiple leadership groups have separately lobbied Raila Odinga and ODM (former Nairobi 
City Councillor Gore is an ODM member and reputedly close to Raila), Mwai Kibaki and 
PNU, and more recently Uhuru Kenyatta and his Cabinet Secretary for Lands, Charity Ngilu. 
  
103 To my knowledge there is no written evidence of this acreage but it is believed to include some uninhabited 
land by the river in Lang’ata not usually considered part of Kibera. 
These petitions have usually taken the form of letters, memoranda or visits (when they can 
secure an appointment). There have been various promises made by various government 
offices in response to these petitions, particularly around election times. However, to date, 
none have been forthcoming.104  Ethnic patronage, by far the most successful method of 
 
securing land in Kenya, has not been a successful strategy for this minority stranger 
community either. 
These competing strategies at the institutional level – some of which seek to take 
advantage of liberal institutions like the judiciary and private property norms others of which 
seek to make use of more informal but usually more effective channels of patronage and 
thereby reinforce existing norms around land distribution – are reflected in the different 
approaches Nubians also take to their neighbours in Kibera. The ideal and the pragmatic 
compete within and between different Nubian individuals and groups as they reflect on what 
would happen to other residents of Kibera should the Nubians receive a title. Many members 
of the community make the vague but potentially promising distinction between security of 
tenure and exclusive tenure, and plead that all they are looking for is the former; for a 
‘guarantee that we can live here uninterrupted’ (Interview 2a). Some Nubians sympathise 
with the other residents in Kibera. Hassan (Interview 6) once explained to me that, ‘[t]his is 
no jokes in Kenya. People are living in poverty. They [the other residents] also need 
 
104 These minimally include promises in parliament June 1993 (National Assembly 1993); as part of the Squatter 
Settlement Programme of 1997 (Ngala 1997); and in the establishment of the ‘Kibera Village Committee’ in 1999 
by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, a committee of various Nubian elders that 
preceded the formation of the Kibra Land Committee and the KNCE. The committee undertook surveying and a 
workshop on the Community Land Trust tenure model between 2000 and 2002 in preparation for receiving the 
title deed (Department of Physical Planning 1999). President Kibaki issued a presidential directive to issue the 
Nubians land title after a 2007 visit from the KNCE (Chege 2010). Most recently, in 2013 Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
Jubilee Alliance promised land title and made public plans for the ‘Proposed Nubian Village’ prepared by the 
Physical Planning Department, but have stalled its delivery, claiming need for clarification of new and pending 
land laws (Menya 2013). Various other promises were frequently mentioned by Nubians but could not be 
corroborated with any documentation. 
something small,’ and elaborated on how, in the event of land title, he thought Kibera’s 
current residents could stay as tenants of the Nubians. In particular, the two main leadership 
groups in the community both acknowledge that the Nubians would have to find ways of 
accommodating the other residents of Kibera, not least because of their mutual dependency in 
terms of commerce and housing. However, the methods of accommodation suggested by  
these different groups, though some demonstrate a greater degree of pragmatic thinking and 
compromise than others, all hold central the idea that the Nubians should be the ones to 
control the land.105  The lack of a feasible solution to the Nubians’ predicament is not the 
 
result of a lack of political imagination or will, but a reflection of the truly impossible 
situation the community is in. The impulse to carve out Nubian territory is experienced as a 
strong compulsion yet there is not necessarily a clear way in which this could be achieved in 
their urban, dramatically over-populated and poor context. 
The urban nature of Kibera makes the Nubians’ claim to it as their homeland unique to 
the extent that cities are expected to be uncontested cosmopolitan locales. Yet, the Nubian 
claim actually has much in common with other battles over ethnic homelands in Kenya. The 
land is not agricultural land yet its economic ‘fruits’, in the form of rental properties, are vital 
  
105 Contentious issues that need to be discussed more than they have been so far would include how to deal with 
those who have bought land outside Nairobi, those who have relatives in other Nubian settlements, those who have 
inter-married, and how to allocate land to those with a large number of rental structures that would likely be 
demolished, as compared to those with currently perhaps only one or two rooms in which they live with their 
whole families. How to avoid increasing segmentation of the community in these negotiations will be a challenge 
(Geschiere 2009, 89–94). The mode of development, including funders, would also need to be discussed, perhaps 
starting with the Kibra Land Committee’s model of multi-storey developments where families would get rooms to 
live in and rooms to let. A procedure for the allocation of plots for infrastructure and public utilities would also 
need to be decided upon. In addition, the community would benefit from giving more thought to how current 
tenants would be accommodated in much better quality houses where the rent would be many times more than 
what they are currently paying. This aspect of accommodation is often brushed over when Nubians talk about 
continuing to allow their current tenants to live in their new structures. Finally, the issue of how to compensate 
non-Nubian structure owners, both resident and non-resident, also needs attention. 
to many Nubians’ economic survival. The sense of injustice in land ownership in Kibera is 
rooted in the ethnicised maldistribution of land as a patrimonial resource under Mwangi 
Maathai, the Kikuyu MP of the late Kenyatta period, just as injustices that fuel conflicts in the 
Rift Valley and Coast are rooted in perceptions and realities of patrimonial, ethnicised and 
irregular distribution of lands in a similar period. The difference here is that the much smaller 
Nubian ethnic group lacks the powerful patrons these locations have had, such as Moi for the 
Kalenjin or Kenyatta for the Kikuyu. Finally, claims to land are made on the basis of 
longstanding (almost ‘first’) occupation and use of the area. Though the Nubians remain 
realistic about the impossibility of evicting ‘interlopers’ or outsiders, this does not erase their 
ambitions for Nubian dominance. As such, despite the impossibility of ‘purification’, the   
clear reality of not having been first and the urban locale of Kibera, the Nubian claim to their 
‘homeland’ carries significant autochthonous overtones. 
 
The Autochthonous Overtones of Nubian Kibera  
That the Nubians’ strongest response to their marginalisation in Kenya pivots around land, 
and exclusive control over it, is significant for what it tells us about citizenship in Kenya. The 
Nubians’ position on the land issue cannot strictly be classified as autochthonous. Their 
claims are based on past agreements with the British colonisers rather than myths of having 
arisen from the soil, and their claims for exclusive control are tempered with a degree of 
compromise. Yet, though their claims are not based on a myth of eternal occupation of place, 
they do entail a silencing of other peoples’ pasts in Kibera while emphasising the mythical 
qualities of their own history there and so the compromise regarding sharing the land is a 
fragile one. Their claims, therefore, may not be purely autochthonous, but they certainly have 
autochthonous overtones and aptly demonstrate the slippery, malleable and politically 
problematic nature of autochthonous principles of belonging. 
This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the fact that Kibera was almost certainly 
inhabited by other people before the Nubians; in particular by Maasai pastoralists who have 
long struggled to command rights to land that they do not occupy in a sedentary manner 
(Hodgson 2009). The Nubians maintain an understanding that the British had made an 
agreement with the Maasai regarding the transfer of the land to the military (Carter 1933, 572–
8). Nevertheless, with some exceptions, they tend to largely ignore or downplay any 
connection this previous community had to the land in Kibera, including by referring to their 
transitory use of the land as pastoralists. For example, one method for diminishing the 
significance of Maasai occupation of Nairobi, compared to the Nubians’ settlement there, is   
to call on the perceived superiority of Nubian culture and therefore meaningful claim to 
historical importance, such as when one Nubian woman explains that ‘actually the Nubian 
community in general, brought civilisation into Kenya. Way back when Maasais were  
dressing in hides and skins, the rest walking bare feet, but our forefathers were dressed in 
suits.’ This draws attention to the nervous and paranoid nature of autochthony discourses, 
where alongside an obsession with purification, with eradicating outsiders, there exists a 
simultaneous fear that the group making the claims will be found out to be not so original  
after all, that others are more so (Jackson 2006). If the Maasai were to publicly make a 
historical claim to the land in Kibera (which does seem unlikely), this could seriously threaten 
the Nubian claim, at least in moral terms. 
In addition to this past problem is an equally significant but more urgent future one: 
what will happen to the enormous number of other residents in Kibera who have come to 
Nairobi in search of economic opportunity. When developing strategies for how to manage 
land, if and when they receive land title, leadership groups have taken into account the 
pragmatic need to accommodate the large numbers of other residents However, amongst 
some more radical sections of the community, and even amongst leaders in times of 
heightened politicisation in Kibera (which are common), these accommodating approach 
gives way to a more militant exclusivism. One Nubian man106  explained why he thinks the 
Nubians should be the exclusive occupiers of the area, ‘there's nothing they can do [about 
being ejected] because they have their rural areas, their identity card is showing where they 
  
106 Due to the extremely sensitive nature of some statements in this section, I will not attribute all of them. 
are heading from. I've never been there to compete with them on theirs.’ In December 2013 
when the new government floated plans for a potential Nubian title, tensions were high and 
there was some violence until the government withdrew the proposition, claiming the  
plausible need to wait to establish clarity around emerging land laws, but likely also out of  
fear of wider violence in Kibera should the Nubians be given superior land rights (Menya 
2013). Combined with the propensity on all sides for using ethnic youth ‘gangs’ to resolve 
disputes, these opinions run the risk of violent clashes that would be far more serious than 
those of the 1990s and 2000s (Katumanga 2005; Osborn 2008). The pattern of alterity that the 
Nubians have suffered, and in some cases seek to perpetuate, is painfully evident. Just as  
other tribes have had the benefits of full citizenship in their rural areas, so many Nubians seek 
the same. 
This capacity to understand their interests as ethnic interests, not shared with past or 
present others in Kibera, is reinforced by active imagining and reification of a golden past the 
Nubians have in Kibera. Though the relatively recent date of their arrival there is not ignored, 
the nostalgia associated with the early decades in Kibera gives the Nubian history there, at 
least for them, a mythical, timeless and natural quality. The Nubians consciously and actively 
locate their heritage and ancestry not in Sudan, the home of their forefathers, but in Kibera. 
The settlement of the soldiers of the King’s African Rifles with their families in Kibera at the 
beginning of the twentieth-century represents the establishment of a homeland for the 
community after decades of military migration. The KNCE explain that, ‘Kibera and other 
Nubian settlements in the country have been in existence for over one hundred years and with 
no other rural or tribal homes these have logically been regarded as the ancestral land of the 
Nubians’ (KNCE 2005). The Nubian interpretation of history, understood through a language 
of ancestry and heritage, is one where traditions have been invented and continue to be 
renewed in various kinds of association with the land – authentic and strategic (Ranger 1983, 
1995). In myriad ways, including storytelling, reminiscing and careful preservation and 
display of symbols of the early settlement, Nubian families engage frequently and sincerely 
with this history and contribute to on-going transformations in its interpretation, each 
deepening and making more concrete their attachment to land, transforming it from space into 
place (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). 
Within the collective memory great emphasis is placed on the initial settlement of the 
4,197.9 acres. Nubian families relay a consistent narrative about being ‘brought by the 
British’ and settled with shamba passes, where they built homesteads that they continue to 
live in. Again, Mama ‘Jonuba’ (Interview 1), one of the oldest remaining Nubians whose 
father built a homestead in the initial settlement of Kibera, explained this period as follows: 
At that time the place was so bushy, filled with big savannah, and that’s where 
the name Kibera came from … So they kept on coming, cutting down the trees 
and bushes, wanting to know the name of the place, that’s when the place was 
given the name Kibra because of the big trees and bushes. 
Mama ‘Jonuba’s’ family and many others retain their original shamba passes, and refer to 
them as documents proving their ‘ownership’ or right to the land. These shamba passes 
largely correlate with a map from 1934, held by a few different leaders in the community, 
which marks out the plots for each homestead with the plot number and family name. At a 
community meeting held in March 2009 by the KNCE this map was rolled out and people 
gathered excitedly to find their family’s plot and share family histories. Yusuf Diab, the 
secretary of the KNCE declared confidently that the Nubians are not squatters or slum 
dwellers but should be proud of their land. Zamzam (Interview 47), a young Nubian woman 
later explained to me about her family home. ‘Now you see number 103, that's our plot 
number … We've not removed that number, we just left it there. Up to now. Us we are the 
grandchildren. Great grandchildren they are here.’ Her sister Mariam (Interview 47) further 
explained that in the struggle for land title: 
they start by mentioning these plot numbers 103, 104. You know if they start 
doing that, the government will surely know that “Oh, these people, they know 
for sure that that land is theirs, they have their numbers, their documents, their 
shamba pass, their forefathers were there, so these people, if they surely know 
that they are the owners of this place, we cannot do what? We cannot ignore 
them, as we have been doing.” 
The notion of first-occupation and that the current generation’s fathers’ fathers lived in this 
particular place (even if it is acknowledged that earlier they did not) is felt to be the basis of a 
right to continue to live there. In these narratives, the area is remembered as vacant, not as 
land on which others were already living. Mama ‘Jonuba’ (Interview 1) explained: 
I cannot say that I am from Sudan because it was our grandfathers who were 
born there. So after they came they had no  aim  of  going  back,  because  they 
didn’t know if they went back where they would go to. But it is the British who 
took them and brought them here, and they let them build their homes here, so 
after the blacks got their independence we had settled here. And so we became 
part of this ‘government’. Those now living here are their children, the children 
of their children, and the children of their children’s children. 
While the relatively recent arrival of the Nubians in Kenya features in narratives of their 
settlement, more central to these contemporary narratives is the assertion that the current and 
future generations therefore necessarily and unequivocally belong there. Thus the notion of 
heritage is intimately connected to notions of guardianship or trusteeship for future 
generations; a notion highly consistent with Islamic conceptions of land as vested in God but 
‘temporally enjoyed by men and women through responsibility or trust’ (Sait and Lim 2006, 
10). 
Compared to now, with Kibera highly congested and living conditions sub-standard, 
the era when families each had their own homestead is viewed nostalgically (Smith 2004). 
Tales of fishing and swimming in Nairobi dam, going for walks in the remaining forested 
areas, and grazing cattle right up to the 1960s and 1970s are frequently relayed to visitors to 
convey the loss that has occurred with the congestion of the area. A survey of landlords and 
tenants in Kibera in the late 1960s attests to the Nubians’ special attachment to the land. The 
survey reported that landlords (almost all Nubian) had been on the land much longer than the 
tenants, most having been born there, and the character of the area, evident for example in 
social, sporting and political associations, could be mostly attributed to the Nubians (Clark 
1970). In 2010, an exhibition by photographer Greg Constantine held not only in a gallery in 
central Nairobi but also in Kibera, displayed photographs of contemporary Nubians 
juxtaposed against photos of their grandparents and great grandparents from the early 
twentieth century onwards, graphically illustrating the contrast between past and present in 
Nubian Kibera (Constantine 2011). 
This general sense of a unique attachment to Kibera as a historical homeland is 
reflected in the way the Nubians sometimes refer to themselves and are categorised by others 
(Clark 1970, 16) as ‘urban villagers’, a community who, ‘adapt their non-urban institutions 
and cultures to the urban milieu’ (Gans 1965, 4). The way Atieno-Odhiambo (1977, 8) 
described the Nubians in the late 1970s still resonates today: 
they are now [in the 1970s] third generation immigrants with no tangible ‘tribal’ 
hinterland to go back to, and yet they still emphasise ethnic cohesion,  and 
maintain very close kinship, social and voluntary associational ties …. In their 
contexts, the backyards that the British awarded them to build their tin huts on 
were at the same time their ‘tribal’ hinterland. Their communities have formed 
urban villages in the sense therefore that they have lived for two or three 
generations in a specific area, gaining the monopoly on the use of land, housing 
and trade in these areas. They have at the same time regrouped because they 
have been thrown back on themselves so much, with no other hinterland and no 
other kinsmen other than Wanubi from other villages. 
Atieno-Odhiambo points to the practices that have forged this connection since the 
Nubians moved from the various places where their forefathers came from and arrived in 
Kenya. Originally, they dominated the use of the land for agriculture and cattle grazing, 
housing with their large homesteads and trade in the area, with people from other tribes being 
either tenants or workers. All the while they have maintained clan and other kinds of social 
associations developed during their decades of migration and temporary settlement in rural 
and pre-urban areas. 
Kibera has, since its initial settlement, constituted the central physical location of 
Nubian culture. Ismail Ramadhan (2004) explains that before the area became congested, and 
when their forefathers felt more secure in their tenure, ‘[t]he environment was conducive to 
economic development, practising and maintaining the cultural heritage and preserving social 
activities such as weddings, burials, education, sports and other forms of entertainment’. The 
physical gathering together of people to perform cultural ceremonies, particularly weddings, 
burials and larbein107 requires a place for these events to be held. Since approximately the 
 
middle of last century an annual celebration of the ‘Sister Club’, where Nubians from all over 
Kenya and Uganda gather for Nubian dholuka music and Nubian food, and women dress in 
traditional gurbaba and prepare gurusa (a Nubian bread), has frequently been held in Kibera 
(as well as Bombo in Uganda). Since their initial settlement and continuing until today 
Nubians travel from all over East Africa for these ceremonies. The fear of many Nubians is 
that the insecurity of their land tenure in most of the Kenyan settlements will lead to the loss 
of open areas and the impossibility of easy gathering for these celebrations, leading people 
like Hassan (Interview 3) to ask, ‘[w]here are the Nubians going to be settled? Nowhere! 
This—this is a race which is going to be extinct you know.’  
The absence of any other place in which they had the rights to dominate the land in 
these ways reinforced their place in Kibera. Families regularly visited their extended relatives 
and friends in other Nubian settlements and continue to do so, continually re-establishing 
those settlements, especially Kibera, as Nubian in character (see also Clark 1970, 16–17). 
Though the dominance of use, housing and trade has diminished, and the Nubians have now 
thoroughly lost control of Kibera, it is the memory of this era and the continuation of social 
practices and relations from then that buttress their sense of unique historical attachment. It is 
    
107 Kinubi word for a celebration held 40 days after a burial 
not only the historical fact of the settlement but the contemporary reification of its symbols 
that promote a sense of ownership of the land. 
In addition to the mythical quality conferred upon the Nubians’ history in Kibera, in 
some sense a mythical quality is also conferred upon the soil. Through particular practices the 
Nubians have established authentic attachments to the land in that particular place. Most 
prominently, the claim to Kibera is bolstered by a vigorous defence of the integrity of the 
Islamic cemetery in Kibera, the only cemetery there and one predominantly occupied by 
Nubians. It is often pointed out that other residents of Kibera usually get returned to their  
rural homeland for burial when they die. The Nubians are the only community who routinely 
bury their dead in Kibera. The cemetery therefore functions as a physical representation of 
Nubian ancestry that unites the community and marks out territory that is significant to them 
alone. In highlighting this aspect of their claim on Kibera as territory, the Nubians appeal to a 
well-established notion that in Africa, your home is where you are buried (Durham and Klaits 
2002; Geschiere 2009, 190–207; Shipton 1994).108 
 
The community also continue to think of particular sites as culturally significant 
because of their historical (and to a much lesser and more covert extent, contemporary) 
connection with animist rituals involving dancing, music and the sacrifice of animals in order 
to protect the community or bring about other particular goals such as a peaceful marriage or  
a recovery from illness. Though any practice of these rituals is condemned by the mosques 
and largely socially frowned upon, the sites still represent significant historical engagement 
with the land and its ‘spirits’ that mark the special attachment of particular clans to particular 
areas. One of these sites, used by the Muru clan, is a cave in the side of a small incline above 
a creek, deep in Gatwekera, one of Kibera’s villages. This site is now littered with rubbish  
and human faeces and has clearly developed other uses for the non-Nubian community who 
live immediately on top of it. Another was an annual sacrificial ritual involving chickens and 
  
108 Islamic law allows for the significance of cultural and ancestral attachments to land, including as more than 
property, but as a ‘permanent temporal abode’ (Sait and Lim 2006, 17). 
goats, on a site that is now a shopping area in Olympic. These sites were presented to me on a 
lengthy walking tour as proving in profound and on-going ways the Nubians’ claim to land. 
With the increasing congestion of space in Kibera and the severe outnumbering of the 
Nubians, as well as the constant threat of further land encroachment by developers (formal 
and informal) and KENSUP, it is increasingly difficult for the Nubians to protect and   
preserve these sites of historical significance. Yet, these practices remain significant, not 
because many people still engage in them (very few people do), but because of the way in 
which these practices are displayed to outsiders as a further mark of the community’s unique 
attachment to the land itself. 
Through the practices of imagining and constituting Kibera as a place of physical and 
historical significance, the land there has come to represent for the Nubians a crucial part of 
‘what people have at their disposal in organizing and thinking about their lives’ (Strathern 
2009, 19). The continued physical congregation of like-people in the same place sustains a 
sense of stability and relationships of respect and reciprocity, underpinned by a shared 
identity (cf. James 2006). One fairly wealthy Nubian (Interview 35) who chooses to continue 
living in Kibera, despite having the possibility of social and physical mobility, explained her 
decision: 
You know, okay, to stay here I like it because, you know all the families—all 
Nubians they were together. Now if you want to go and visit  your  friends, 
families and all that, you can go even walking. But—if you’re staying far away 
from people, you know it’s very difficult. Maybe you can stay there for three 
days, four, five days you come back to see your people. 
In such a context, social relations are reasonably predictable and navigable and it is possible 
to learn ‘how to hustle’ (Interview 41a) or how to get by in life. Muhidin further explains the 
importance of place as an anchor for identity (Interview 30): 
Nubian land is a pride. It's a pride because you come to know your identity. 
Today even if I go to—Mombasa—I'll always attach my identity to this place. 
There will be a house here which will not be sold to anybody. And that one will 
make a centre focus of actually where we came from, identity. Yeah. Even if it is 
ten, twenty years, a hundred years, still this place will remain. The culture will 
remain the same. Yeah. Because Nubians have been there over 3,000 years ago, 
and up to now we are there, so it is not easy for Nubians to get lost. 
What matters here is having not just a space but a particular place as the context in which to 
understand one’s place in the world and foster a sense of security in the face of increasingly 
rapid social and economic change (Eyoh 1999; Haugerud 1995; Lonsdale 2004, 80). Land is 
intimately tied up with the integrity of the community, the ‘intangible but vital capacity for 
relationships that the land and its fruits mobilize’ (Strathern 2009, 29). This ontological 
security is a significant part of what the Nubians associate with Kibera. 
The autochthonous overtones of the Nubians’ understanding of and attachment to 
Kibera thus have multiple dimensions: mythical qualities are conferred upon their history in 
Kibera and relationship to the soil; tolerance of a place for past and present Others is fragile; 
while the risk of a highly exclusivist approach to their control over the land is palpable. This 
is in part the product of the Nubians’ anxious sense of belonging in Kibera and Kenya (cf. 
Townsend 2013), but also exceeds such a strategic interpretation for, in the many acts that 
constitute land as meaningful, it has come to take on authentic significance in people’s daily 
lives and imaginations. Thus, autochthonous principles have come to have highly significant 
emotional appeal at the same time as they pose major risks to the stability and security of the 
Kenyan polity. 
 
Land, Autochthony and Belonging in Kenya  
As explained in Chapter 1, the predominant approach adopted by well-intentioned NGOs to 
the Nubians’ citizenship problems has been to place the emphasis on access to ID cards. 
Understandable as this is given the sensitivities around the land issue, and the comparative 
likelihood of success in using legislative means to secure access to ID cards as opposed to 
access to land, the discussion here suggests that this approach starts at the wrong end of the 
problem. In practice it seems that a recognised homeland is the very basis of citizenship in 
Kenya. Rather than citizens being entitled to land, it seems that those with land are entitled to 
citizenship. Tribes in Kenya who can identify their shags do not have their membership or 
their rights questioned in the same way or with the same frequency as those without a shags. 
Working back from this chapter through the preceding two, it is possible to map the 
ways in which ethnic territorialisation and heightened localisation of membership, rights and 
political participation impact upon the practice of citizenship in Kenya. Collective recognition 
as an indigenous tribe opens the door for its members to dominate local decision making 
organs and take advantage of local development funds and quotas in education and 
government employment. Arrangements such as these head dangerously in the direction of 
establishing localised ethnic enclaves of membership and rights where people can only be 
elected, be appointed to civic administration positions, be educated or be employed in their 
homeland (locally defined in autochthonous terms). This is particularly so in relation to ID 
cards, where access to and security of formal citizenship status depends not nearly as much on 
entitlements under law as it does on having indigenous and autochthonous credentials in the 
eyes of local administrators. 
The state in Kenya has a long history of marginalising minority and indigenous groups 
through a denial of recognition of their collective land claims (Wachira 2008, 25). Land is the 
primary mechanism through which the Kenyan state and Kenyan society can continue to  
make politically and socially hierarchical distinctions between ethnic strangers and ethnically 
indigenous groups, recognising the full and rightful membership of only the latter (cf. 
Mamdani 2001b, 31). Landlessness sustains a continued perception that the Nubians are 
strangers, people with no place, physically and therefore also politically, in Kenya. As such, 
landlessness, more than any other factor, has been both the cause and effect of the Nubians’ 
marginal status in Kenyan society. 
The previous chapter outlined the ways in which the Nubians’ claim to be recognised  
as the 43rd tribe of Kenya is a response to a recognition and distribution regime that privileges 
indigenous ethnicity in the sense of being one of the ‘original’ tribes of Kenya. A claim for 
exclusive land title is something more and slightly different to this. While it entails a claim to 
indigeneity, it exceeds that. Both indigeneity and autochthony have significance at local and 
national levels insofar as recognition of such a status brings with it greater intersubjective 
respect and authority, and greater access to material development through dominance of 
administrative and electoral units (if numbers permit) and associated access to channels of 
(especially ethnic) patronage. But autochthonous or almost-autochthonous (in the case of the 
Nubians) claims to land title are more localised than claims to indigenous status. Both claims 
are outward looking in the sense of being claims for recognition and distribution from outside 
(the state, other citizens), but autochthonous claims look more to the immediate outside, to 
protection from immediate outsiders (or, indeed, ‘interloping’ insiders). Both claims are 
primarily relational (albeit with some substantive content), and both seek to strengthen the 
Nubians’ relationship with the nation in general. However, the autochthonous aspect of the 
Nubians’ claim to belonging also has its sights fixed very firmly on immediate relations with 
those in very close physical proximity. The dominance of autochthonous principles in the 
recognition and distribution regimes that construct citizenship in Kenya therefore represents 
the manifestation of extreme localisation of citizenship: territorialisation. 
Though expressed, as the mainstream society and political culture dictate, in a language 
of belonging which is intimately connected to blood and especially soil, the claim is at root 
one for inclusion and equal treatment based on universal Kenyan citizenship but expressed in 
ethnically parochial terms that are intelligible and meaningful in the society and the political 
culture in which they live (cf. Dunn 2009). The incentives in the extant recognition and 
distribution regimes are to fit into the dominant discourses rather than to transcend or 
transform them. As such, the Nubians construct and then form affective attachments to an 
identity that is rooted (in the strongest metaphorical sense) in the land, their homeland. Their 
efforts to reach out to fill the existing spaces of recognition and distribution offer more 
promise, from their perspective, than does the challenge to create new spaces (Li 2000, 2001). 
That both recognition and distribution take place so centrally through land and territory 
explains the ‘strategic’, emotional and political appeal of identifications that are rooted in the 
soil. Despite the apparent availability of other bases on which to make similar claims for 
inclusion (particularly class), land and ethnic identity carry far greater appeal (Klopp 2002, 
274). 
The construction of spaces of recognition and distribution in ways that emphasise 
territory puts the Nubians in an unusual position. The Nubians do not have many of the usual 
grounds on which to make special claims to particular parcels of land. They cannot claim any 
‘ecological indigeneism’ by purporting that they understand and can care for the land in a  
way nobody else can (Lonsdale 2008; Lynch 2011a, 154–5). Nor do they work the land, 
drawing on its literal fruits. A transcendence or transformation of the existing recognition and 
distribution regime may well serve them much better. However, precisely because of their 
long-term experience of marginalisation, the Nubians are not well positioned to spearhead a 
transformation that would undermine indigenous and autochthonous principles governing 
belonging in Kenya. It could be argued, then, that the Nubians adopt the strategy of an almost 
autochthonous claim on Kibera not despite their relatively weak claim to autochthony but 
because of it. 
Lonsdale (2008, 306–7) observes that ‘all Kenyans are learning more exclusive 
attitudes to territory’ and that a ‘claim to be original, autochthonous, a first-comer, is the 
weapon, even the refuge, of the weak’ (cf. Alcida Rita Ramos in Kuper 2003, 398). The 
development of almost autochthonous associations with the land in Kibera has evolved into 
both an affective and a strategic source of identification and locus of struggle. However 
opportunistic the Nubians’ initial settlement may have been, the evolution of a group ethnic 
identity grounded in Kibera has exceeded the purely instrumental interpretation of what 
Kibera is and means, and has become authentic in its own right (cf. Li 2000, 153). The 
relation between the use of and affective attachment to the almost autochthonous meanings 
invested in Kibera is an iterative one. 
The Nubian case – and in particular the development and salience of almost 
autochthonous principles to make sense of and seek to remedy their marginalisation – is a 
particularly revealing one for our understanding of Kenyan citizenship. Despite the struggles 
over approaches to securing land, some of which exhibit a greater commitment to liberal 
values than others, the overall goal – to secure an ethnic homeland – remains paramount. The 
primacy of ethnicity is not challenged in any fundamental way in either the Nubians’ 
perceptions of the cause and substance of their citizenship deficits or their approaches to 
remedying them. 
It is clearly important to understand the interconnecting, shifting, manipulable and re- 
definable characteristics of tribal homes and identities (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo 1992; 
Shipton 1994; Vail 1989). However, we do need to also commit ourselves to asking more 
precise questions about the nature of the social, cultural and political relations, and 
particularly inequalities that are embedded in land (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 11). Given the 
ambiguities in the Nubians’ approach to past and future Others in Kibera, their taking up of 
this near-autochthonous discourse compels us to ask ‘for whom and with what effect’ do 
changing discourses around land operate in Kenya (cf. Berry 2002, 655; Peters 2004, 279). 
When people and places are connected in apparently historically or naturally self-evident, yet 
deeply ambiguous ways, there is a dangerous propensity to entail exclusion, invisibility and 
persecution, generating the ‘aberrant’ condition of the ethnic stranger (Geschiere 2009; 
Malkki 1992, 27). This propensity is inherent as much in the Nubians’ claim for Kibera as it 
has been in their historical exclusion from the Kenyan land regime. While the Nubians have 
historically suffered in this aberrant condition of being a stranger, if Kibera is to become 
exclusively Nubian land, then other kinds of local strangers may be created. When 
autochthony and indigeneity become central modes of belonging to a particular place, 
belonging comes to depend on the obviously arbitrary, and often difficult to prove, facts of 
descent. 
The strong interdependence between autochthonous and indigenous ethnicity and 
citizenship is most worrying at times of heightened politicisation when a temporary fixity 
applies to the relationship between land, ethnicity and citizenship (cf. Li 2000, 152). In 
moments of threat and fear, or where the political, social or economic stakes are high, claims 
to homelands and rightful status (based on indigeneity) become more myopic, less 
multidimensional and more violent. Elections and constitutional reviews, for example, have 
brought out these patterns in Kenya. For the Nubians, moments where they feel their place in 
Kibera is threatened, for example the riots of the 2001, have constituted the moments in  
which their claims have been the most autochthonous and the least compromising. As de 
Smedt (2011, 244–5) explains ‘[m]any Nubis claim they would defend (their rights in) Kibera 
with their life, whereas most people of the other communities probably would not – Kibera is 
not their tribal homeland’. This is the nature of autochthonous claims – they compel high 
stakes contests in contexts where the meaning and significance of land to different people is 
slippery. 
The Nubians’ claim to first-occupation and to the exclusive land rights associated with 
that status is not a sign of a renegotiation of the relationship between land and belonging. 
Rather, it is a sign of the further consolidation of connections between exclusive ethnic 
territory and national citizenship. It is a sign that the Nubians have largely bought into a 
system that restricts full citizenship to those with particular kinds of claims, claims that, by 
their very nature, are exclusive. Any claim to a status that aims to exclude others outright 
from land is not an attempt to undermine the autochthon/stranger distinction in the pursuit of 
a more equal national community. Rather, it is an attempt by one particular group to shift 
from one category to the other. It is representative of a ‘general trend to transform territory 
from the site of a civic project into the site of memory’ (Maier 1993, 150) by emphasising 
past parochial attachments to place rather than future inclusive ones. 
Gausset et al (2011, 141) argue that ‘[i]t might be time to end the sterile debate in terms 
of 'for or against' the concepts of autochthony and indigeneity, and to focus instead on the 
context and legitimacy of the different political projects that instrumentalise them’. When the 
Nubians plead that they have ‘nowhere else to go!’ they point to a fundamental fragility in 
their citizenship and a valid political project to remedy that fragility. The question is why 
addressing this issue is pursued in Kenya so predominantly via territorial and ethnic 
exclusivism. 
Chapter 5: Ethnicity and Democratic Citizenship 
   
 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that Kenyan Nubians’ marginality is the result of 
the hegemony of a discursive framework that privileges indigenous and autochthonous 
ethnicity in ways that have come to seem natural and self-evident. Citizenship in Kenya is an 
assemblage of membership, rights and opportunities for political participation in which 
informally recognised territory is a precondition for meaningful membership and leads to 
greater security of, access to, and enjoyment of the other components of citizenship (cf. 
Sassen 2006). In struggles over the structure of the state (Chapter 1) and citizens’ experiences 
of collective life, development and interactions with state agents, indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnicity have trumped other possible ordering principles, including 
nationalism, class and liberalism. Though liberalism and its technologies, including 
theoretically impartial citizenship status and identification, constitutions and parliamentary 
institutions, have some place in Kenyan politics and bureaucracy (and this will only become 
more so if the promises in the 2010 constitution can be fulfilled), throughout the Nubians’ 
story, liberal ideology and technologies have been subordinated to ethnic logics. 
In the preceding chapters I have outlined the ways in which liberal technologies 
including ID cards and notions of land as private property have had thoroughly illiberal 
effects on citizenship in Kenya. However, even more than that, preceding chapters have 
illustrated the multiple ways in which indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity have anti- 
democratic effects on Kenyan citizenship, bringing about serious citizenship deficits for the 
Nubians. In this context, it is possible to explain why the Nubians’ claims to be indigenous 
and autochthonous have the strong emotional appeal that they do. Indigenous and 
autochthonous ethnic identities are an effective discursive framework within which people 
can deploy allegations of historical injustice, claims for reparations and assertions of 
belonging (Li 2000, 2001; Lynch 2011c, 27). 
However, as much as previous chapters have made this case, they have also implicitly 
suggested that other ways of constructing citizenship might be possible in Kenya. Though 
pressures from above and below to sustain the status quo are strong, they are not entirely 
monopolising. This chapter attempts to grapple with some political possibilities for   
citizenship in Kenya in the current climate. After more explicitly articulating why the 
privileging of indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity can be a problem for democratic 
citizenship, the chapter explores two possible alternative modes of accommodating ethnicity   
in politics. One is familiar: the notion of inter-ethnic solidarity, where citizens maintain their 
ethnic identity, and maintain that such an identity is politically relevant, but do so in ways that 
are supportive of mutual development and political participation rather than competition or 
hierarchy. The second possible alternative mode of accommodating ethnicity is less familiar: 
the notion of inter-ethnic agonism, where citizens acknowledge inter-ethnic tensions that may 
not be immediately (or perhaps ever) resolvable, but commit to democratic processes for 
dealing with them. 
 
Ethnicity’s Challenge to Democratic Citizenship  
In traditional political theory, citizenship is supposed to act as a source of solidarity and 
cohesion for a national community. The liberal tradition has this as the result of universalism 
and individual equality. The civic-republican tradition has this as the result of emphasis on 
civic community, civic duty and participation to be animated by a public spiritedness that  
goes beyond individualism or parochial sub-national community attachments (Oldfield 1998). 
Whatever the source, the agreement is that a national identity and community provides the 
basis of national citizenship. In both the liberal and civic-republican traditions, ethnicity, 
though it may have provided the origins of nations, should not be their on-going foundation. 
Maier (1993, 147–8) explains: 
the modern nation was not merely an expression of ethnicity. It was a 
commitment to values of communal liberty and culture that might have been 
organised through ethnicity, through linguistic kinship, but that also transcended 
ethnicity. The ethnic unit as expressed in language or faith or even territory was 
supposed  to  provide  the  basis  for  nationality,  its  subsoil  so  to  speak.  But 
ethnicity alone did not incorporate values that the nation-state was supposed to 
achieve. These values remained future-oriented, not just historically conditioned, 
they incorporated universal aspirations of law, justice and welfare. The modern 
nation-state grew out of ethnicity, not toward ethnicity. 
Ethnicity is therefore usually understood to be separate from and subordinate to national 
citizenship. This position usually (but not always) appreciates how a kind of ethnicity can be 
central to political identities and experience of political community but does not see it is a 
pre-condition for the experience of national citizenship. In the much older nations of Europe, 
which have had centuries to forge a civic or liberal national identity, this position makes 
sense. Yet, in Kenya it was colonialism, not ethnicity, which provided the origins of the 
Kenyan nation. Thus, to suggest that liberal or civic-republican positions can or should 
supplant an ancient form of ethnic cohesion that has previously bound the nation is 
misguided. Instead, as in many other postcolonial contexts, ethnicity continues to act as an 
inextricable part of political life, and it is not always a shared ethnicity. 
Drawing on Mamdani’s (1996) well-known formulation of bifurcated citizenship, that 
is, of Africa being constituted of both citizens and subjects, a number of scholars have argued 
that, rather than being liberal or civic citizens who have relegated their ethnic identity to the 
private realm (if they have withheld it at all), most Africans are both citizen and subject 
(Nyamnjoh 2005, 38).109  An exemplary position is as follows:  
everybody, not only urbanites but villagers as well, is at the same time citizen 
and subject  – the fact  that everyone partakes to some extent  at  least  in civil 
society but remains at the same time part of the community, defined by custom, 
as a crucial point of identification (Geschiere and Gugler 1998, 315). 
    
109 Here ‘subject’ can be understood as ‘ethnic citizen’ as Mamdani reformulated it in Mamdani 2001b. The 
reformulation takes into account that ethnic communities are not just authorities but also the source of some 
important rights. 
These positions refine Mamdani’s original formulation by recognising that in different 
circumstances people claim the status of, and act as, either ethnic members or national  
citizens. The two realms exist side-by-side and people dip in and out of both of them as they 
strategically and affectively negotiate the challenges of daily life. Ethnicity is regarded 
variously as either operating without reference to national citizenship, often in conflict with it, 
or, at times, cooperatively. 
However, this position also suffers analytical shortcomings. Although it gives due  
credit to the salience of ethnicity in people’s real lives, and sometimes acknowledges that 
ethnicity can have a productive and creative relation with national citizenship, from this 
perspective there is no necessary connection between the two. Theoretically, then, and as 
advocated by Mamdani (2001b, 30), any public significance for ethnicity could fade away. In 
such a situation, this perspective suggests that people would still be left with their national 
citizenship and that the fading away of the public significance of ethnicity would not alter the 
structure of national citizenship, only perhaps make it more meaningful to people insofar as it 
fills a void. In this sense, the logical conclusion of the bifurcated citizenship thesis is that the 
ultimate end-point of political identities will resemble those of European nations, where 
liberal or civic political allegiances fully displace ethnic ones.110 
 
In contrast, the examination of the case of the Nubians presented in the previous 
chapters suggests that ethnicity is not distinct from national citizenship in Kenya nor is it a 
dimension of national citizenship that could be carved out and discarded. Ethnicity is, rather, 
quite integral to citizenship in the two senses in which ethnicity is often perceived to be 
problematic: as a criterion for membership (insofar as national membership is contingent 
upon membership of a recognised tribe), and as a source of competing allegiances and 
obligations (in the sense that duties to fellow ethnic members take precedence over duties to 
fellow nationals, and members of recognised tribes use the national state to advance the 
interests of their communities). Indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity are defining features 
 
110 Of course, it is doubtful that point has been achieved even in European contexts. 
of the recognition and distribution regimes that determine people’s access to and enjoyment 
of citizenship in Kenya. To the significant extent that this is so, then ethnicity is clearly not 
distinct from national citizenship: it is very much part and parcel of it. 
In modern nation-states, ethnicity is seen to be particularly inappropriate when used as 
a criterion for either formal membership (from the liberal perspective) or effective 
membership (from the civic-republican perspective). Insofar as political communities are 
constituted by the ‘we’ of ‘we the people’ (Pitkin 1972, 208), this ‘we’ should, according to 
traditional citizenship theory, be determined on the basis of equitable criteria for inclusion 
and be therefore civic in nature. Membership in an ethnic community, on the other hand, is 
almost always understood as ascriptive, conferred by birth, marriage or ‘adoption’, and 
therefore it can never be an equitable basis for inclusion in a civic community (Kivuva 2004; 
Ndegwa 1997).111  Benhabib (2004, 206–7) explains that the ethnos cannot serve as a just   
basis for the demos, because the ethnos cannot change itself, it cannot permit free entry and 
exit. This was precisely the problem that Arendt (1973, 275) identifies as the root cause of 
statelessness and the mass deprivation of the right to have rights for minorities in Europe after 
World War I: the nation (meaning the ethnos) overtook the state, and the criterion for 
inclusion became nationality (meaning ethnicity) rather than civic commitment. In the case of 
the Nubians, the arbitrariness of their ethnicity proves this point: it has had a serious negative 
effect on the quality of their citizenship. Despite Kenya’s new liberal constitution, legislation 
and formal institutional design, the informal quality of meaningful membership in the  
political community takes precedence. It has left the Nubians first stateless and then with 
inferior membership because of their lack of recognised homeland, and lack of collective 
recognition as a tribe of Kenya. 
 
111 While this is an important criticism, it does tend to oversimplify the nature of ethnic boundaries. As discussed  
in the introduction, the boundaries around ethnic groups are in practice highly contestable, negotiable and 
responsive to the pressures and demands of prevailing social, political and economic circumstances (Berman 1998; 
Lynch 2006b, 50). Furthermore, it should be noted that national citizenship cannot be chosen at will either, 
particularly in countries with restrictive citizenship laws (Benhabib 2004). 
The second way in which ethnicity is seen as threatening to democratic citizenship 
practices is insofar as ethnic groups act as competing sources of allegiance and obligation. 
Lonsdale’s account of ‘moral ethnicity’ (which he sets up in opposition to ‘political  
tribalism’) describes moral ethnicity as ‘that contested internal standard of civic virtue against 
which we measure our personal esteem’ (Lonsdale 1994, 131; 2004). Though Lonsdale’s use 
of the term ‘civic’ here is misleading, a point I return to shortly, his general observation about 
relations between people of the same ethnicity is astute. According to Lonsdale, it is within  
the ethnic community that debates and contests occur over which actions should be   
considered distinctive, and when and how – in the face of changing social, political and 
economic circumstances – these actions should be taken. Lonsdale (2004, 79) is not asserting 
any inherent value in ethnicity but is rather highlighting that it is within the ethnic community 
that moral standards are agreed upon or more commonly debated. It is therefore within the 
ethnic community that individuals can enjoy the reputation and esteem that arises from 
meeting or exceeding the moral demands of the community. 
Lonsdale (1994, 132) goes on to explain that moral ethnicity is borne from ‘the 
common human instinct to create out of the daily habits of social intercourse and material 
labour a system of moral meaning and ethical reputation within a more or less imagined 
community’. In saying so, Lonsdale points to the concreteness of ethnic experiences as 
compared to national ones. The ‘daily habits’ of social interaction and labour make concrete 
communities, or where those communities are so big as to disallow concrete interaction 
between all members (as in ethnic groups of millions), then these habits make the imagining  
of those communities significantly easier. The actual social practices that occur in ethnic 
communities, for example rituals related to rites of passage, or gatherings for judicial or 
decision-making purposes, reify the obligations of the ethnic community. As such, ethnic 
authorities have the ability to generate obligations and sanctions in ways that are experienced 
and perceived by individuals as much more salient in their real lives than any obligations they 
may acknowledge towards the national community (Ndegwa 1997, 613). 
In an earlier but similar formulation, Ekeh (1975) argues that Africans operate 
simultaneously in two publics – a primordial and a civic public. Ekeh argues that the 
primordial public is the realm of action that impinges upon the public interest and which is 
governed by the moral norms of the private realm. By this, Ekeh means that the moral 
meanings that operate in what is conventionally understood as the private sphere, for example 
norms of care and reciprocity that exist in a kin group, also operate in wider ethnic 
communities, whereas they do not operate in national publics. As such, the ethnic community 
is imbued with moral pressures and demands, the fulfilment of which constitute what  
Lonsdale would call, perhaps unhelpfully, civic virtue. 
However, what Ekeh’s formulation conveys clearly that Lonsdale’s does not is the 
different character of the ethnic public as compared to the civic public.112  While Lonsdale is 
right to highlight the importance of the moral standards that are generated within ethnic 
communities as an important source of guidance on how to behave in relation to others,  
Ekeh’s characterisation of these norms as ‘primordial’ rather than civic is more accurate. 
While ‘primordial’ may have since taken on too pejorative a tone, Ekeh is right that these 
norms cannot be characterised as civic because they do not apply to relations with all others; 
only to relations with others of the same ethnic group. That is not to say that these norms are 
necessarily inherently problematic or that they have no relevance to the public realm. It is 
rather to agree with Ekeh that moral norms of the ethnic community are significant in a public 
sense but are not civic in character. 
In the case of Kenya, Lonsdale argues that there is an absence of principles of civic 
virtue in the national sphere, and a variety of particularly strong moral norms and obligations 
in the ethnic sphere erode the obligations we would usually expect in a national political 
community. This results in national citizenship being subordinate to and defined by ethnicity. 
    
112 Another important distinction between the two is that Ekeh is referring to particular moral norms, whereas 
Lonsdale (especially 2004) refers more to the debates over what counts as a norm. 
The national public is then characterised primarily by political tribalism: inter-ethnic 
competition rather than civic allegiances. As Berman (1998, 338–9) puts it: 
internal processes of moral ethnicity, groping towards defining communities of 
cultural identity and social responsibility, contrast with an external realm of 
competitive political tribalism defined by purely materialistic and opportunistic 
relationships to the state through the control of patronage. 
Many scholars agree that the principal issue here is that, unlike ‘moral ethnicity’ or the 
‘primordial public’, the national arena is devoid of moral norms or principles to govern action 
and behaviour. Ndegwa (1997, 614) argues that, ‘[i]n the case of Kenya, the national political 
community (nation-state) lacks the capacity to extract obligation but grants rights freely 
through a liberal citizenship’.113  Ekeh (1975) agrees, arguing that citizenship in the national 
realm is about material rights claims, but carries no corresponding duties, he thinks because it 
is not governed by any moral norms negotiated in the more salient private realm. Lonsdale 
(1994, 141) is more specific when he explains that political tribalism exists at the national 
level because there are no salient mechanisms of accountability, no precedents of good 
behaviour, and therefore no limits on reward. Berman (1998) calls this ‘uncivil nationalism’. 
Politicians can act in an unprincipled way because they are not bound by the rules and 
sanctions that govern their behaviour at home in the ethnic community. Any notion of 
national citizenship as a relation of equals (from the liberal perspective), or a cohesive and 
participatory political community (from the civic-republican perspective) is seriously eroded 
in the case of Kenya by the superior salience of ethnicity in daily lives and the competitive 
tendencies this form of allegiance promotes at the national level. 
However, the presence of strong intra-group norms does not in and of itself necessitate  
the absence or weakness of inter-group or national level (inter-individual) norms. Lonsdale 
  
113 Here Ndegwa makes a distinction between national citizenship as liberal citizenship, and ethnic citizenship as 
civic-republican. In his view the former is primarily about rights and has few, if any, obligations while the latter 
confers obligations upon ethnic members in a way that membership in the national polity is unable to do. 
(1994, 132) reminds us that rather than being the norm of inter-ethnic relations, ‘[t]ribalism is 
contingent upon political intention and context. Far from explaining all African conflicts, 
political tribalism itself always needs to be explained.’ Ethnic groups are not necessarily 
competitive. The history of inter-ethnic interaction is mixed and includes instances of 
cooperation and hospitality as well as competition. In pre-colonial Africa, the structure of the 
political economy meant that ‘prudence set limits to cultural chauvinism’ (Lonsdale 2004,  
78). It was not in anyone’s interests to act out of chauvinism or xenophobia, and cooperation 
paid more dividends than competition. 
The strength and sustenance of problematic patterns of relations between ethnic groups, 
and between ethnic groups and the state, can be explained at multiple levels, including the 
institutional design and operation of the Kenyan state but also the practices of the bureaucracy 
and norms of intersubjective relations between citizens that have been relayed in preceding 
chapters. Together, these aspects of Kenyan politics form the recognition and distribution 
regimes that condition citizenship, rendering it an identity and experience of political life that 
pivots primarily around ethnicity. Membership in an indigenous and autochthonous ethnic 
group operates as a (necessary but not sufficient) precondition for access to the other 
component parts of citizenship: rights and political participation. This particular assemblage 
has both democratic and anti-democratic consequences. Within ethnic groups certain 
democratic principles are fostered, including a form of accountability of leaders, norms of 
reciprocity and responsibility, and practices of deliberation and debate. Yet, outside the ethnic 
group these norms are far less prevalent, and the anti-democratic consequences of the lack of 
democratic norms between ethnic groups have, as we have seen in previous chapters, had 
severe consequences not only for ethnic stranger groups like the Nubians but more generally. 
The reasons for this are contingent – historically, institutionally and culturally conditioned. 
There are possibilities for the emergence of different assemblages of identities and claims to 
belonging, different norms of recognition and distribution. But, given the profound 
attachments that Kenyans have to their ethnic identity and the slim likelihood that that will 
change any time soon, it is politically necessary, even urgent, that our political imaginations 
extend to possibilities of alternative citizenships that allow space for ethnicity, but mitigate 
the democratic deficits currently associated with it. 
The case of the Nubians’ citizenship deficits illustrates both of the undemocratic 
tendencies of ethnicity outlined above. Firstly, many democratic theorists argue that ethnicity 
cannot serve as the basis of democratic citizenship because it is ascriptive in nature and 
therefore an arbitrary basis on which to admit or refuse members. The Nubians’ non- 
indigenous and non-autochthonous identity has operated as an ascriptive and arbitrary basis   
on which members of this ethnic group have been situated in a relation of alterity with other 
Kenyans, if not outright exclusion (during periods when they have had no access to ID cards, 
exclusion has been an accurate descriptor). Secondly, many democratic theorists and other 
scholars of and in Africa have argued that ethnicity, when brought into political life, erodes 
any grounds for common, civic allegiance and instead divides the polity, fostering   
competitive and chauvinistic relations between sub-national groups. Political tribalism of this 
kind has, as we have seen in preceding chapters, dominated Kenyan politics. Through highly 
personalised, localised, ethnicised and even territorialised approaches to governance, 
administration, development and control – and through the pressures from above and below to 
sustain neo-patrimonialism as the primary mode of recognition and distribution in Kenya –   
the Nubians have found themselves largely unable to access power and resources from the 
state. 
The Nubians’ marginalised condition is not the result of the simple fact of ethnicity, 
ethnic diversity or the public salience of ethnicity. It is rather the result of hierarchical 
distinctions generated and sustained by particular recognition and distribution regimes which 
operate within the discursive framework that privileges indigenous or autochthonous ethnic 
groups and provides incentives to preclude solidarity or, sometimes, even respectful 
competitive relationships between ethnic groups. Therefore, it may be possible to retain some 
public salience for ethnicity without retaining the inter-ethnic competitive tendencies, or the 
hierarchical positions of indigenes, autochthones and strangers. 
Contemporary Citizenship Assemblages in Kenya  
Though hierarchical and competitive relations between ethnic groups have so heavily 
conditioned citizenship in Kenya, struggles around the reconfiguration of recognition and 
distribution regimes to democratise citizenship have also taken place (c.f. Sassen 2006, 413). 
While efforts to bring about political liberalisation have occupied particular political and 
scholarly attention in this respect (Mutua 2008), as argued throughout preceding chapters and 
above, the liberal political tradition has been and continues to be unable to account for the 
realities of ethnicised citizenship in Kenya. Understanding and transforming the nature of the 
Nubians’ citizenship deficits requires a different focus. 
One possible avenue for such an exploration is to draw on examples in which moral 
ethnicity is scaled up to the national level to imbue national politics with principles of 
accountability (Orvis 2001), tolerance and cosmopolitanism (Klopp 2002). Such instances 
have been seized upon as demonstrating promise for a more democratic multi-ethnic future in 
Kenya. Lonsdale (2004, 81) asks: 
Could ethnic electorates pool their local critiques of power, encouraged by the 
inter-ethnicity that often underwrites survival among the poor, to build a 
common citizenship against the prejudices inflamed by political tribalism? In the 
absence of the socio-economic conditions for liberal or social democracy, can 
the only indigenous sources of change, namely,  outraged  moral  ethnicities, 
unite? 
For Lonsdale (2004, 81), to contemplate this prospect is to ‘open up the prospect of a 
dynamic relationship between local moral ethnicities and national accountability’. On 
Lonsdale’s interpretation, taken up by Klopp and Orvis, democratic values of respect, 
accountability, justice and deliberation are only available within the ethnic group, and so on 
these grounds there are reasons to maintain a place for ethnicity in politics, however fraught 
that might be. 
Klopp’s (2002) reflections on the Nandi nationalists provide an example of how moral 
ethnicity may be able to trump political tribalism. Klopp explains how, in the 1990s, the   
Nandi Nationalist movement came to challenge the majimboist politics of ‘their own’ 
politicians, including Moi (of the broader Kalenjin ethnic group to which the Nandis belong), 
when faced with land grabbing by these elites that would dispossess them of ancestral lands 
and livelihoods. Though some resisted the land sales using the familiar language of 
patrimonialism, many others instead engaged a language of ancestry (but without exclusive 
rights), the right to subsistence and principles of equity (Klopp 2002, 280). In this narrative 
Klopp understands moral ethnicity as a counter-politics or resistance. On this account, moral 
ethnicity ceases to be limited only to within ethnic groups, and norms of democratic 
deliberation and ideas of justice become matters of national public debate, specifically around 
the broad trans-ethnic need to address historical injustices associated with accumulation at the 
centre, and processes of dispossession that have severely disadvantaged the poor. Other   
groups in Kenya, including the Ogiek, have waged similar campaigns (Klopp and Sang 2011). 
Through seeking alliances, support and recognition at the national level, campaigners for this 
kind of justice counter the political tribalism of that realm by injecting into it norms that were 
previously absent. 
Though the idea that moral ethnicity can be up-scaled to counter political tribalism at 
the national level has obvious appeal, despite these occasional examples, questions have been 
raised about the political and logical feasibility of such a notion. Cheeseman (2009, 107) 
rightly identifies that moral ethnicity, as originally theorised by Lonsdale, cannot logically or 
politically apply to an inter-ethnic context without a radical transformation of its nature. As  
he explains: 
Moral ethnicity (in its current manifestation) is part of the reason why Kenyans 
do not unite against their leaders. Moral ethnicity promotes both the significance 
of  kinship,  and  the  notion  that  clients  should  only  expect  favours  from  their 
patrons  and  that  patrons  should  only  be  held  accountable  by  their  clients. 
(Cheeseman 2009, 102, emphasis in original). 
On his reading, moral ethnicity is only possible within an ethnic group. Moral ethnicity is not 
‘shorthand for a political culture which promotes transparency, accountability, inclusivity and 
civic responsibility’ (Cheeseman 2009, 100). Rather, it is these virtues as, and only as, they 
operate within the ethnic group. As Lonsdale describes it, the idea of moral ethnicity is that 
what counts as virtue and what earns esteem is a matter to be decided through the deliberative 
development of norms within the ethnic group. Lonsdale’s observations have been that virtue 
and esteem are determined far more within ethnic groups than at the national level. Further, in 
Kenya, the colonial and post-colonial structure of the state and the economy have been such 
that moral ethnicity has come to define virtue, good leadership and good citizenship in terms 
of ethnic patrimonialism, where to be virtuous is to be wealthy, and where legitimacy is  
earned through patronage (Cheeseman 2009, 101). It is not necessarily the case that this is 
how moral ethnicity will evolve, but in Kenya this is what has happened over the past century. 
As such, in Kenya moral ethnicity and ethnic patrimonialism are intrinsically  
connected. Moral ethnicity in its current form cannot, therefore, tolerate the extension of itself 
across ethnic boundaries. Moral ethnicity, as it has played out in Kenya (which is for 
contingent reasons) is the reason why the national realm is the site of political tribalism: the 
relationship is symbiotic (Cheeseman 2009, 100). This is highly problematic for democracy 
insofar as the only available source of moral critique – the norms established within ethnic 
groups – are corrupted by anti-civic values that dictate that moral esteem and critique are only 
relevant within the ethnic group. Under these circumstances prospects for inter-ethnic civic 
politics seem slim, explaining Cheeseman’s pessimism. 
 
Transforming  Citizenship  Assemblages 
 
Both Klopp’s optimism and Cheeseman’s pessimism about the prospects for an expansion of 
moral ethnicity in Kenya have their place, and their problems. On the one hand, Cheeseman is 
right to identify the impossibility of moral ethnicity in its current form being transposed to the 
national realm. However, his critique is, ultimately, a liberal one that sees little prospect for a 
civic future in the presence of ethnicity. Cheeseman admits that a radical transformation of 
moral ethnicity from its current form might make such a prospect possible, but he says little 
about what such a transformation might look like. The political culture free of patrimonialism 
and political tribalism that Cheeseman aspires to resembles one in which liberal values of 
universal, difference-blind equality predominate. Yet, it is far from clear that such a scenario 
is at all politically feasible in Kenya, given the depth of prevailing patterns of recognition and 
distribution. Furthermore, Cheeseman also remains unclear on alternative sources of 
democratic values such as justice, accountability and deliberation. If they are, as Lonsdale 
argues, primarily located within the ethnic group, more work is required to identify from 
where such values might arise in a more liberal context. It is doubtful that institutional 
structures alone (such as the constitution) will suffice to develop such values in the citizenry. 
Klopp, on the other hand, accurately identifies compelling instances of inter-ethnic 
solidarity, suggesting that there may be some real life possibility of a transposition of moral 
ethnicity to relations between ethnic groups. However, her error is not to identify these 
instances as offering promises to erode political tribalism, but to call these instances moral 
ethnicity. As politically desirable as these activities may be, they cannot properly be   
identified as moral ethnicity because the democratic ideals that motivate these instances are  
not developed exclusively within the ethnic group. Lonsdale’s original account of moral 
ethnicity was a theoretical device to explain his observations in the Kikuyu community that  
the ethnic group is, in practice, the primary locus of democratic education (Berman and 
Lonsdale 1992, chapter 12). The democratic inter-ethnic interactions described by Klopp are 
more properly civic in nature, and so suggest a breakdown of the moral ethnicity/political 
tribalism binary rather than the transposition of moral ethnicity to the national realm. Through 
this slightly different interpretation of the Nandi nationalist movement, we can begin to now 
theorise the possibility of an evolution out of the binary of moral ethnicity and political 
tribalism to something more multifarious. These two competing visions of the possibilities for 
an expansion of moral ethnicity illustrate not so much mutually exclusive accounts of 
democratic potential in Kenya. Rather they each accurately identify and emphasise different 
sides of the contradictions of localised and ethnicised citizenship. 
In order to overcome the tendency to look at ethnicity as either good or bad, and make 
use of the insight that ethnicity has different salience in relation to the different component 
parts of citizenship, what is needed is a tentative move towards addressing the pressing and 
difficult problem of how to overcome the apparent impasse between affirmative responses to 
the place of marginalisation in citizenship (which reinforce political tribalism and run the 
significant risk of fostering chauvinism, xenophobia, inter-ethnic competition and ethnic 
patronage), and transformative responses like those identified by Klopp and suggested by 
Cheeseman (which unrealistically seek to either eradicate or transcend ethnicity).114  As has 
 
been argued elsewhere, ‘If we are to find a way of reconciling ethnicity and democracy, we 
need to find ways of encouraging pluralism without compromising norms of freedom and 
equality’ (Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004, 13). 
A disaggregated approach to citizenship allows both a theorisation and practice of 
citizenship that is amenable to reconfigurations of recognition and distribution regimes, and 
alternative assemblages of citizenship’s component parts that might be more democratic and 
better able to accommodate ethnic pluralism. By understanding that different components of 
citizenship can be assembled in different ways, depending on the social and political context 
of recognition and distribution, an opportunity is found to reconfigure the basis of 
membership and, given its position in many citizenship assemblages as a precondition for 
other components, thereby bring about a greater chance of inching ever closer to equality of 
citizenship. If membership is linked not to hierarchically differentiated identities but 
horizontally differentiated ones, it may be possible to retain ethnic identities and the positive 
intersubjective relations that grow within ethnic groups, while mitigating the anti-democratic 
modes of relating to ethnic Others. 
  
114 On affirmative versus transformative responses to injustice resulting from recognition and distribution regimes, 
see Fraser (1997, 23–7). 
Therefore, what I suggest that Klopp’s position leaves largely unsaid (though it is 
possible within her work), and Cheeseman’s position is pessimistic about, is an account of 
democratic principles of inter-ethnic relations that can deal not only with feelings of solidarity 
but also with feelings of antagonism. This account is not one of a simple up-scaling of the 
norms of moral ethnicity to the national realm (for we have already seen that is rare and 
unlikely on any mass scale given the current nature of moral ethnicity in Kenya). It does two 
things differently. Firstly, it resists the temptation to call civic inter-ethnic norms ‘moral 
ethnicity’. Secondly, it avoids an overly positive account of inter-ethnic possibilities, while 
also resisting an overly pessimistic view of those possibilities. Rather than seek to reinforce   
or transcend ethnicity in politics, this act of political imagining seeks a moderate 
transformation of ethnicity as it relates to the various components of citizenship. As 
Cheeseman argues, ‘moral ethnicity needs to evolve if it is to provide a cultural foundation   
for a democratic Kenya’ (Cheeseman 2009, 100). What follows is an attempt to imagine what 
such an evolution might look like. 
Following Isin (2002) there are two particular modes of inter-ethnic interaction which 
hold promise of a moderate transformation of the place of ethnicity in politics, such that its 
tendency towards anti-democratic inter-ethnic competition and hierarchy is mitigated: 
solidaristic and agonistic. Though both of these modes of intersubjectivity have been most 
robustly theorised in the normative democratic theory of the global North, the ideas and their 
practice are also relevant to different kinds of political communities, like Kenya. Both modes 
of political action are, in the liberal democracies of the global North, at best nascent rather 
than pervasive, and so solidarity and agonism have been theorised as normatively remedial 
measures for the building or reinvigoration of lively democracy (Mouffe 2000, 2005, 2013). 
In particular agonistic democratic theory is situated as a critique of political apathy and a call 
for more rigorous engagement with politics and political life in such a way that injustices and 
inequalities might be contested and transformed. It is in this sense that these two approaches 
offer some critical and theoretical purchase on the nature of Kenyan citizenship and 
democracy, in particular insofar as citizenship in Kenya is constructed, practised and 
experienced in ways that generate significant inequalities and citizenship deficits for ethnic 
strangers. 
 
Inter-Ethnic  Solidarity  
In response to those who say that identity has no place in politics because it leads to the blind 
pursuit of one’s own interests, Iris Marion Young (1990) argues that it is inappropriate to 
pose a dichotomy between egoism and impartiality. We cannot be impartial, she admits, but 
we can develop a ‘moral point of view’ through encounters with others that move the subject 
away from egoism (Young 1990, 106). In our exchanges with individuals or groups who are 
different from us, we can be less defensive, aggressive and exclusive, and more willing to be 
understanding, accommodating, respectful, trusting, accountable or welcoming. This can 
come into being when people are willing to look for and accept commonalities but also when 
commonalities are hard to come by. To engage with others in solidaristic ways is not 
necessarily to assume that there are commonalities that are simply hidden, nor to assume that 
conflicting interests or opinions can necessarily be resolved (more on this point shortly), but 
simply that political engagements can be better than they are commonly are (Yuval-Davis 
1999, 132). As Klopp (2002, 284) describes it, ‘The image here is of a mutually respectful 
and co-existing set of inter-penetrating communities that can negotiate differences in a 
national public arena, rather than resort to mutually destructive violence.’ 
This idea of solidarity is developed in relation to solidarity across ethnic groups in what 
Werbner calls moral inter-ethnicity. Extending Lonsdale’s formulation of moral ethnicity, 
Werbner (2002a, 734) points to cases in Botswana of permeable ethnicities, where ethnic 
groups with long histories of inter-marriage and blending cultures extend the moral aspects of 
their ethnic relations to members of these other ethnic groups. Werbner sometimes explains 
this as confidence in a ‘trans-ethnic public arena’ (Werbner 2002a, 752), drawing on Berman 
(1998), who sees such a scenario as the antithesis of ‘uncivil nationalism’. However, placing 
the emphasis on actual mixing of ethnicities misses the utility of the term Werbner coins. 
Insofar as it emphasises a shared past (even if underneath a more complex recent past and 
relations of inequality), Werbner’s apparent approach to moral inter-ethnicity is, in fact, more 
one of trans-ethnicity. Werbner seems slightly confused as to whether he means to endorse  
the transcendence of ethnicity in public affairs, or the on-going but moderately transformed 
salience of ethnicity in the polity. 
The notion of moral inter-ethnicity retains a greater degree of utility and originality if it 
is used to refer not to tribes who acknowledge a shared and mixed history, or a trans-ethnic 
public arena, but rather an inter-ethnic public arena, where people relate (positively) to others 
not as tribeless individuals, or individuals who ultimately share a common past or a shared 
predicament, but as people with an ethnicity that may or may not have historical and/or social 
overlap with the ethnicities of others, where difference is central to the relation. While trans- 
ethnic solidarity is radically transformative in that it renders ethnicity irrelevant, inter-ethnic 
solidarity retains the salience of ethnicity but entails the extension of intra-communal norms  
of respect, transparency, accountability and so on to relations between, not only within,  
groups. In this sense it is moderately transformative of the nature of the distinction, rather  
than eliminative of the distinction itself. Moral inter-ethnicity is in operation when individuals 
or groups relate to each other in solidaristic, respectful, trustful, accountable ways, as  
members of particular groups. While trans-ethnic solidarity occurs between two Kenyans, 
inter-ethnic solidarity occurs between, for example, a Nubian and a Luo. Recognising 
instances of moral inter-ethnicity requires attention to ‘areas of cooperation, inclusion, 
coalition-building and trust, and not merely competition, exclusion and conflict’ (Werbner 
2002b, 678).115 
 
Werbner raises the possibility that ethnicity and the moral communal norms associated 
with it are not in and of themselves problematic for national allegiance (Werbner 2002a, 741). 
It may not be necessary to deconstruct ethnicity in public affairs but rather to transform the 
nature of its salience. To use Werbner’s (2002b, 677) term, the proposition is to ‘revise the 
  
115 Werbner refers to these two broad directions as ‘transcendence’ and ‘friction’, though as discussed here, I 
prefer to restrict notions of transcendence for discussions of the irrelevance or elimination of ethnicity. 
terms of tribal integration’ and foster practices of moral inter-ethnicity, where tribes respect 
each other and engage with each other in relations of equality and with a public spiritedness. 
Such a prospect would not be the simple transposition of moral ethnicity to the national 
realm: it is something more and different to that. 
The scenario Werbner imagines would take place in a community of concrete   
collective others (Fraser 1986). A Habermasian or Rawlsian view of justice and political 
community emphasises relations between generalised others but Benhabib (1985), Fraser 
(1986) and Young (1990, 106) argue that in fact we cannot, and should not, approach that  
kind of an impartiality in democratic politics. Instead, we must appreciate that in real life, we 
relate to concrete individuals (Benhabib 1985) and groups (Fraser 1986), each of whom bring 
their own views and interests to public debates. In keeping with Young’s (1990, 106) refusal  
of the dichotomy between egoism and impartiality, we do not shed our identity but rather 
retain the point of view that we have, but express it in moral terms and engage in a public- 
spirited way with the moral points of view of others. We do so ‘in the sense of being open to 
listening to the claims of others and not being concerned for their [our] own gain alone’ 
(Young 1989, 257–8). This practice of engaging with others, all sides respecting and trying to 
understand the point of view of the other, serves the purpose of teaching us to appeal to 
standards of justice that are meaningful to others, thereby, at least in theory, preventing the 
corruption of the public by the particular interests of any one group (Pitkin 1981, 347). This 
kind of negotiation over the standards of political argument is similar to what Lonsdale (1994, 
2004) refers to when he speaks of moral ethnicity. Moral inter-ethnicity would have such a 
scenario extended to negotiations between and not only within ethnic groups, and in the 
process moral ethnicity is transformed. In fact, it may also be extended, at least in principle,   
to other groups not defined by ethnicity, for example, groups such as Kenyan Asians who are 
defined by race. 
In a political culture where solidarity between different groups outweighs competition, 
difference between groups takes on a different nature. A public-spirited engagement between 
concrete collective others governed by moral norms of interaction leads to a less conflict- 
prone understanding of difference. As Young (1990, 171) puts it, ‘[d]ifference now comes to 
mean not otherness, exclusive opposition, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity’. In a 
context like this, difference cannot form the basis of hierarchical distinctions. Distinctions 
that erode democracy – such as that between indigenes, autochthons and strangers, which 
marginalise certain individuals and groups – as well as competition between groups are 
mitigated. 
 
Agonistic Inter-Ethnic Politics 
 
Inter-ethnic solidarity depends on a context where the different groups agree on something 
significant and have an alternative principle around which they can coalesce. Yet it is  
apparent that not all inter-ethnic relations occur in such contexts. In fact, some of the most 
difficult tensions between ethnic groups occur in contexts where the absence of anything that 
can be agreed upon is precisely the problem. These are often high stakes contests, such as 
contests over land or positions of political privilege and access to resources (contests where 
the spoils are limited). Solidarity, on the other hand, often takes place in contexts where the 
goals are intangible and therefore unlimited; or in contexts where a group outside of a given 
contest offers solidaristic support to a contesting group. Appealing to solidarity as the basis  
for a more democratic negotiation of differences in contexts of high stakes, fundamental 
disagreements, and poor historical relations that predispose groups to hostility rather than 
sympathy or solidarity, seems futile and naïve. In these circumstances, the limits of toleration 
for difference in a democracy are tested in a more significant way. It is in these circumstances 
that an ethos of agonism rather than solidarity may go some way towards mitigating the anti- 
democratic potential of ethnic difference and inter-ethnic relations. 
Agonism is a democratic political ethos that refutes the notion that consensus is good 
for democracy. Rather, agonists see consensus as the culmination of the domination of the 
will or interests of one group over others. Agonistic politics is based on the assumption that 
there will be winners and losers, logics of alterity, as this is inevitable in politics. What 
differentiates it from an anti-democratic politics of competition, chauvinism and xenophobia 
is that the basis on which political goods (power, resources and so on) are won or lost must 
always be open to contestation, including questioning from and by the excluded, marginalised 
or Other (Glover 2011, 220). In this sense, agonistic politics seeks to avoid the hegemonic   
and incontestable domination of the will or interests of one group over others. In   
communities of significant diversity, consensus is neither possible nor desirable. What is 
required for democracy in these contexts is sufficient space for dissensus, but sufficient limits 
to keep conflict on the side of agonism (disagreement), rather than antagonism or violence 
(Mouffe 2000, 2005, 2013). 
Agonistic politics requires political subjects to have Young’s ‘moral point of view’, 
moving the subject away from egoism and self-interest alone. Like solidaristic politics, it 
requires political actors to resist being (too) aggressive and exclusive. But, unlike solidaristic 
politics, it does not require political actors to be accommodating, trusting and welcoming, it 
only requires them to be respectful (hence the ‘moral point of view’), and to desist from 
malicious acts. Agonistic politics is not anarchic politics, for it is not devoid of rules and 
institutions that limit the intensity of conflict. Rather, it takes seriously the reality of 
unresolvable conflict and seeks to allow for but contain it. 
Agonistic inter-ethnic politics would therefore be different from both moral inter- 
ethnicity, and political tribalism, but have features in common with both. It is like moral inter- 
ethnicity to the extent that it requires a threshold level of interpersonal and inter-group respect 
in interactions, but it is unlike moral inter-ethnicity in that it does not require positive   
affection between groups. Agonistic inter-ethnic politics is like political tribalism in that it 
recognises and allows for the fact that different ethnic groups may have irreconcilably  
different or conflicting interests. But, unlike political tribalism, it is a politics that has some 
rules or principles of conduct, namely the requirement of a threshold degree of respect and to 
desist from violence or other malicious acts (a category in which we might include, for 
example, illegal pillage of the central state’s resources). 
Some Practical Possibilities  
Though the road to a democratic politics characterised by moral inter-ethnicity rather than 
political tribalism is a long one in Kenya, it is one that is already being embarked upon in 
some important ways. There is an affinity between solidaristic and agonistic approaches to 
inter-ethnic relations and those that Nubians and other Kenyans aspire to and sometimes, 
though not always, practice. Whether such relations will remain in the realm of mere 
aspiration, precluded by more pressing material concerns and stronger incentives to sustain 
the status quo, or whether Kenya might be at a historical turning point when it comes to 
evaluating the place of ethnicity in citizenship in politics, remains to be seen. What we can 
say is that, for the Nubians, there are some clear ways in which they would benefit from a 
move in this direction. 
As we have seen, membership in the Kenyan political community requires both formal 
and informal modes of recognition that are closely connected to notions of indigeneity and 
autochthony, and the belief that the nation is constituted by 42 tribes. A democratic 
contestation of the basis of the 42 could potentially shed significant light on the unspoken 
underpinnings of belonging in the Kenyan nation. Other nearby nations (Ethiopia and  
Uganda) have had public discussion about the role of ethnicity and the nature of its formal 
recognition, be it in the form of ethnic federalism or constitutional enlistment of certain ethnic 
groups as indigenous (respectively). These discussions have not always resulted in a more 
inclusive approach to citizenship but they have exposed the basis of membership and thereby 
rendered it more amenable to on-going, if episodic, contestation. The institutionalisation of 
similar debates in the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission offer some possibility of such a contestation in the Kenyan 
context. It seems possible that discussions of this kind could take either a solidaristic and 
relatively open approach to inclusion of outsiders or a more agonistic debate characterised by  
a greater degree of struggle. However the discussion evolves, it offers some promise of a  
slow, iterative transformation of the basis of membership that may have larger consequences 
not only for recognition but also for distribution. 
Far more controversially, land politics in Kibera – and Kenya more generally – may 
benefit from an agonistic approach to conversations about policy, legislation, administration 
and, most fundamentally, distribution of land, particularly to minority groups and in  
contested, ethnically heterogeneous areas. In keeping with a well understood and widely 
shared sense of priorities, land reform was one of the first items of the reform agenda that 
arose from the 2007–2008 post-election violence, with a widely admired National Land  
Policy adopted in 2009, promising provisions in the 2010 constitution and the creation of a 
National Land Commission in 2012 to more fairly administer land. There are signs that the 
wananchi are ready and willing to address this issue, though there is also mounting and 
unsurprising evidence that Kenya’s leaders, with their vested interest in land throughout the 
country, are far less ready. The politics of land in Kibera can be understood as something of a 
microcosm of land debates that are taking place across the nation: claims to land are rooted in 
history and perceptions of grave injustice, deeply implicated in citizens’ sense of political 
belonging and pitched against powerful interests of Kenya’s political and business leaders. If 
land politics continues to be ignored or sidelined, tensions will only grow. Yet, it is unclear 
how a conversation about land can start without fuelling fires of past discontent and division. 
An agonistic approach to addressing these issues, though not without significant challenges, 
offers some suggestion of an ethos of contest within democratic bounds that may be the only 
way out of the conundrums of land disputes. 
 
Conclusion  
Agonistic and solidaristic approaches to alterity and citizenship deficits are a response to the 
call for: 
new approaches to nation-making that recognize and allow for the political 
expression of the social pluralism of African societies [based on the] premise 
that citizenship in ethno-cultural communities retains its far greater relevance to 
the political behaviour of the majority of Africans than the abstractions of 
(universal) national citizenship. What are needed to enhance the accountability 
of political systems are institutions that validate indigenous precepts of political 
community and authority and permit representation of both individual and 
communal interests. (Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004, 12) 
Werbner (2002a, 741) explains the ‘apparent paradox of ethnic self-assertion and claim for 
national belonging’ by arguing that identity is linked to claims for respect and equality of 
difference, but loyalty is transcendent. He gives the example of elite Botswanans equally 
involved in ethnic associations, such as the Bakalanga students’ association, as civic ones, 
such as the Rotary Club (Werbner 2002a, 741). As long as difference does not entail either 
exclusion, or inferiority, then difference is not intrinsically problematic (Young 1990, 156– 
91; Werbner 2002a, 742). 
The current political climate in Kenya, since the departure of Moi from the Presidency, 
and particularly since the post-election reforms underway since early 2008 offers some, albeit 
fragile, potential for ethnicity to serve as a springboard for positive political participation. 
Historically, unlike in Botswana (Werbner 2002b, 675) or Uganda (Mamdani 2001a, 660) 
where there have been public debates about the terms on which tribes are integrated into the 
state, in Kenya, the prevalence of indigeneity and ethnicity as determinants of belonging has 
been a covert, unacknowledged practice, making it all the more difficult to either contest   
one’s designation as native or stranger (and affirm the prevailing way of doing things), or 
challenge the grounds of inclusion at all (and transform the way of doing things). However, 
now for the first time in post-colonial Kenyan history, the political reforms and the new 
constitution have presented the possibility of public debate about the basis of inclusive 
citizenship in Kenya in terms of membership and rights. The new constitution contains a 
number of provisions designed to eradicate tribalism, including provisions relating to freedom 
of discrimination (in the Bill of Rights), protection of language rights (Article 44), a ban on 
hate speech and incitement to violence (Article 49), a requirement that political parties have a 
‘national character’ (Article 91), requirements that the national Executive and the civil service 
reflect the ethnic makeup of the population (Articles 130 and 232), the imposition of 
presidential responsibility to promote respect for ethnic diversity (Article 131), and electoral 
design that requires broad national support to win office and thereby incentivises national 
campaigning (Kramon and Posner 2011, 98). In addition, devolution to Counties is designed 
to mitigate the high stakes competition that has fuelled tribalism in the past (Kramon and 
Posner 2011, 98). It remains to be seen whether the legislation and practice around these 
issues will inspire such public debate, but if it does then it is certainly an opportunity for acts 
of moral inter-ethnicity, as tribes make appeals to each other in a language of justice, rights 
and equality. 
The claims the Nubians generally make, as outlined in preceding chapters, are wrapped 
up in the politics of recognition and as such entail appeals to public respect and dignity, 
translating to rights and demands for ‘actual opportunities for participation in citizenship and 
public life’ on an equal basis with the majority (Werbner 2002b, 679). Though I have 
suggested in previous chapters that elements of the Nubians’ claims are normatively 
problematic insofar as they affirm ethnically exclusive approaches to community and 
especially territory, the final sections of this chapter have also demonstrated that there are 
ways in which to make claims, when they are for inclusion and access to full citizenship, 
which appeal in a less problematic way to norms already in operation in ethnic groups in 
Kenya, and norms which we have reason to value. As Werbner (2004, 191) explains in the 
case of Botswana: 
What they seek as advocates of difference and diversity is not exclusive 
citizenship by right of birth; nor is it purely ethnic nationalism with its lager 
mentality closing in against  the peril of  strangers; rather,  it is  the rebirth and 
healthy growth of a more civic nationalism, albeit mixed with an ethnic element. 
Their demand is for first-class citizenship, in no way ambiguous, partial, or 
conditional, for more inclusive citizenship, providing both  equal  individual 
rights as well as equal group rights. 
This chapter has suggested two particular approaches to addressing alterity that hold potential 
to enhance democracy while accounting for a role for ethnicity. These approaches, suggested 
here as ethos rather than institutional arrangements, will not bring about any kind of  
consensus or complete resolution to the problems ethnicity poses for democracy. Nor will  
they address all the varieties of citizenship deficits that occur in Kenya, including those  
related to class. The ideas posed here are not a solution, but a proposition for democratic 
struggle. 
Conclusion 
   
 
Recall Mahmood from the opening pages of this book. How does my analysis and the 
concluding discussion of democratic possibilities of ethnicity help us understand his political 
condition and that of his family and community? 
After struggling to get an ID card, Mahmood turned his attentions to the Nubian 
struggle for land title and recognition as the 43rd tribe of Kenya. From a liberal democratic 
perspective this is a troubling development. Citizenship should be conferred through 
universal, difference-blind processes that establish the relationship between the state and the 
citizen. Yet, for Mahmood, the recognition of the Nubians as a rightful tribe of Kenya, with 
their own recognised and protected homeland, was a far greater indicator and protector of 
equal and secure citizenship. The prevailing recognition and distribution regime is not one 
that functions on liberal democratic principles of universal equality. Rather, it is one that is 
subsumed by ethnic logics that make appeals to indigenous and autochthonous status logical 
choices for those seeking to emerge from marginalisation. The ‘spaces of recognition’ and 
channels of distribution available to Mahmood are localised, territorialised and ethnicised. 
Mahmood’s calculation, that problems with individual documentation would be more 
permanently remedied by collective ethnic rather than individual liberal recognition, is based 
upon his experiences of state instruments of governance, control and development, as well as 
social and political dynamics. Appeals for generic, ethnicity-less equality or even minority 
rights have their place and have been made through the courts, with the help of CEMIRIDE 
and a few international NGOs. But from Mahmood’s perspective – with his daily encounters 
with his neighbours in Kibera, with census enumerators, with the chief and district 
commissioner’s office – these channels have had little impact on his citizenship. The 
hegemony of indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity as an ordering principle of political life 
permeates almost all of his experiences of the Kenyan community. 
Mahmood’s experience of his ethnic identity is ambivalent from the perspective of 
democratic citizenship. His ethnicity is at once an important source of belonging and the basis 
of claims for political inclusion and the primary factor behind his alterity. Mahmood’s most 
enduring experiences of belonging, respect and reciprocity have been within the Nubian 
community. His democratic education has been one that has focussed on a call for equal 
inclusion on the basis of collective ethnic identity. His understanding of his marginality  
centres around alterity arising from non-indigenous status and a lack of a recognised 
homeland, manifest in but not exclusively caused by discrimination in access to ID cards. The 
development of Mahmood’s political consciousness and subjectivity has been a response to  
the micro and macro experiences of disadvantage resulting from belonging to a small,   
stranger community unable to penetrate the channels of ethnicised, localised recognition and 
distribution that (sometimes) deliver development and political influence to other 
communities. Mahmood’s experience of ethnic politics is thus one that demonstrates the 
democratic potential of ethnicity in intra-ethnic terms and the challenge that ethnicity poses to 
democracy in inter-ethnic terms. A politics devoid of ethnic significance is unimaginable   
from Mahmood’s perspective. In this sense, the role of ethnicity in citizenship as it has been 
discussed in this book illuminates and critiques the role of ethnicity in the generation of 
Mahmood’s citizenship deficits, but in ways that can also account for the benefits Mahmood 
experiences from his ethnic identity. 
The challenge, then, is to imagine a future for Kenyan citizenship in which ethnicity 
plays a role but in which the anti-democratic tendencies of ethnicity can be mitigated. In the 
final chapter I have suggested that solidarity and agonism may be able to serve as an 
alternative ethos to slowly transform political tribalism to moral inter-ethnicity. If such 
approaches could take hold, Mahmood and his family might be able to contest, on more 
democratic grounds, the bases of their alterity. Some solidarity between the Nubians and  
other ethnic groups might contribute to an increasing acceptance of this group as part and 
parcel of Kenya’s ethnic makeup. At the institutional level, civil society groups might 
continue to struggle with and for the Nubians to secure their access to ID cards, and to 
demand an interrogation of the idea of the 42. Public discussions might be had not only about 
inter-ethnic violence between the big tribes, but also about other fundamental questions 
relating to the place of indigeneity in the determination of belonging and membership in the 
Kenyan polity. The land issue will certainly be harder to resolve. As I write these pages the 
Nubians continue to struggle for land title, and with the incumbent alliance of parties, Jubilee, 
having made public promises to deliver a title for a Nubian Village in Kibera, concerns have 
been raised about increasing tensions as other residents worry about their future there (Menya 
2013). Mahmood and his family continue to examine the possibility of moving to their plot on 
the outskirts of Nairobi while still hoping that the Nubian village will materialise. An  
agonistic approach to addressing the fears and hopes of all sides may be the only approach   
that can mitigate the risk of violence while still attending to the disadvantage manifest in the 
Nubians’ landlessness. What form this might take remains unclear. Indeed, of all the areas 
raised in this book that warrant further research, this stands out as the most pressing. There is  
a very urgent need to better understand and democratically manage contests over land and 
injustices in its distribution, particularly when they relate to ethnicity and foster the more 
troubling aspects of ethnic politics. 
The Nubians’ citizenship deficits not only represent an important challenge to Kenyan 
democracy but also reflect a democratic challenge present in all democracies: how to account 
for and remedy citizenship inequalities that result from hegemonic practices of alterity, rather 
than outright exclusion. These forms of citizenship deficits are different in nature from the 
outright exclusions that attend conditions of migration, asylum and refugee status. They speak 
not to questions about the scope and nature of democracy across borders but within borders.  
In a sense, then, the way in which minorities relate to a polity is one of the truest measures of 
the depth and sustainability of that polity’s democracy. Thus, while this book has drawn on 
one case study of one minority community, the democratic deficits identified and explored 
here are of much broader significance for Kenya. 
 
Citizenship  
Understanding the Nubians’ political condition through the lens of citizenship illuminates 
many of the aspects of the Kenyan recognition and distribution regime that construct the 
Nubian community in a relation of alterity with the Kenyan nation. The Nubians’ citizenship 
status has long been a source of international academic and NGO interest from organisations 
concerned with their (formerly) stateless status. Though their stateless condition has now 
been (largely) remedied, important deficits remain in the Nubians’ enjoyment of citizenship 
that can helpfully be understood by applying a conceptualisation of citizenship as 
disaggregated. 
The Nubian experience of citizenship demonstrates the ways in which citizenship is not 
simply a documented, legal status that defines the relationship between the individual and the 
state. It is, rather, an assemblage of various components that can and do connect with or 
disconnect from each other in different ways, and take on different forms. In the Nubians’ 
experience of citizenship, membership takes on a particularly prevalent position in this 
assemblage, but not membership in terms of the formalised, documented relationship with the 
state. Rather, membership in the crucially important form of informal and unclear recognition 
of indigenous and autochthonous status acts as a prerequisite for meaningful and equal 
political belonging. This form of membership impacts upon, and is produced by, both inter- 
subjective, citizen-level interactions, and state–citizen relations. Other components of 
citizenship, namely rights (their possession and enjoyment) and political participation (access 
to opportunities for it, and real capacity to make use of those opportunities) are to a great 
extent dependent upon membership recognised in these informal ways. Legal status, usually 
thought of as the very foundation of citizenship and the precondition for being able to claim 
rights and access opportunities for political participation, is something of a dependent factor, 
but not nearly so much as the liberal democratic view would have it. Legal status is, in itself 
and in practice, dependent upon more informal, unclear but nevertheless importantly 
recognised membership in an indigenous and autochthonous ethnic group. The recognition  
and distribution regime in Kenya is, therefore, from the liberal democratic perspective, turned 
on its head. Territorially and ethnically defined membership precedes collective recognition 
(albeit in ambiguous and unclear ways), which precedes the formal, individual recognition of 
an ID card. 
Understanding citizenship as made up of component parts that can be assembled in 
different configurations, and resisting the temptation to start from a liberal democratic 
standpoint that sees legal status as the foundation of citizenship assemblages, enables a 
theorisation of the Nubians’ experience of Kenyan citizenship and alterity. This approach 
allows us to address the different aspects of citizenship individually or as a whole. We can 
treat each component with the attention it warrants, rather than focussing only or 
predominantly on rights, participation or status alone. The substance of the multiple 
components of citizenship can be understood each in their own right, such that we can come  
to understand what rights matter and how they are claimed, what forms of political 
participation matter and how they can be accessed, and what forms of membership are most 
meaningful. By using broad categories of components rather than pre-empting their   
substance, we can be more attentive to the lived experiences of rights, politics and belonging. 
Furthermore, the ways in which the components depend (or not) on each other can be mapped 
out also with reference to lived experience, rather than preconceived notions of how 
citizenship works and which parts function as precedents for others. 
From this theoretical perspective we can glimpse the ways in which citizenship’s 
components cohere and the ways in which citizenship fragments into sometimes disconnected 
parts, or parts that connect in unanticipated ways, particularly ways that do not reflect liberal 
norms. Crucially, an understanding of citizenship such as this can account for the realities of 
fluctuating and inconsistent experiences of citizenship. More than simply rights being 
disaggregated to be accessed in supra-national institutional and territorial contexts (Benhabib 
2004; Sassen 2006; Soysal 1994), the component parts of citizenship can disaggregate in far 
more fractured ways. The component parts can adhere around hyper-local and not only hyper- 
global forms of membership. They can be assembled in one configuration at the hyper-local 
level – for example where territory and autochthony prevail as determinants of belonging – 
and a different way at the national level where indigenous recognition is foregrounded but  
with autochthonous status in the background. Social, political and physical spaces all  
influence the particular character of citizenship as assembled, experienced, expressed, 
diminished or denied at that moment. The different components of citizenship do not always 
hang together in the way we might imagine they should, such that the norms that pervade a 
particular space render one more important than others, and more connected or disconnected 
from others. A full reassembling does not always follow the disassembling of membership, 
rights and political participation. In this way, nationality status can be important in one arena 
but not in others. The citizenship deficits associated with statelessness are thus not remedied 
by the conferral of nationality status alone. 
While Benhabib (2004) was excited about the cosmopolitan opportunities inherent in 
the disassembling of rights from territory, this study of the Nubians suggests that different 
patterns of unbundling and rebundling of membership, rights and participation are not always 
so democratic. The assemblage of citizenship’s component parts in patterns that depart from 
liberal democratic norms (which privilege individual legal citizenship status as the foundation 
on which other components are assembled) is neither necessarily democratic nor anti- 
democratic. It is feasible to imagine different models of community and democracy that 
combine membership, rights and political participation in alternative ways, perhaps ways that 
encourage a thicker democracy than the liberal tradition pursues, for example. Yet, in the case 
of Kenya, the alternative assemblage of component parts on a foundation of ethnic, rather  
than individual liberal membership has demonstrated predominantly anti-democratic 
tendencies that have constructed ethnic strangers like the Nubians in a relation of alterity. 
 
Recognition and Distribution  
Recognition and distribution are the mechanisms through which membership, rights and 
political participation are assembled together to form citizenship (while misrecognition and 
maldistribution can be responsible for their disassemblage). Processes and acts of recognition 
are, to put it more colloquially, the ‘glue’ that binds membership to rights and political 
participation. 
The processes through which indigenous and autochthonous ethnic identity took on 
hegemonic status as the primary ordering principles of recognition and distribution in Kenya 
have been established and reinforced from above and from below. During the colonial period 
a state apparatus was constructed and enforced throughout the country that established 
governance, development and control as highly localised and personalised affairs. 
Administrative and later electoral units were defined along territorial and ethnic lines, and big 
men were invested with significant powers and access to resources. Ordinary citizens learnt 
that stability, security and prosperity would depend upon a relationship with such men. 
During the postcolonial period, Kenyatta and then Moi presided over and consolidated an 
enormously powerful Executive office, while eroding the middle of political structures (the 
legislature for example) and strengthening very localised structures in the form of the 
provincial administration, which was governed directly from the President’s Office. Local 
administrative and electoral offices thus became sites of neo-patrimonialism. The political 
relationships of importance became, more than ever, ethnic relationships. In different 
institutional formations this pattern has been perpetuated since Moi’s departure from office in 
2002. 
Efforts to sustain this status quo have been engaged in as much by the wananchi as by 
aspiring or incumbent political figures at the local and national levels. While publicly  
decrying political tribalism, ordinary citizens continually reinforce relationships of patronage 
with local ethnic leaders as their primary strategy for accessing development resources and 
exerting political influence. Efforts to instil a greater respect for law, order and 
constitutionalism notwithstanding, ethnic relationships stand out as the most likely avenue for 
exercising citizenship in terms of claiming rights or engaging in political life, be it through 
more passive acts of voting or the more active politics of barazas and rallies. As such, 
Kenyans largely and understandably act out and express their citizenship through localised 
and ethnicised channels. 
In this context, groups that lack an ethnic identity that attracts the recognition and 
distribution afforded by the state and other citizens find themselves on the outer of political 
life and disadvantaged in terms of distribution of resources such as development funds, 
educational bursaries and civil service jobs. Numeric minorities without a recognised territory 
and with an ethnic stranger status are particularly vulnerable to these methods through which 
alterity is established and maintained, and citizenship deficits generated. As in many other 
postcolonial contexts, ethnic strangers have come to occupy the position of immanent 
outsiders against which the mainstream polity constitutes and affirms its own identity (Isin 
2002; Mamdani 2001a). The severity of the citizenship deficits associated with this condition 
fluctuates. At times of heightened politicisation or particular resource scarcity, the boundary 
between indigenous and autochthonous groups, and ethnic outsiders, is made more prevalent. 
At other times it seems as though there might be more progress towards a diminishing of the 
relation of alterity, such as when the Nubians were counted in the census. In yet other 
moments, individual Nubian families who may have had the good fortune of a trip to Saudi 
Arabia, or who inherited a greater number of rental structures in Kibera, may be able to 
mitigate some of the disadvantages of their ethic stranger status by drawing on their financial 
wealth; or those who have been able to benefit from the brief periods in which a Nubian 
patron occupied a Nairobi City Council seat may be able to do similarly. Yet despite a largely 
involuntary initial incorporation into the Kenyan polity, more than a century of cohabitation 
with other Kenyans, and these occasional acts of recognition or distribution, the Nubians are 
yet to fully shed their ethnic stranger identity in the eyes of many other Kenyans. 
The alterity of ethnic strangers illuminates the arbitrary basis of membership and the 
tendency towards competition and chauvinism in ethnicised democracies. This alterity and the 
attendant citizenship deficits therefore also raise important questions about the relationship 
between ethnicity and democracy. Ethnicity has long been a source of concern for democratic 
theorists and has in many ways undermined democratic practices by acting as an arbitrary 
criterion for political membership, fostering sub-national divisions and competition. All of 
these anti-democratic tendencies of ethnicity have played a role in the Nubians’ alterity. 
Ethnicity has been the determining factor in limiting the scope and quality of the Nubians’ 
membership, and the establishment and entrenchment of competitive and anti-civic relations 
between ethnic groups has seen the Nubians marginalised from tangible opportunities for 
political participation and meaningful capacity to claim rights. The context in which the 
Nubians have attempted to assert their membership, exercise their rights and contribute to 
political life beyond their group is a context in which competition and chauvinism between 
bigger, more dominant ethnic groups has severely constrained their capacity to claim and 
enjoy their citizenship in these ways. 
Yet, in the case of Kenya, ethnicity also has something to offer democracy. It is, for 
many, the primary source of democratic education, albeit often in an anti-civic form. It is not 
that Kenyans are incapable of democratic sentiment or behaviour but rather that such 
sentiment and behaviours are very often extended only to members of the same ethnic group, 
and far less often extended between ethnic groups. Democratic sentiments encourage and  
even mandate (albeit limited) distribution from the rich to the poor, for example, and hold 
ethnic leaders accountable for the delivery, or lack of delivery, of development goods from  
the central state. Kenyan democracy is thus strangely anti-civic in nature, posing a significant 
and difficult tension. 
The examination of the way in which prevailing recognition and distribution regimes 
incentivise certain strategies for achieving equality goes some way towards explaining the 
emotional, material and political appeal of approaches to citizenship that can be chauvinist, 
exclusivist, hyper-localised and territorial. Ethnicity has been central to experiences of  
political life, both democratic and anti-democratic. It has therefore been through localised, 
territorialised ethnic identities and claims that Nubians have sought to emerge from their 
marginalised status. Ethnic identity has simultaneously operated as the cause of the alterity 
that the ethnic group seeks to remedy – a resource for mobilisation and claims to inclusion  
and the most obvious framework through which citizenship can be obtained, expressed and 
enjoyed. The strategic utility of an ethnicised approach to emerging from marginalisation is in 
tension with its apparent capacity to reinforce the anti-democratic tendencies of ethnicity  
when it conditions citizenship and political life. 
The bottom–up methodological approach adopted in this study has led to an emphasis 
on indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity as the most influential feature of the Kenyan 
recognition and distribution regime. However, as stated at the outset, the intention of this 
focus is not to suggest that this is the only important feature, or even the most important 
feature for some people, in determining quality of citizenship. The Nubians certainly feel that 
they are the most marginalised of the marginalised but there are many Kenyan groups who 
would have a similar perception of their place in the country. Rather than establish a  
hierarchy of disadvantage, the disaggregated citizenship approach enables a more nuanced 
and niche analysis of particular experiences of citizenship deficits in their context. An almost 
quantitative comparison of who is ‘more marginalised’ is less helpful than a qualitative 
method for understanding the nature and basis of different experiences of marginalisation. 
For the Nubians, their ethnic stranger status features as the predominant determinant of 
the quality of their citizenship. Yet, the citizenship deficits experienced by most Nubians are 
also generated by other characteristics of their place in Kenya, particularly class and being a 
numeric minority. These features of the Nubian community – that it is extremely small and 
that the vast majority of Nubians are poor (though some are not, and many are not as poor as 
some other Kenyans) – also contribute to the disadvantages members of this community face 
in claiming rights and accessing opportunities for political participation. The Nubians share 
these sources of disadvantage with many other Kenyans, particularly the poor who are present 
in all ethnic groups in the country. As such, the Nubians do not have a monopoly on 
citizenship deficits, and nor can the privileging of indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity in 
Kenya’s recognition and distribution regimes explain all kinds of citizenship deficit. In this 
study, the central place of indigenous and autochthonous ethnicity in Kenyan politics   
emerged as the most significant explanatory factor for the Nubians’ marginalisation, yet in 
other studies different aspects of political and social life may emerge as holding more 
explanatory power for different circumstances. An approach to understanding citizenship that 
is flexible and dynamic, and which draws on real life experiences of citizenship and its 
deficits, can and should accommodate difference of this kind. 
Democratic  Possibilities  
One response to the problems raised by an ethnicised polity is to prescribe a more liberal 
approach to citizenship. On this account, citizenship should be a matter of formalised, legal 
status that establishes a relationship between the individual and the state and that, in doing so, 
confers an anonymous equality upon all citizens. The pro-democracy movement in Kenya has 
focussed on establishing a more liberal model of democracy in Kenya by channelling its 
efforts primarily to reform of the Constitution. Yet, the constitution has always had a liberal 
approach to citizenship, granting it on the basis of parentage and birth not ethnicity. The 
problem has not been one only of the letter of the law, but of its implementation, where ethnic 
logics have subsumed liberal ones. Efforts to address alterity and citizenship deficits for 
Kenyan citizens – efforts that rest on hopes for a liberal political culture that emphasises 
individuality over community – have a significant challenge on their hands. The possibility, 
and perhaps even the desirability of a radical liberalisation of political culture, and   
recognition and distribution regimes in Kenya, seems slim. 
A democratic project that may feasibly begin on the path to remedying citizenship 
deficits and alterity of ethnic strangers like the Nubians will need to take more seriously the 
extent to which citizenship is connected to ethnicity. The difference-blind approach of 
universal equality that is so central to the liberal tradition may shed theoretical light on 
democratic deficits but in practice it is entirely unclear that it will be able to subsume the 
ethnic logics that dominate the democratic norms that do exist and are fostered in Kenya. 
Here, the ideal of moral inter-ethnicity, conceived not as the transcendence or elimination of 
ethnicity but as more democratic relations between ethnic groups, may have something to 
offer. On this account, the objective is to render relations between ethnic groups more 
horizontal and less hierarchical, more co-operative and less competitive, more agonistic and 
less antagonistic. The transformation is thus significant but not so radical as to constitute a 
fundamental reconfiguration of the political community. As Smith (2013, l99) argues in 
relation to Ethiopia, on this view ‘[e]thnicity can be democracy enhancing’. 
Moral inter-ethnicity is not an approach that can bring about a perfect democracy or 
fully alleviate the citizenship deficits facing all Kenyan citizens, or even Kenya’s ethnic 
strangers. This is not least because it is contingent upon a range of politico-economic and 
institutional conditions that would foster moral inter-ethnicity over political tribalism, or at 
least create the preconditions for it. Among the wide range of conditions that could contribute 
to the development of moral inter-ethnicity, improved economic conditions that alleviate 
scarcity of resources, inspired leadership and conducive institutional arrangements stand out  
as particularly important. The attainment of these conditions is in itself a significant political 
challenge but there has been evidence of some progress on all these fronts. The economy is 
stable and growing, albeit not as much as hoped. Though the current President and Vice- 
President of Kenya have records of political tribalism that are so questionable they are on trial 
at the ICC, there are other sources of optimism in terms of political leadership, particularly in 
civil society where leaders and institutions of the pro-democracy movement of the 1990s and 
2000s are gaining in influence. The constitutional reforms of 2010 and establishment of  
bodies such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission all provide sites on which moral inter-ethnicity could be built. 
In this sense, moral inter-ethnicity is not a prescription for an end-point of democratic 
achievement. But nor is it a prescription for a lesser quality of democracy fit for a polity less 
capable of democracy. The incomplete nature of this approach to addressing democratic 
deficits is not a deferral to colonial notions of Africans as politically or morally 
underdeveloped and thus in need of models of political life that are more suited to some 
imaginary earlier stage on a trajectory towards western-style liberal democracy. On the 
contrary: the notion of moral inter-ethnicity is precisely an effort to think outside of the 
western model of liberal democracy. It is not a proposal for an inferior kind of democracy, 
just a different kind. It is an effort to interpret the ethos of democracy – what it is and what it 
could be – in the Kenyan context. Practices and thought that moves towards democracy can 
only be iterative and partial, never complete and final, and should not uniquely apply to 
Kenya or Africa but are rather relevant to all democracies. Democracy is a process that 
requires constant tillage and attention, wherever in the world it is being pursued. 
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